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Abstract 
 
Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) have occupied a prominent role in the 
development of rural Zimbabwe since the time of its independence in 1980. NGO work 
in Zimbabwe currently takes place within the context of a tense and fluid political climate, 
an economy struggling to recover from crisis, international skepticism toward long-term 
donor investment in development, and global expectations about the methodologies and 
accountability measures carried out in intervention-based development work.  
In the light of the participatory methodologies and empowerment-based 
development frameworks that dominate the current global expectations for work within 
the NGO sector, this thesis focuses on the work of one particular NGO working in 
Zimbabwe, namely, World Vision. The main objective of the thesis is to understand and 
explain the participatory methods, accountability and effectiveness of World Vision in 
Zimbabwe (with particular reference to Umzingwane District) and, in doing so, to deepen 
the theoretical understanding of NGOs as constituting a particular organizational form. 
World Vision is a large-scale international NGO that has a pronounced presence in 
Zimbabwe and it is specifically active in Umzingwane District in Matabeleland South 
Province. 
The thesis argues that NGOs exist within a complex and tense condition entailing 
continuous responses to pressures from donors and states that structure their survival. 
Ultimately, in maneuvering through such pressures, NGOs tend to choose directions 
which best enable their own sustainability, often at the cost of the deep participatory 
forms that may heighten the legitimacy of their roles. World Vision Zimbabwe responds 
to donor trends, national and local expectations of the state and its own organizational 
expectations by building local government capacity in order to maintain the longevity and 
measureable outputs of its projects. In doing so, it redefines the concept of participation 
in pursuing efficient and practical approaches to ‘getting things done’. This compromises 
deep participatory methodologies and, in essence, alters the practices involved in 
participatory forms in order to maintain World Vision’s own organizational sustainability 
and presence in Zimbabwe. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Since independence in 1980, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have played a 
significant role in planning and implementing development projects in rural Zimbabwe. 
In the scholarly literature, the methodologies deployed by and the effectiveness of these 
NGOs in Zimbabwe has been subjected to only limited scrutiny. The thesis contributes to 
the existing literature by critically discussing the purposes, challenges and successes of 
development projects carried out by World Vision, a large-scale international NGO, in 
Umzingwane District in Zimbabwe, with a particular focus on participatory methods, 
accountability and effectiveness. The following sections of this introductory chapter 
provide an explanation of the context, objectives, research methods and limitations of this 
thesis. It ends by providing an outline for what is discussed throughout the chapters that 
follow. 
 
1.2 Context of the Thesis 
Internationally, NGO development work is carried out through individual projects and 
focuses on concepts of participation and capacity-building for the purpose of achieving 
empowerment and livelihood sustainability, generally for the poor and most vulnerable 
people. NGO visions widely accept that participatory methods in development projects – 
involving the assertion of community rights about decision-making – are necessary for 
achieving empowerment and, therefore, sustainability. ‘Participation’ however is open to 
conceptual slippage and is defined differently in different contexts, often either implying 
an empowerment-based (bottom-up) concept of participation, that is entirely beneficiary-
driven and beneficiary-owned, or an involvement-based (top-down) concept, which 
involves a more consultative approach. The effectiveness of NGOs entails sustainable 
development for communities, but NGOs themselves often conflate this with their own 
organizational sustainability.  
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In the end, the question of participatory forms relates to the critical issue of NGO 
accountability which must be balanced between three major stakeholders: donors who 
fund NGO efforts, the states in which NGOs work and the beneficiaries who they are 
attempting to help. While the intention of NGOs is to prioritize accountability to the 
beneficiaries of their work, that accountability is often compromised due to efforts to 
meet the requirements of the other two stakeholder groups (donors and states).  
Ultimately, however, whilst seeking to respond to the often contradictory requirements of 
these stakeholders, NGOs maneuver their way through in such a way that they are 
accountable to themselves, in order to secure their own organizational sustainability. 
The history of NGOs in Zimbabwe highlights many of these general points about 
NGOs internationally. Two main types of NGOs exist in Zimbabwe: rights-based 
advocacy NGOs which usually work within urban centers and development NGOs which 
work primarily in rural areas toward improving livelihoods, often with an agricultural 
emphasis. NGOs also conduct emergency relief and disaster response in times where 
people suffer from extreme conditions, and these actions are usually carried out by 
development NGOs.  Development NGOs are the focus of the thesis.  
Prior to Zimbabwean independence, development initiatives were carried out by 
external aid organizations, primarily mission churches, as well as a few NGOs. NGOs, 
however, received a significant boost in the 1980s with a specific focus on the Communal 
Areas (CAs) outside the white commercial farming areas (Moyo et al. 2000). Since their 
inception as Native Reserves under colonial rule up until the present, CAs have been 
treated as both a political and physical resource by the state (both the pre-independence 
colonial state and the post-independence Zimbabwean state), being subjected to various 
state laws and programs that have continually restructured their governance systems as 
well as being used as a pool for political support, a labor reserve, and even at times a 
dumping ground for unwanted urban dwellers. Factors traditionally affecting the 
livelihoods of people living in communal areas, which continue in many forms today, 
include access to land, quality of land and soil, access to water and irrigation systems, 
and limited infrastructure including access to education and health care (Ncube 2011, 
Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2008, Mbiba 2001, FAO 1997, Mashava and Dzingirai 2010, 
Maroyi 2009, Makura-Paradza 2010, Vivian 1994).  
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Though Zimbabwe has experienced radical land redistribution from the year 2000 
under Fast Track, decongestion in communal areas as a result of land reform has been 
minimal. Operation Murambatsvina in 2005 (Potts 2006), involving state destruction of 
informal housing and businesses in urban areas, and the movement of former workers 
from previously white-owned commercial farms (Ncube 2011), has undercut prospects 
for decongestion.  Because of such conditions, and with goals of poverty alleviation and 
environmental sustainability, NGOs have for many years carried out development 
projects in rural, communal areas throughout Zimbabwe. Donors, who in large part refuse 
to fund projects in the new resettlement areas because of claims about the illegitimacy of 
Fast Track, continue to fund NGO work in CAs.  
Particularly since the mid-1990s, there has been a tense political atmosphere in 
Zimbabwe which has directly affected NGO funding (notably for advocacy NGOs but 
also for development NGOs) because of the ruling party’s suspicion of foreign-funded 
NGOs. Even development NGOs, before the formation of the Government of National 
Unity in 2008, were regularly accused by the ruling party of using food aid to support the 
main opposition party; this led to toughened legal restrictions and registration processes 
for all NGO activity. Particularly controversial in this regard was the repressive NGO Bill 
of 2004 which, for reasons which remain unclear, was never signed by the state president 
(Zimbabwe Institute 2008, NGO Consultancy Africa n.d., CIVICUS 2004, Tsunga and 
Mugabe 2004). The positioning of the ruling party vis-à-vis NGOs since the year 2000, 
while focused on the urban civic movement, has less directly (but still significantly) 
affected the work of development NGOs by influencing the funding decisions made by 
international donors and by creating excessive administrative requirements for NGOs 
which can be expensive and resource-consuming.  Donors, having severely diminished 
their overall support for NGOs after the controversial land reform and changed focus 
toward emergency food relief during the economic crisis following the early 2000s, are 
only now beginning to open up again to more long-term, development-based NGO work.  
Umzingwane District located in Matabeleland South (which provides the case 
study for the thesis), consists of twenty wards, of which thirteen are communal.  Among 
other factors, livelihoods in Umzingwane have been affected significantly by severe 
problems with access to water, as it is located in agro-ecological zone IV, which is 
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characterized by low annual rainfall, seasonal drought, and dry spells during the rainy 
season (FAO 1997). As a result, people have diversified their livelihoods, sometimes 
even turning to illegal, dangerous and unsustainable practices for sources of income and 
survival (including gold panning, illegal beer brewing, and prostitution).  NGOs working 
in Umzingwane have – amongst other things – sought to develop irrigation schemes, 
sanitation systems, and agricultural production (FAO 1997, Mashava and Dzingirai 2010, 
UNICEF Zimbabwe 2009).   
World Vision, the NGO whose projects are examined in this study, has worked in 
Zimbabwe since 1973 focusing primarily on development work, with additional efforts 
toward food aid and security.  It is present in all districts of Zimbabwe and conducts two 
types of development programs/projects: long-term, child-sponsorship funded programs 
called Area Development Programs (ADPs) and shorter-term, individual donor-funded 
projects, which are the focus of this study. All of its work in Umzingwane district 
involves the shorter-term, donor-funded projects.  Because of its close relationship with 
the state, its large size, and its global efforts toward achieving organizational learning and 
accountability, its presence in Zimbabwe provides an excellent opportunity to examine 
and understand the priorities and accountability measures of NGOs, with particular 
respect to issues of legitimacy and effectiveness. 
The existing academic work on NGOs in Zimbabwe is not extensive. The most 
comprehensive overview of NGO activity in the country dates back to the year 2000 and 
focuses on the early 1990s (Moyo 2000 et al.). More recent studies focus primarily on 
specific advocacy NGOs (Ncube 2010, Magure 2009, Rich-Dorman 2001, McCandless 
2011). Bornstein’s work (2005) on Christian Care and World Vision is the main 
exception to this. This thesis therefore seeks to fill a significant empirical gap in the 
prevailing literature.  But it does so by also making a theoretical contribution to our 
understanding of NGOs (as a particular organizational or social form) with reference to 
participatory methods, accountability, legitimacy and effectiveness. In this regard, it 
draws on the works of Mosse (2004, 2005), Lewis and Moss (2006) and Helliker (2006, 
2007, 2008), and their examination of processes and structures internal to NGOs which 
go beyond treating NGOs as ‘black boxes’. NGOs exist and work within a tension-
riddled and contradictory social field (including global, national and local pressures) and 
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they maneuver their way through this field regularly by way of ambivalent responses. 
They often also do so in a manner that compromises participation, downward 
accountability and effectiveness. Hence, ‘caught in the middle’ of varying and often 
contradictory interests, development NGOs face serious criticisms about their 
organizational openness, legitimacy and effectiveness.   
1.3 Objectives of the Thesis 
The main objective of the thesis is to understand and explain the participatory methods, 
accountability and effectiveness of World Vision in Zimbabwe (using Umzingwane 
District as a case study) and, in doing so, to deepen our theoretical understanding of 
NGOs as a particular organizational form. The time period covered is the Fast Track and 
post-Fast Track periods (from 2000 to current). In order to achieve this main objective, 
specific secondary objectives are pursued. These include: 
a) To identify the methods, procedures, systems and processes of action practiced by 
World Vision in Zimbabwe. This entails an in-depth ‘internal’ understanding of 
World Vision as a global organization, its policies and philosophies, and an 
examination of World Vision’s projects in Umzingwane District in Zimbabwe.  
b) To locate the work of World Vision in the context of the local political economy in 
the district and its communal areas and more nation-wide economic, social and 
political processes in contemporary Zimbabwe. 
c)  To examine the work of World Vision in relation to changing donor policies and 
procedures vis-à-vis the Zimbabwean state, both at the national and project level.  
 
1.4 Research Methods  
The research undertaken for this thesis is qualitative, relying on primary sources of data. 
It involved gathering information from three groups of stakeholders, including World 
Vision, local government, and project beneficiaries.  
Qualitative research, which does not require the informants to leave their daily 
routines for the purpose of measuring predetermined variables but instead involves 
entering into the informant’s regular setting in order to attain complicated, multi-faceted 
and contextual information, is a particularly beneficial approach in pursuing the key 
research objective of the thesis (Baily 2007). In this regard, the main objective of this 
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thesis is considered in terms of participatory methodologies, which are themselves rooted 
in the deeply qualitative and immeasurable concepts of empowerment and self-reliance. 
As such, qualitative research is a necessary and appropriate approach in attempting to 
understand the extent and appropriateness of NGOs’ (and World Vision’s specifically) 
abilities to carry out their work and achieve their largely un-measurable – as understood 
in a strict quantitative sense – objectives.  
 All the research for the thesis was carried out in accordance with general ethical 
standards concerning informed consent, deception and confidentiality (Baily 2007, 
Neuman 2000, Burgess 1984). This means that all research informants were made aware 
of the purpose and goals of the research and there was no aspect of deception involved. 
All confidentiality preferences of informants also have been honored.  
Methods of gathering data are outlined below – 
a) Interviews with World Vision staff at varying levels, including the national Grants 
and Human Affairs Director, the regional (Matabeleland) Food Security and 
Livelihoods Program Manager, the Umzingwane District Coordinator, the 
Umzingwane Field Officer, and a former World Vision employee (who is 
currently employed with a different NGO called TearFund): 
These interviews were semi-structured, allowing the researcher to guide the discussion 
through prepared questions, while leaving space for open discussion in responding to 
unexpected conversational direction. This method was very helpful in gaining a holistic 
understanding of the informants’ perspectives, including their professional and personal 
stances and understandings as well as shining some light on their everyday experiences 
both in the field and in the office. Initial interviews were conducted both in person and 
over the phone. Follow-up interviews were conducted after project site visits had 
occurred, which involved a video conversation and a written, email dialogue. In addition 
to interviews with World Vision staff, I interviewed staff from other NGOs working 
within the area, such as Operation Trumpet Call and (as indicated above) TearFund. 
b) Interviews with local government officials who have been involved in World 
Vision projects, including the head of Umzingwane district’s Department of 
Agricultural, Technical, and Extension Services (Agritex), a district-level Agritex 
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field officer (who also accompanied me throughout project site visits and 
beneficiary interviews) and three ward-level Agritex field officers: 
These interviews were both helpful in gaining an understanding of Agritex’s (and 
therefore the state’s) involvement in World Vision projects in Umzingwane, and 
necessary in gaining access to project sites. These interviews were unstructured, and 
those occurring with the field officers took place during, in-between and throughout 
project site visits, allowing me to gain insightful perspectives and understandings of the 
projects, both professional and personal. These discussion-based interviews also allowed 
the direction of the discussion to react to new information and follow up on unexpected 
comments or pieces of information provided by the Agritex officers at any given time. 
c) Interviews with World Vision project beneficiaries located in Communal Areas in 
Umzingwane District: 
Interviews with seven beneficiary farmers took place at seven of the eight sites which 
were visited. No one was interviewed at the eighth site (an irrigation scheme 
rehabilitation site) because the site visit was late in the day after the farmers had gone 
home. The sample sites were non-randomly selected by the Agritex district-level field 
officer who was tasked with accompanying me on the site visits. He suggested that his 
selections were based on providing me with an opportunity to view each type of project 
that World Vision was conducting in the district. The limitations and potential biases of 
this sampling are discussed below.  
These interviews were semi-structured, again allowing the discussion to respond 
according to answers given, while still maintaining direction by returning to my pre-
determined guiding questions. They were conducted partly in English and partly in 
Ndebele, with translation occurring through both Agritex officers and a translator (who is 
a teacher at a local private secondary school and is a dual first language speaker in 
Ndebele and English). These interviews allowed me to gain insight into the beneficiaries’ 
personal involvement in the project, their satisfaction with project processes and 
outcomes, the successes and failures regarding their ability to sustain their project and the 
impact it has on their livelihoods, and their overall opinion about the effectiveness and 
usefulness of the project.   
d) Site visits of World Vision projects in Umzingwane district’s communal areas: 
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This entailed physically visiting current and previous project sites to observe what is still 
operational and how people are using project resources, and thereby gathering details and 
information on those projects.  Seven sites located in communal areas were visited, which 
covered a range of overlapping projects, including conservation agriculture, guinea fowl 
production, rabbit production, goat production, chicken layers and egg production, and 
two irrigation scheme rehabilitation sites. Due to World Vision’s key organizational 
value of holistic development (it is the conceptual framework in which they form and 
understand ‘development’), covering a wide variety of project types – with overlap 
between beneficiaries – was very helpful in placing World Vision projects on the ground 
in Umzingwane within the overall context of the global World Vision organization and 
its values and objectives. 
e) Collection of primary documentation from World Vision: 
In order to understand and contextualize World Vision’s work in Umzingwane within the 
organization’s objectives, philosophies, ideologies, values, professed methodologies, and 
policies, it was necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of the organization’s primary 
documentation, both at the global and national levels. This documentation included 
World Vision’s global accountability reports, official policies, a multitude of literature 
produced as practical guidelines for World Vision (WV) employees, and a national-level 
report from World Vision Zimbabwe. 
f) Dispersal and collection of an information table: 
A structured table asking for the following information was dispersed to ward-level 
Agritex staff to fill in about all World Vision projects being conducted in their ward: 
- Project start and end dates 
- Number of beneficiaries 
- Description of World Vision physical inputs 
- Number of beneficiaries currently sustaining their projects 
- Number of beneficiaries who struggle or have failed to sustain their project and 
reasons why  
- Current monitoring status (was WV or Agritex conducting monitoring and 
support) 
- Future intentions from WV (will they provide further inputs or support) 
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g) Additional unexpected site visit located in an ‘old resettled area,’ which was 
resettled in the 1990s under the willing-buyer, willing-seller agreement: 
Although this unexpected site visit was not located in a communal area, the Agritex 
officer wished to show it to me, as it had been included in the WV conservation 
agriculture project, which was conducted all throughout the district. It is included in the 
later research-based discussion, as the project was treated (by WV and Agritex) in the 
same way as those projects conducted in CAs, and observations from this site provided 
some interesting insights regarding the local political economy in the district. 
 Data analysis methods included memoing, descriptive accounts, theme analysis 
and critical event analysis as described in the qualitative field research guide by Baily 
(2007). Memoing involved the process of making notes based on my reflections 
throughout the data collection processes, and then revisiting those notes for further 
reflection and adaptation. Such memoing aided in theme analysis, allowing me to draw 
themes from recurring patterns and concepts throughout the qualitative data. Additionally, 
creating descriptive accounts of experiences during data collection enabled me to identify 
relevant critical events for further description and analysis. These techniques allowed 
thoughtful and careful analysis of the qualitative insights gained throughout the research.  
  
1.5 Limitations of the Study 
The methods carried out in this study have involved significant limitations, which may 
involve implications for the research.  First, while the semi- to unstructured interviews 
allowed the collection of vast amounts of personal insights from various stakeholders 
involved in the projects, it also created a lack of consistency in the information gathered, 
as particular aspects were prioritized differently by different informants, depending on 
their role and situation. At the same time, though, this differing prioritization does 
indicate how the different stakeholders give meaning to the WV projects. But this lack of 
consistency, coupled with the absence of both quantitative and secondary data, does not 
allow for a comparison against baseline data, nor does it allow for the verification of 
reliability that could potentially be provided by juxtaposing primary data with secondary 
data. 
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 Second was the necessity of being accompanied by Agritex officers during the 
site visits. This did provide an excellent opportunity to gain insight from them regarding 
their involvement in the projects and their general perspective (which was especially 
useful as it was found that they carry out much of WV’s work themselves, involving 
conducting monitoring, evaluation and support both with and in place of WV). It also, 
though, created great potential for a biased perspective. This bias could occur in three 
ways. The first is that the Agritex officers were in control of selecting the sites to be 
observed. While one out of the eight sites visited did involve an unsuccessful project, the 
majority were sustained very successfully, implying that Agritex wished to evidence their 
good work. The second potential bias could arise from their very presence influencing the 
discussion and answers to questions given by the beneficiaries. The third potential bias 
that became evident throughout the research involved my very presence in visiting the 
project sites. It became clear that any presence of an outsider accompanied by an Agritex 
officer was automatically assumed to be either a donor or an NGO staff member. While 
the Agritex officers continually explained to the beneficiaries that the reasons for our 
presence was for information gathering and research purposes, that explanation does not 
guarantee that answers and discussion were not influenced by such an assumption. 
 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
This thesis has six ensuing chapters, which I now outline.   
Chapter two includes a literature review which discusses the general role of 
NGOs in development and their ideologies and methodologies with regard to current 
development discourse, particularly the emphasis on the concept of participation.  It then 
discusses the key issue of accountability to the three major stakeholders affecting NGO 
work: donors, states, and beneficiaries.  Finally, the chapter culminates in a discussion of 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of NGOs and their role in development by 
conceptualizing them in the ambiguous state between the conflicting values and pressures 
of the three stakeholder groups and considering the compromises they make in order to 
navigate and maneuver through the inconsistencies of that relational context. 
Chapter three provides an understanding of the social, political, and economic 
context of Zimbabwe as a whole and its communal areas, and the current and historical 
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roles that NGOs play in the country’s development. It particularly considers the 
controversial and at times volatile political climate and its impact on NGO work in 
relation to the developmental needs of the rural poor, particularly those living in 
communal areas, and the impact on donor funding streams and trends.  The chapter ends 
by providing a perspective on the role of NGOs in Zimbabwe within the broader context 
of their legitimacy and effectiveness, relating back to accountability to donors, states, 
beneficiaries, and ultimately, themselves. 
Chapter four provides an in-depth study of World Vision, both at the global level 
and at the national level. There is significant emphasis in this chapter placed on World 
Vision global partnership’s official policies and values, their internal contradictions, and 
the implications these have on the organization’s approach to development, 
accountability and organizational learning. This chapter includes information collected 
through World Vision’s primary documentation and through interviews with high-
ranking World Vision staff, as well as with a former staff member. 
Chapter five provides a discussion of the research findings from examining World 
Vision’s projects in Umzingwane district.  I compare the approach and methods of its 
work at project level against its global policies, values and general organizational context. 
This chapter carefully considers World Vision’s practice on-the-ground. Emphasis is 
placed on WV’s close relationship with local government and the ways in which that 
relationship enables WV to adhere to its own organizational values, stretch donor funding 
and build local government capacity in working toward organizational stability and 
sustainability. 
Chapter six provides a synthetic overview of the thesis. It summarizes the 
research findings from Umzingwane district, and discusses what can be drawn from these 
findings in a theoretical way about the accountability, legitimacy, and overall 
effectiveness of the role of NGOs in Zimbabwe and globally. 
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Chapter 2: Participation and Accountability – The Role of NGOs in 
Development 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Non-governmental Organizations, or NGOs, function as deliverers of development 
throughout the developing world.  Their purpose is to promote sustainable livelihoods for 
poor, oppressed or vulnerable people by means of catalyzing empowerment and self-
reliance through carrying out participatory development projects.  In attempts to achieve 
these objectives, NGOs fund and implement development projects while responding to 
the needs and requirements from their donors, the states in which they work, and their 
beneficiaries. This chapter considers the legitimacy and effectiveness of their role in 
development in the context of their accountability to the stakeholders to which they 
respond and the decisions they make to ensure their own organizational sustainability. 
 
2.2 Development and NGOs 
In the field of development, NGOs possess a leading role in both delivering and 
facilitating development initiatives, particularly in the developing world.  NGOs emerged 
as the leading development aid channel in the 1980s, what is known by some as the 
“NGO decade” (Bratton 1987, Mitlin et al. 2007). They are separate from state systems 
and market systems and have grown in prominence as the supposed answer to (or 
substitute for) incompetent states and weak markets that have failed to deliver basic 
social services and infrastructure including access to health care, sanitation, education, 
and basic security and safety (Makoba 2002). The continual rising of their importance 
and prevalence in the development sector has subsequently led to much debate about the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of their role. 
 In order to understand this role, it is necessary to first understand the term 
‘development’ and the ways in which NGOs are engaged in it. Development can be 
understood in two ways: as an immanent and unintentional process of structural, political 
and economic change, or as intentional intervention with the goal of creating change 
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(Bebbington 2004).  Mitlin et al. (2007:1701) discuss this distinction in terms of ‘little d’ 
development and ‘big D’ Development, wherein ‘little d’ development refers to the 
immanent, unintentional and uneven processes of capitalist development on a global scale, 
and ‘big D’ development refers to targeted intervention projects in the developing world 
(sometimes referred to the development industry or the international development 
system).  They go on to explain that NGOs are directly involved in ‘big D’ development 
but, in doing so, their activities form part of the broader processes of capitalist 
development (or ‘little d’ development). This means that NGO interventions (big D 
development) are a component of – or are integrated into – wider capitalist development 
processes. This thesis considers the ‘big D’ development interventions of NGOs and the 
legitimacy of NGOs in terms of both the effectiveness of their interventions, and their 
prominence in the ‘big D’ development sector. For the remainder of this chapter, the term 
‘development’ will refer to ‘big D’ development, unless otherwise specified.  
The legitimacy and appropriateness of the prominence of NGOs in development 
and social services delivery is a complex question. On the one hand, they are seen as 
alternatives to corrupt or incompetent governments (or even failed or fragile states) in 
delivering development, relief assistance and alleviating poverty. This is because of their 
supposed flexibility and freedom with regards to political pressure and influence, their 
open-mindedness, their efficiency with mobilizing resources, and their reputation for 
facilitating participatory, bottom-up approaches that reach the most vulnerable and the 
poorest people. They are idealized as analysts 
See NGOs as everything that governments are not: unburdened with large 
bureaucracies, relatively flexible and open to innovation, more effective and faster 
at implementing development efforts, and able to identify and respond to grassroots 
needs (Fisher 1997: 444).   
They are therefore seen as able to reach poor people and to bring to the fore (or innovate) 
new methods for helping people in ways that governments have difficulty (Clark 1997). 
They are as well generally considered as ‘doing good,’ as they are non-profit 
organizations whose work is charitable in nature. They have been embraced by donor 
agencies as the preferred method for delivering aid assistance and NGO involvement is 
often a requirement for international funding for development initiatives.   
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On the other hand, their effectiveness in facilitating long-term sustainable 
development programs, as well as the legitimacy of their role in development, has been 
called into question. NGOs have been criticized for furthering globalization (or ‘little d’ 
development) by using targeted development aid to transfer external, Western, donor-
driven values of democracy (Brett 2003) and providing effective instruments for 
advancing external agendas that manipulate beneficiaries (Mosse 2004). The validity of 
their existence has been subjected to scrutiny with questions about what right they have 
as external agents to implement development initiatives and with criticisms about the 
assumption that communities are not already engaged in their own self-development (in 
other words, the assumption that local methods and values toward development require 
modification from external sources). That being said, the most common criticisms of 
NGOs question their legitimacy as development aid implementers, the effectiveness of 
their methods, and their accountability. 
 NGOs vary in size and function. They can be broadly broken up into three 
overlapping categories: community-based NGOs, national NGOs, and large, international 
NGOs (Bratton 1987). Community-based NGOs are small, local, and generally have 
limited resources and professional staff.  They are often supported by larger national and 
international NGOs for funding and professional support.  National NGOs operate within 
a specific country and include both intermediary NGOs (who direct funding and provide 
support services to community-based NGOs) and implementing NGOs (or a combination 
or both). They may also include umbrella organizations representing multiple 
community-based NGOs.  International NGOs have large staffs of professionals, large 
budgets, and a presence in multiple countries. They are also involved in both 
implementing their own projects on the ground and acting as intermediary NGOs which 
support smaller, more local NGOs.  
In addition to size, NGOs vary in function and usually fall within two broad 
types: development NGOs and advocacy NGOs. Development NGOs, the focus of this 
study, are involved in social services delivery, including infrastructural development, 
poverty reduction and alleviation, income-generation, access to health care services, 
education and other forms of social services.  They are often based in rural areas and in 
large part steer away from political or policy-related projects. Advocacy NGOs are 
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primarily concerned with advocating for policy changes, particularly issues of human 
rights, and are often based in urban areas. There is a third type which is often connected 
with development NGOs, and that is direct aid and relief NGOs who provide emergency 
food relief and disaster response; at times, development NGOs enter into a relief mode of 
operation. All types vary in their focus and location; however, they do share the common 
feature of being voluntary. They are not entirely voluntary, in that they are comprised of 
paid employees (and not unpaid volunteers), but their existence and their functions are 
voluntary. This is contextually relevant to a discussion of their legitimacy, as it sheds 
some light on their very purpose.  
NGOs are self-selected and self-appointed, and their staff members are not 
usually representatives from the poor and vulnerable groups that they aim and claim to 
help (Kaldor 2002). They have not been impelled into existence because founders of 
NGOs (and ensuing staff members) are subjected to oppression or marginalization in 
society, or as a result of obeying orders from governments or other forms of authority to 
operate. Rather, they have formed themselves for various reasons, such as charitable 
public service, as is reflected by Bratton’s statement (1987:12): “NGO leaders tend to set 
basic organizational objectives and recruit and motivate staff on the basis of a shared core 
belief in the value of unrewarded public service.” At the same time, there are more self-
interested reasons for starting up NGOs, notably as a source of employment. Furthermore, 
this voluntary existence does not imply that NGOs are autonomous, as they must answer 
to multiple stakeholders within the development field.  In working toward understanding 
the role of NGOs and their legitimacy and effectiveness as social organizations within the 
development field, the next section examines the discourse, frameworks and 
methodologies on which NGO operations are based. 
 
2.3 Participatory Development Ideology and Methodology 
The use of participatory methods is widely regarded as fundamental and vitally important 
to implementing development initiatives and schemes that are initiated by donor-funded 
outside agents for the purpose of improving the livelihoods of poor and vulnerable people.  
The goal of such initiatives and the reason for using participatory methods is to promote 
and develop sustainable livelihoods through aiding in the physical improvement of living 
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conditions and fostering a sense of empowerment that leads to further livelihood 
improvement and self-sustainability. The participation of the intended beneficiaries (or 
the people whose lives will be affected by the development initiatives) in the planning, 
implementing and evaluation of these schemes is considered to be both ethically and 
practically necessary.  The ethical necessity comes from the need to legitimate the actions 
of these donor-funded development agencies (Brett 2003).  This concept of legitimization 
through the use of participatory methods is attributed to the ideological belief that 
without local participation and input, an outside agency imposes its own values (namely 
Western values) and does not understand, or acknowledge, the values and needs of the 
particular group or community whom they aim to help. Such impositions undermine local 
knowledge, abilities, and confidence, and contribute to a sense of vulnerability rather 
than empowerment.   
Participation is also considered practically necessary for various reasons, namely 
the following beliefs: it helps to build interest and mobilize people to cooperate with the 
development field workers; it helps the development agency to improve the management 
and efficiency of its projects by revealing local resources that may prove beneficial to the 
development project or scheme (including local skills and man-power); and beneficiaries 
are more likely to continue to use what was produced by the development scheme, after 
the outside agency has left, if they feel a sense of ownership, a sense that is developed 
through personal involvement in the project’s planning and implementation and a full 
understanding of its purpose and functions.  
NGOs and their funders recognize these ethical and practical reasons for 
conducting their work in a participatory way, and proclaim the importance of 
participatory methods in their mission and value statements, and in their publications (see 
for example WVI 2012a and – an Oxfam publication – Eade 1997). Due to these ethically 
legitimating and practical aspects associated with participation, it has become not only 
customary but a requirement to adhere to participatory policy and practice in the 
development sector. 
Despite the general acceptance of this necessity and the broad adherence to its 
importance, the concept of ‘participation’ in development methodology is subject to 
conceptual slippage and is therefore understood and defined differently in different 
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contexts. This discrepancy between understandings has serious implications on 
development theory, organizational policy and, most importantly, on the beneficiaries 
who are ‘participating.’  Within these varying interpretations of what ‘participation’ truly 
means in development, a distinction can be made between top-down participation, or 
involvement, and bottom-up participation, or popular participation (de Beer and 
Swanepoel 1998).  
Top-down participation is involvement-based and is at best consultative. This 
type of participation occurs where a development NGO, already having determined a 
project plan, informs and consults the local group or community about its plan and 
mobilizes them to take part in carrying out the intended projects. In this understanding, 
participatory planning and implementation meetings are more of an educational (or even 
propaganda) pitch to get people informed and excited than they are an effort to plan the 
project around local values.  They also provide an opportunity for the NGO to learn about 
any local resources (for example ‘free’ local unskilled labor resources) and to gain 
somewhat of an understanding of local cultural values and power structures, for the 
purpose of success in executing the planned development project.  
 The overarching, long-term goal of this scenario remains to improve livelihoods 
and promote sustainable development; however, the fundamental focus is on the project 
itself – its success and its sustainability. This focus on project success in an involvement-
participation scenario is considered top-down and ineffective, if not ethically illegitimate.  
It undercuts the deeper conceptual goals of participation and sustainability that are 
centered on complex processes of empowerment and its effects and implications. The 
shorter-term, project-focused goals therefore may promote project sustainability, but do 
not contribute to lasting, long-term livelihood sustainability. Through this involvement-
based participation, the main effect may be the sustainability of the NGO, as short-term 
successes may facilitate further funding for the NGO. 
These criticisms lead to the alternative understanding of participation as more 
bottom-up and empowering. Empowerment is considered to be inherently linked to 
livelihood sustainability and therefore is the truly meaningful objective of deep 
participation. This inherent linkage between empowerment and sustainability comes from 
the concept of self-reliance, or a person or group’s willingness and capacity to rely on 
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their own abilities and resources (Nikkhah and Redzuan 2012). This self-reliance is the 
platform for achieving livelihood sustainability and it is achieved when people are 
empowered to control and manage their own lives. This is opposed to a never-ending 
reliance on external sources for livelihood stability, which creates a dependent condition 
that is not sustainable and is often (although in large part unintentionally) perpetuated by 
external aid agencies. Rather than perpetuating this sense of dependency, an approach to 
development involving a deeper understanding of the term ‘participation’ must be 
considered. Popular participation derives its foundation from the goal of achieving 
empowerment and views individual development projects as a means for promoting this 
broader and longer-term goal.   
This form of participatory methodology seeks to activate and nurture 
empowerment, particularly among the most vulnerable groups of people, and it contends 
that empowerment has the potential to grow out from mundane and ordinary development 
activities (Ndegwa 1996) by transforming the existing sense of poverty into self-
confidence and self-reliance. It is therefore about mobilizing people to “play roles which 
development agencies and governments cannot play” (Shepard 1998: 182). In other 
words, issues involving livelihood sustainability cannot be solved merely by an outside 
agency or government implementing a development project; rather, they are solved by 
fostering empowerment and self-reliance through the transformative powers of 
participatory development projects.  The most important aspect of this understanding of 
participation is the importance of people making their own decisions and controlling the 
factors that affect their own lives. This entails much more than mere involvement or 
consultation.  
A popular framework for approaching empowerment-based participatory 
development is capacity-building. Capacity-building is a conceptual approach to 
development based on the belief that the capacities for development already exist among 
people and within communities, and that the role of an external development agent 
should be supportive in helping people initiate their own development by fostering their 
existing capacities. The goal of this approach is to discover what is preventing people 
from attaining their basic rights and to help people strengthen their own abilities to 
overcome those obstacles (Eade 1997). It emphasizes long-term change and sees 
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participation as a method of investing in people and helping them to identify, build-up, 
and use their own abilities, social relations and knowledge; in other words, their 
capacities. This framework for approaching ‘participation’ stresses that truly participatory 
development projects are at first catalytic and then supportive in nature; first involving 
helping people to identify and affirm their own capacities and then guiding, or facilitating, 
those people in developing their own plans and means for improving their livelihoods.  In 
this sense, external development agents should be seen as community resources and not 
researchers, planners, or implementers (Wetmore and Theron 1998). 
The question of how best to approach capacity-building generates a considerable 
amount of development discourse, which suggests ways in which to carry out such an 
objective. One such approach to achieving the goals of capacity-building is ‘filling the 
gap,’ which is where the role of the outside aid agent (such as an NGO) is to initiate and 
guide a project and then ‘fill the gap’ by providing only the most necessary materials, 
knowledge or funding that the local people are incapable of providing themselves.  This 
requires the local people to carry out the project with limited resource input from the 
outside agent. Here, the role of the development agency is to facilitate local leadership 
and action, with the potential for providing additional resources where necessary. Its 
goals are to use local resources (for example, labor and land) to the greatest extent 
possible before inputting any new materials, in order to foster resourcefulness and self-
reliance from the start. In this way, local people are acknowledging their own resource 
capacities to work towards development aims.  
This approach hopes to achieve sustainability by instilling in local people a sense 
of ownership of a project, which in turn should promote empowerment and therefore 
sustainability. It is, however, highly idealistic. In his discussion of development images 
and perceptions, Tembo (2003:101) notes that “the major assumption for this framework, 
where assistance is perceived as filling the gap, is that there is [a] shared understanding of 
the existing assets and capacities.” Such an assumption is very dangerous, as it leaves 
people vulnerable to misunderstandings.  If an NGO field worker expects that the local 
people will produce bricks and labor for building a structure, and the members of the 
local community assume that the NGO has been given money to input into that structure, 
this discrepancy between expectations and assumptions may easily lead to hostility 
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between the NGO workers and the beneficiary community.  The field worker may see the 
local people as lazy and unwilling to help themselves while the local people may see the 
field worker (and the NGO) as a crook in refusing to pass on the money and service that 
was to be allocated to the community. In such a case, both sides form negative 
perceptions that ultimately lead to unsustainable (if not unfinished and abandoned) 
projects, as well as to the undermining of the original goals of self-reliance and 
empowerment. Further, this sets up an environment where future development initiatives 
are likely to fail.  Still, the ‘filling the gap’ approach can be effective when great care is 
taken to avoid assumptions that lead to misunderstandings. 
Participatory Rural Appraisal, or PRA, is another approach to capacity-building 
that is a popular means of facilitating deep levels of participation. In addition to its 
ideological grounding in the same values as capacity-building, PRA presents a set of 
tangible methods intended to help facilitators guide local people in analyzing their own 
livelihoods and planning and implementing their own means of improvement.  It draws 
its base from the belief that people are knowledgeable (and not ignorant) and are 
therefore capable of analyzing their own lives and needs (Kumar 2002).  It therefore has a 
strong focus on the facilitation of locally-directed needs assessment and situational 
analyses. PRA methods particularly involve modes of communication, including visual 
aids and diagrams, transect walks, mapping, and story-telling, as mediums for local 
people to describe their community, culture and needs to the outside agent (Mukherjee 
1993). Korf (2010) describes PRA workshops, or localized sessions, where external 
facilitators meet with the local community and together (using the communication 
methods listed above) they discuss needs and issues facing the community and jointly 
plan developmental solutions accordingly. These workshops are meant to create isolated, 
participatory windows that reveal needs and developmental solutions that are free from 
the pressures of development aid paradigms and are representative of the entire local 
community.   
Overall, the goal of PRA is to introduce communication methods that provide a 
truer understanding of local perspectives and local knowledge and empower local people 
to plan improvements based on their own perspectives. Like other approaches to 
empowerment-based participation, however, PRA also lends itself to dangerous 
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assumptions and potential problems. First, there is the assumption that the facilitators (in 
particular the NGO field workers who facilitate the participatory workshops) are capable 
of creating environments where local people will speak freely and on an equal level 
without restraint from local political dynamics and power structures. Such a feat is 
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Even if external facilitators try to avoid the 
influence of local power dynamics by separating participants into groups (for instance, by 
gender, age, or local leadership level), they should not assume that people will in fact 
speak openly about their needs. Second, the external facilitator has a very influential level 
of power over the analysis and decision-making processes involved in PRA. In order to 
avoid this potential drawback, PRA facilitators must be carefully conscious of their own 
biases and make efforts to prevent influencing or controlling the voice of the community 
members; they must be able to ‘hand over the stick’ and not to lecture, and they must be 
particularly good listeners.   
A third issue is the dangerous assumption that a consensus can even be reached 
that is in the interests of the community. The assumption that any rural community 
constitutes a cohesive group of people who are willing to work together is problematic 
(de Beer and Swanepoel 1998). That assumption can mask deeper issues of power 
dynamics among communities, an oversight that may cause vulnerable people to feel 
even more vulnerable while enforcing local elites and the possibility of elite capture of 
NGO projects. Finally, additional issues may arise when putting PRA methods into 
practice, as participatory sessions can easily turn to a more seminar-structured 
educational experience of formal learning (Green 2010) rather than a space for local 
people to teach external facilitators about their needs, desires and perspectives, and share 
their concerns and values. The problems and dangerous assumptions noted here are not 
specific only to PRA, but are potential issues of any capacity-building-based, catalytic, 
facilitative approach to participatory development.  
A common thread among approaches to and methods of empowerment-based 
popular participation is that empowerment must be a necessary ingredient in each stage 
of a development project; from needs assessment, to planning, to implementation, to 
monitoring and evaluation. It is necessary in needs assessment, as developmental needs 
are multidimensional and community-specific. Traditional “blue-print” methods to 
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developmental needs assessment (such as pre-written surveys) are not culturally or 
environmentally adaptable (Mukherjee 1993) and thus they do not reflect local power 
dynamics, values or beliefs. In general, qualitative methods – which intrinsically require 
participation (they require thoughtful interaction from local people) – are more 
informative and enlightening. The emphasis that participatory methodologies place on 
project planning is also significant, as it is an important step to developing the sense of 
ownership and self-reliance through decision-making. Finally, each one of the approaches 
to deep bottom-up participation (as described above) places great importance on 
participatory implementation, monitoring and evaluation.  If the true aim of the project is 
to empower people and help them develop sustainable livelihood practices, it is 
impossible to conduct any meaningful evaluation without gaining a true understanding of 
how those people actually evaluate and feel about the project, both during 
implementation and after. 
In this regard, efforts toward achieving bottom-up participatory forms have 
increasingly led development theory to focus on organizational learning (for NGOs 
themselves) in order to practice more effective and legitimate development assistance. 
Meaningful learning, however, is difficult to achieve, mainly because the primary goals 
of development NGOs are not tangible or measureable in any strict quantitative manner. 
It is not possible to measure exactly the form or level of empowerment that may or may 
not have been instigated by an NGO project. Additionally, organizational learning cannot 
be one-dimensional. It involves multiple levels or ‘loops’ that are each essential to any 
meaningful learning.   
The first level, or single-loop learning, is concerned with improving individual 
project effectiveness by looking at what was done and how the implementation of 
projects could be more effective in the future and better achieve participatory aims.  The 
motivation for single-loop learning centers on projects and their impact. This type of 
learning is particularly important for developing more effective ways to achieve 
meaningful participation in the project implementation process and for building exposure, 
experience and preparedness among field workers.  It is difficult, however, to apply this 
type of learning to project-specific improvements, as development projects are 
necessarily specific to the communities and environments in which they are carried out.   
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Double-loop learning is concerned with the legitimacy of the NGO within the 
context of achieving its stated goals of poverty reduction and fostering empowerment.  
Rather than being based on measureable results, this type of learning involves comparing 
the NGO’s stated values to its actual practice. It can be undertaken therefore through 
examining the incongruence that is found between the two (Bloch and Borges 2002).  
This type of learning involves constant reflection on NGO motivations and the methods 
they carry out, and it requires long-term commitment to self-evaluation of all functions 
and aspects of the NGO. Such learning is necessary if NGOs are to seriously address 
issues of competence and legitimacy in delivering development assistance.  Triple-loop 
learning also exists, and this is concerned with the role and legitimacy of NGOs as 
prominent organizations within the development sector, tasked with the overall goal of 
‘delivering development’. This type of learning questions the overall appropriateness and 
necessity of NGO interventions in development (or the role of ‘big D’ development 
within ‘little d’ development).   
Also pertinent to organizational learning is the application of these learning loops 
to development discourse, which determines development methodologies and ultimately 
development practices. The discourse of participation, for example, provides the 
framework for much of development methodology. The belief that participation is the 
key to promoting empowerment and sustainable development is generally accepted 
among development NGOs and its necessity is embraced as the theoretical solution to 
top-down, intrusive and unsustainable development aid projects. It is important, however, 
to acknowledge that while participation serves to legitimize development projects, it is 
not necessarily an absolute course to empowerment. It could be argued that the concept 
of ‘participation’ has become so engrained and assumed as a necessary requirement (for 
authentic development in practice) in development discourse that its actual benefits, 
meaning, and authenticity have lessened as agencies have increasingly and uncritically 
adopted it. Hence, the rhetoric of participation is now in danger of becoming another 
externally-driven controlling force over local people, instead of being an exception to 
oppressive, unsustainable programs that involve the failure to acknowledge local values 
and needs.  
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It has been proposed that the belief that participation necessarily leads to 
livelihood improvement is “an article of faith,” rather than a questioned hypothesis 
(Tendler 1982:129). Nevertheless, participatory development methods still claim greater 
legitimacy than non-participatory methods, as they allow people to make their own 
decisions (or at least contribute some input) about their own developmental directions.  
What is necessary to draw from this is not to say that the value in participation is 
misplaced, but that elements of development discourse (such as participation), while so 
deeply embedded in development policy, should not be blindly accepted as an absolute 
truth, but should be continuously challenged and re-evaluated in order to work towards 
genuine development. Mosse (2004), in this respect, suggests that discourse in 
development policy functions as a product of development practice in order to legitimate 
it.  If discourse is what legitimates practice, then goals of organizational learning must 
also question the discourse itself, in addition to discrepancies between that discourse and 
actual practice. This is particularly important to triple-loop learning (in considering the 
appropriateness of NGOs as deliverers of development).   
 This section has discussed the conceptual frameworks within which NGOs 
operate and has argued for the necessity of organizational learning. These frameworks 
have come about as a response to a call for legitimizing the actions of external 
development agencies through participatory forms. Through explaining how 
empowerment-building participation is considered both ethically and practically 
necessary to the aims of enabling livelihood sustainability and long-term development, 
this section has emphasized that participatory methodologies, while fundamental to 
development NGO policy and practice, are difficult to achieve in actual development 
situations. They must therefore be the subject of constant reflection in organizational 
learning and when developing methods and procedures for development initiatives.  
 
2.4 NGO Accountability  
The work of NGOs, particularly their use of participatory methods, should be considered 
both in terms of the efficiency and appropriateness of the methods they use to implement 
and facilitate individual development projects (for example, how a particular project 
could be more effective) and their overall legitimacy and justification for their existence 
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and their position in the development sector or industry.  Ultimately, these considerations 
come down to the question of accountability. Accountability defines the relationships 
between the various stakeholders involved in the NGO development sector, and the 
extent and authenticity of an NGO’s use of participatory methods in a development 
project is an indication of to whom the NGO is most accountable. The three primary 
stakeholder groups considered here are: the local people (or beneficiaries), who the 
development assistance is intended to benefit; the donor agencies who provide the 
funding for NGOs; and the governing powers (both national and local) for the area where 
the project is located.  Ideally, an NGO’s actions and its development goals would reflect 
a high level of accountability to the intended beneficiaries of their development projects 
(downward accountability), a situation where NGOs answer to the needs, values and 
desires of those whom they aim to help.  
This downward accountability is the ideal because it is what legitimates the 
presence of NGOs in development; it is the notion that they exist for the purpose of 
meeting the livelihood needs of their beneficiaries. The necessity to adhere to the 
requirements of the other key stakeholders (donors and governing bodies), however, 
challenges the realization of this downward accountability. In this way, the notion that 
legitimizes NGOs (that is, downward accountability to beneficiaries) is not necessarily 
what ensures or defines their existence in practice. Carefully considering the relationships 
between NGOs and the stakeholders involved in their operations is necessary in order to 
scrutinize their role in society as a viable alternative to notably state-led development. I 
first discuss accountability to donors.  
 
2.4.1 Accountability to Donors 
The claim can be made that donors set the tone for NGO development work.  After all, 
“he who pays the piper calls the tune” (Edwards and Hulme 1997:8).  In order to function, 
NGOs are reliant upon donor funds. While it is too simplistic to claim that NGO practices 
and accountability are completely driven by the desire to secure ongoing funding, their 
reliance on donors has significant influence. Both the causes and implications of NGO-
donor relationships are complex in character. The central aspect of the relationships 
between NGOs and their donors is the transfer of funds. Development projects conducted 
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by NGOs (their quality, sustainability, and effectiveness) are not the only entities whose 
success relies upon the stability and continual flow of these funds. NGO employees also 
depend on the influx of donor funding for their salaries and job security. In other words, 
donated funds are the sustenance and life-line of development NGOs in a variety of ways.  
This condition of dependency ensures that the stability of every aspect of an NGO’s 
purpose and existence, from their infrastructure to their products (development projects), 
remains in a constant state of precarious uncertainty. Many NGOs, to some degree of 
success, try to address this fragile, dependent position by spreading their risk out among 
multiple donors (Borren 2001); however, this strategy inherently generates additional 
administrative costs and accountability issues, as different donors have different reporting 
expectations and requirements. 
The process by which NGOs procure funding significantly limits (and sometimes 
eliminates) the use of participatory methods, therefore undermining the goals of 
empowerment and sustainability. The process of fundraising is competitive and normally 
takes place on a project-by-project basis. NGOs formulate and submit project proposals 
to potential donors, including a line-item budget for a project. The proposals are then 
considered against other project proposals from other NGOs. These proposals are 
submitted in response to calls put out by donors that often define specific elements that 
the donor will look for in the proposal. These elements may specify the type of 
development that they intend to fund (for instance, water and sanitation, education, 
nutrition and healthcare) as well as listing other requirements and values that must be 
present in the proposal (for example, the call may require that the project must reach a 
specified amount of beneficiaries, must include participation of intended beneficiaries, 
and must have direct benefits for women, elderly and other vulnerable groups). After, and 
if, funds are received, the NGO must continue to report monitoring and evaluation results 
to the donor, the criteria for which are also often very specific. This very process 
contradicts goals of participation. In breaking this down, this point becomes quite evident. 
 
2.4.1.1 The Call for Proposals 
The fact that the first step to implementing a development project begins in the domain of 
the donor is problematic for achieving participation. When the donor sends out the call 
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for proposals, they have often already determined the values of the project and the type of 
development that is to be implemented. This prevents NGOs from facilitating needs-
assessments based on popular participation (where project beneficiaries actually 
determine what their own development needs are and how to go about meeting those 
needs). This is because the determinant for whether a project can be and is to be 
implemented or not (the funding proposal evaluation) takes place before much, if any, 
participation has occurred. Instead, the NGO makes those decisions based on limited 
assessments.  
Therefore, from the beginning of a project, the extent and quality of beneficiary 
participation is already pre-determined and top-down driven, if not obsolete. It is difficult, 
if not impossible, for NGOs to conduct participatory needs-assessments prior to 
developing and submitting a funding proposal for the intended project.  This is due to two 
important facts: the first is that the NGO may not have sufficient funding to facilitate 
participatory needs-assessment before it has been granted funding for future potential 
projects; and second, there is a risk involved in participatory needs-assessment before 
funding has been granted. The risk is that if the NGO was able to conduct participatory 
needs-assessment and then did not ultimately receive the funding, it would not be able to 
implement the project that it had assessed.  At that point, it would be too late to take back 
any false hope that it may have created in the community. This would foster distrust and 
negativity.   
 
2.4.1.2 The Development of the Proposal 
After the call for proposals has been issued, there is small window of time in which the 
NGO can develop its project funding proposal for submission.  This small amount of time 
is insufficient to conduct community needs, values and resource assessments, even if the 
NGO ignored the goals of authentic (empowerment-based) participation and conducted 
such assessments via top-down oriented methods. Thus, not only is an empowering, 
participatory process of designing the project – where local people are making the 
decisions – difficult, but it is also extremely difficult to even cater the project to a specific 
community. NGOs end up preparing generic proposals that they can have ready when the 
37 
call comes out, and then attempt to fill in the community-specific gaps in their proposal 
before submission.  
Donors also significantly, though inadvertently, influence NGO methods and 
values even before the funding process begins. The NGO funding environment is 
extremely competitive.  That competitive atmosphere necessitates that NGOs build their 
reputations by pursuing the values and performance standards that attract positive donor 
attention, such that when their funding proposal is received, they may stand out against 
other funding applicants. Because of this, the values of an NGO, which ought to be 
formed around participation, self-reliance, sustainability and respect for their 
beneficiaries, can be called into question. There is no doubt that donors claim to 
acknowledge these necessary priorities in a formal sense; however, by their setting 
standards for these values from the top, they actually undermine the values themselves.   
This situation implies that the values of NGOs are regularly compromised in order 
to receive funding from donors and this therefore presents the question of whether or not 
it is appropriate for NGOs to develop official views and values as a tactic to attract 
funding. If NGOs do embrace official views, they may attract funding from particular 
donors with corresponding values; however, it may come at the cost of compromising 
goals of empowerment. Once an NGO has developed official views, local and community 
participation is then only encouraged so long as it aligns with the official values of the 
organization (Ellerman 2003). Additionally, while adopting official views may attract 
funding from values-based donors, it could also have the opposite effect, as espousing 
strong views does not allow the flexibility that may be necessary to adapt in order to 
appeal to a variety of donors.   
 
2.4.1.3 Monitoring and Evaluation 
Donors require monitoring and evaluation (M&E) reports as evidence that the donated 
funds have been used for their intended purposes. They do this in order to ensure that the 
funds are reaching the intended people and impacting upon their lives in a positive way. 
The rationale for this requirement in itself is reasonable, as monitoring and evaluation are 
essential elements of implementing effective development projects, and a donor’s desire 
to know how its money is being spent is not only justified but also necessary and 
38 
responsible. The problem, therefore, is not that donors require NGOs to report M&E 
results, but that they (the donors) specify the methods that they want used for carrying out 
M&E as well as the type of data that must be reported on and in what form it must be 
reported.  
This is because, at the donor level, the need for control carries more weight than 
the push for participation (Wallace et al. 2006). In this way, the donors are determining 
what project elements are important enough to be monitored and evaluated and to what 
extent. In the case of bottom-up participation, these decisions (that say what should be 
evaluated and how to go about that evaluation) should in fact be made by local people 
participating with project facilitators; instead, they are made by donors.  In addition, the 
continual receipt by NGOs of promised funds is often contingent upon these reports.  As 
meeting these requirements, and adhering to their provisions, is heavily resource 
consumptive, both in time and money (Harsh et al. 2010, Tembo 2003), NGOs often 
cannot afford to conduct the donor-required M&E alongside of more participatory, 
bottom-up approaches.   
This system, which entails the reporting of pre-determined evaluation project 
elements, impedes participatory aims, as well as creating additional pressures that affect 
the efficiency and impact of the development project.  One such pressure comes from the 
rigidity of the required line-item budgets. For example, donors expect NGOs to spend 
money within the time and financial parameters set out in the project budgets and restrict 
the flexibility of moving funds between line-items. This constraint does not allow NGOs 
to be flexible in their project implementation and facilitation, as they cannot react to 
unexpected budgetary needs which inevitably will occur (for instance, the price of piping 
increases in the middle of implementing an irrigation project). This contradicts one of the 
most important elements of M&E, which involves the ability to directionally re-focus a 
project in areas where it is not working.   
If an NGO project facilitator determines through M&E that its project is not 
meeting the needs of the beneficiaries, but the NGO does not have the flexibility to 
rearrange and reprioritize its funds, it will be unable to change project elements in order 
to adapt to those needs. Therefore the project will be ineffective in promoting 
empowerment and will be unsustainable. Nevertheless, donors maintain the expectation 
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that money will be spent for its intended purposes, and therefore inadvertently encourage 
(albeit through good intentions of requiring transparency and financial accountability) 
inefficient and even frivolous spending on the wrong (or unneeded) things, while posing 
the potential threat of project abandonment due to lack of future funding. The result is the 
pressure on NGOs to spend donor money quickly and within a specified amount of time, 
arising from the fear that sending money back would be more detrimental to future 
funding than spending the money on the wrong things (Harsh et al. 2010).   
In addition to threatening project effectiveness by inadvertently discouraging 
participatory methods through accountability requirements, these donor-determined 
conditions also may lead to questionable and unreliable reporting (thereby threatening the 
integrity of M&E feedback) as NGOs may be reluctant to report any negative information 
about projects unless they feel certain that such reports will not jeopardize future funding 
(Mebrahtu 2003). This is particularly true if the overhead costs of the project were higher 
than anticipated. NGOs are expected to have low overhead expenses (this includes 
administrative costs and employee salaries) and these expectations are often very 
unrealistic.  Smillie (1997: 570) argues in this regard that “the myth of the tiny overhead 
is a dangerous time-bomb waiting to explode in the face of NGOs” and that such 
unrealistic expectations encourage lack of transparency and deny the need for necessary 
and legitimate administrative costs that allow effective and professional development 
work. While some NGOs are able to gain donor funding for the purpose of covering core 
costs (or have other inner-organizational support systems as will be explained about WV 
later), this is often not the case. 
The issue of rigid M&E requirements goes even deeper because these donor-
oriented methods are often only carried out by the NGO for the sake of the donor and are 
never fed back down to the NGO field staff (Mebrahtu 2003). Particularly the more 
complicated, quantitative data that NGO fieldworkers regularly collect for reporting 
purposes is never shared with them after it has been analyzed, therefore presenting two 
major problems: the first is that it creates a disjuncture between field staff and M&E, 
where M&E data collection is a mundane task and has no practical application to their 
work in the field; and the second is that the opportunity and potential for improving 
projects that could come from insight discovered through M&E (which should be the sole 
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reason for carrying out M&E exercises in the first place) is denied.  Instead of focusing 
entirely on control and verification, as they tend to do, donors need to “put learning back 
on the agenda” (Smillie 1997:573). Additionally, the quantitative data required by donors 
is not as beneficial to future NGO learning as qualitative data; however, donors are more 
concerned with tangible, measureable results, such as captured for instance in logical 
framework analysis. This oversight of the potential learning and implementation-
improvement benefits that could be gained from qualitative M&E exercises excludes a 
significant opportunity to work towards achieving truly empowering, participatory 
development initiatives.   
In summary, the greatest implication of all these factors discussed under donor 
accountability is the extent to which NGOs are able to realize genuine participatory aims 
that respond to local needs and therefore actually promote sustainable livelihoods. Donor 
expectations reflect incongruence between the reputations and the actual capacities of 
NGOs. Donors perceive NGOs as inherently able to achieve participation rather than 
recognizing the costs that are necessary for achieving participation. This discrepancy is 
fueled by competition for resources, as NGOs attempt to portray themselves as super-
efficient with low overhead costs and high performance standards. Such supposed high 
standards lose their meaning through attempts at compartmentalizing projects (as 
complex processes) into measureable, tangible results that can be reported in numerical 
forms; however, donors continue to require measureable results rather than investing 
resources in analyzing qualitative, meaningful considerations of project effectiveness.  
This is problematic because the goal of empowerment is not tangible and cannot 
be recorded or analyzed with numerical reports. Consequently, NGO responses to donor-
driven accountability measures are sometimes a disturbing sense of resigned compliance 
and a tendency to fall in line with donor expectations, therefore perpetuating a level of 
accountability that makes the realization of participatory forms unrealistic. This fate is 
not necessarily inherent to NGO-donor relations, as NGOs also have the potential to 
place accountability demands on their donors; however, it would require a break away 
from the current competitive mentality and greater inter-collaboration of NGOs.  
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2.4.2 Accountability and the State 
Relationships between development NGOs and states are inconsistent and contingent 
upon historical and contemporary national conditions. They are often fragile and can 
become politically charged at times when NGOs’ presumed ‘apolitical’ role is questioned 
by the state. While there are many activist NGOs which are particularly political in 
character, development NGOs tend to stay away from politically-charged situations, even 
isolating themselves, in order to continue on in their work without attracting negative 
attention from governments. Additionally, the goals of development work are generally 
not very controversial, in comparison to the goals of advocacy NGOs, as issues such as 
access to clean water, health services and subsistence agriculture are easily agreed upon.  
The ways in which these goals are addressed, however, can become controversial, 
particularly if they involve questions of land use and land allocation.   
Even if the content of their work is not particularly controversial from the 
perspective of political regimes, governments (especially authoritarian or repressive 
governments) may feel threatened or challenged by development NGOs for a number of 
reasons. One is the possibility that, through the use of participatory approaches, NGOs 
may empower groups which are traditionally oppressed by their government (Clark 1997).  
This is threatening to authoritarian regimes, because empowered people are more likely 
to challenge the status quo. But even if conducted with a mind to evade political 
implications, and with no apparent attitude or stance that is critical of the state, 
empowering development initiatives intrinsically question the competency of the state at 
delivering social and developmental assistance and infrastructure (Farrington et al. 1993).  
To states that have based the legitimacy of their authority on their ability to ‘deliver 
development,’ NGOs are particularly threatening (Ndegwa 1996).  
Another aspect of NGOs that threatens governments is their international funding, 
which has the potential to disturb governments in two ways: the first is that they may 
perceive international donors as a foreign hand promoting a foreign agenda that threatens 
their hegemony; and the second is that governments may become jealous of NGOs, in the 
sense that they are preferred over governments for channeling international aid resources. 
Alternatively, governments may at times favor NGOs as a development medium to be 
manipulated. NGOs can be used advantageously by political regimes in both the positive 
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and negative sense: as a tool for gaining support by claiming credit when NGOs deliver 
development; and as a ‘fall-guy’ to pass on the blame for development shortcomings and 
poor rural living conditions. Even NGOs’ capacity to bring in considerable international 
funding can be seen by governments in a positive light when the state has controlling 
power over the ways in which the NGOs use the money.   
The potential positive or negative effects that NGOs may have on a state’s 
hegemony create an inconsistent and fickle tone to NGO-government relationships.  
When weighing the possible outcomes in order to determine how to deal with NGOs, 
authoritarian governments are often more concerned with how NGOs may influence their 
hegemony than they are with how NGOs may boost socio-economic development.  
Bratton (1987: 17) argues in fact that “the amount of space allowed to NGOs in any given 
country is therefore determined first and foremost by political considerations, rather than 
by any calculation of the contribution of NGOs to economic and social development.”  
These considerations decide the conditions of government-NGO relations. 
There are two key strategies that governments use in responding to NGOs: the 
exclusionary strategy and the corporatist strategy (Heurlin 2009). Exclusionary tactics 
involve NGO harassment, national NGO registration requirements which are often 
arbitrary (where registration is left up to the discretion of the political official who does 
or does not approve it), and restrictions on when and in what capacity NGOs may receive 
foreign funding. Rather than controlling NGOs, the goal of exclusionary strategies is to 
minimize their presence and their influence. Exclusionary strategies are often carried out 
through vague and subjective legislative clauses that reserve the government’s right to 
shut down NGOs whose practices are considered to be ‘anti-state’ or to “degrade social 
values” (Mayhew 2005:745).  
These exclusionary strategies are in contrast to the second key type of government 
response to NGOs (the corporatist strategy) where the goal is to control NGOs through 
integration and co-optation. Somewhat akin to the idea of ‘keeping your friends close and 
your enemies closer,’ corporatist strategies allow and even support NGOs, but control the 
direction of their actions through co-optation. Governments go about co-opting NGOs 
through a variety of methods including: the development of GONGOs (government-
organized NGOs) in order to preempt independent NGOs forming; controlling 
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registration requirements; appointing independent NGO leaders to government positions; 
handing out NGO leadership positions to retiring government or political officials; and 
providing government funding and physical resources to NGOs such as office space in 
government buildings (Heurlin 2009, Bratton 1987). In most cases, independent NGOs 
are wary of accepting government resources as, the more resources they accept, the more 
vulnerable they are to changing politics or even political-regime changes and the more 
their autonomy is challenged (Farrington et al. 1993). 
 Correlations between the type of government and their strategy toward NGOs can 
sometimes be seen.  For example, authoritarian regimes that are losing support and fear 
the potential of being overthrown are generally more likely to use exclusionary tactics for 
controlling NGO activity. This is because corporatist strategies of co-optation require 
investment in time and resources and, unless a regime feels secure enough to see through 
those investments, it is not likely to initiate them. Long-term stable political regimes are 
more likely to employ corporatist strategies, as they are willing to invest the time and 
resources necessary for co-optation. That being said, it is also likely that any particular 
government will use elements of both strategies, depending on the current level of 
political tension within the country and the need for foreign aid and funding.  
The implications of these strategies on NGOs can be severe and limiting. Strict 
registration and reporting requirements, whether from exclusionary or corporatist 
approaches, imply the use of additional resources by NGOs (in addition to what they use 
in complying with donor requirements) as well as restricted ability to carry out 
participatory development methods. Costly and administratively-intensive registration 
requirements particularly serve to inhibit the activities of smaller NGOs with limited 
funding and those which do not already have strong ties with lucrative donors (Bolton 
and Jeffrey 2008). Also, such registration requirements discourage transparency, as 
engagement with government risks leaving NGOs at the mercy of arbitrary restrictions of 
NGO practices. For example, broad or vague language in registration policy serves to 
threaten NGOs’ ability to operate, as it gives the opportunity to selectively interpret 
phrases regarding ‘public order and safety’ to officials who are responsible for granting 
or denying registration (Bolton and Jeffrey 2008). Additionally, if NGO-government 
relations are already tense, NGOs may be reluctant to share information such as 
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employee names, office addresses and activity details, for fear that not only their 
operations but also the safety of their staff may be at risk. Such lack of transparency 
towards government not only threatens NGOs’ legal status, but also their own integrity, 
as it could lead to their overall lack of transparency and to self-censorship.   
In that sense, government legislative regulations on NGO registration and 
practices could be potentially beneficial by putting forth mechanisms to prevent 
corruption as well as protecting NGOs’ rights to organize. In reality, however, such 
registration regulations have little capacity to ensure protection for NGO transparency 
and legitimacy and are often used as a “guise for arbitrary control” and even NGO 
dissolution (Mayhew 2005: 749). Registration requirements may further threaten NGO 
integrity by necessitating that NGOs align themselves with government values and ruling 
political parties if they are to be granted registration or maintain it. In general, and 
particularly in countries with authoritative governments, the risks of undermining the key 
NGO goals of empowerment and commitment to local people outweigh the potential 
benefits of NGO-government collaboration. Through costly requirements and strict 
control, legislation pertaining to NGO registration can effectively serve to limit the 
influence and operating abilities of NGOs as well as present questions about their 
transparency and their legitimacy. 
 
2.4.3 Accountability to Beneficiaries 
So far this chapter has discussed the ways in which development NGOs are accountable 
to their donors and the state, but at the heart of participatory initiatives is the emphasis 
placed on being accountable to the people who the project is intended to help. The 
achievement of that responsibility is the primary goal of, and indeed the rationale for, the 
development of participatory methods. Despite the fact that it is the founding principle of 
genuine participatory development and is the key intention of non-profit NGO 
development work, being accountable to project beneficiaries is sometimes last in the line 
of NGO priorities. Ideally, NGOs value people first; after all, as discussed in the 
beginning of this chapter, development NGOs exist for that very reason: the desire to 
help the poor and vulnerable. This discursive claim is embodied in their missions and 
visions. Practically, however, downward accountability, where the NGO is in reality 
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accountable to the people it aims to help, is the most difficult to achieve. This is because 
conflicts around accountability end up coming down to a question of who wields the most 
power over the NGO, as well as the fact that “there is no contractual relationship between 
NGOs and recipients” (Tvedt 1998:161-162). Because of this, whether NGOs actually 
help people to make claims for their basic rights or whether they strengthen their own 
institutional relationships and stability requires investigation (Pearce 2003).   
In addition to the pressure from direct conflicts between accountability to 
beneficiaries and accountability to states and donors, other factors also contribute to a 
deficiency in downward accountability. One such factor is the character of the 
relationship between development assistance ‘giver’ and ‘receiver’. NGOs try to 
minimize any sense of dependency of beneficiaries on NGOs and instead engrain a sense 
of participation and partnership by using vocabulary such as ‘client’ or ‘partner’ instead 
of ‘beneficiary’ or ‘recipient’. However, in practice, this effort is generally an exercise in 
semantics rather than one that addresses the deeper issue of ideology and the masking of 
reality. In a business/client relationship, the client holds the business accountable to its 
needs through payment for services rendered. If the client is not satisfied, the business 
will not receive payment or future business from the client and therefore the success and 
survival of the business is dependent on the client’s satisfaction.  The survival of an NGO, 
though, is not dependent on the satisfaction of its ‘clients’ (the beneficiaries) but rather 
on the satisfaction of its donors (Power et al. 2003). Therefore, unlike a business client, 
local communities or beneficiaries remain vulnerable due to a lack of leverage which is 
necessary to hold the NGO accountable (leaving the NGO in the role of ‘giver’ and local 
beneficiaries in the role of ‘receiver’).  
Such compartmentalization into ‘aid givers’ and ‘aid recipients’ is problematic, 
and the two groups should not be treated as if they were “governed by different, or even 
incompatible, logics” (Rossi 2006:27). It may, however, be possible to change this 
giver/recipient paradigm about roles, at least to some extent, in order to allow 
beneficiaries to hold NGOs accountable.  Ebrahim (2004:22) stresses the importance of 
other (non-monetary) forms of capital in determining organizational practices, suggesting 
that the relations of power found in development can be rethought and challenged. If the 
discourse of development can be re-thought to consider alternative forms of capital that 
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local people can use to hold NGOs accountable (possibly through the use of more 
participatory evaluation and monitoring methods), perhaps development NGOs can begin 
to break away from the ‘giver’ and ‘receiver’ mold.  These alternative forms of capital 
could potentially include information, reputation and status, and legitimization. 
 Another factor making downward accountability difficult to achieve is the 
challenge of actually getting people to participate in NGO development activities.  
Theoretical frameworks and development methodologies are helpful in achieving 
participation, but they cannot compel people to participate (and indeed should not do so). 
While development NGOs willingly prescribe to the concept that local people should feel 
a sense of ownership for the development project, it is not inherent or inevitable that the 
people themselves will connect and ‘own’ accordingly (Sayer and Campbell 2004).  Nor 
do local people inevitably react to NGO presence and participatory methods in the ways 
that NGOs expect. Local people’s desire or the lack thereof to participate in development 
initiatives is affected by varying cultural and social elements.  
One issue standing in the way of achieving genuine participation occurs when 
local people form their statements of needs around what they perceive to be the 
development agenda of the NGO (Mosse 2004, Power et al. 2003). If an NGO is 
perceived as only delivering a particular type of development (for instance, the 
construction of structures), people will tell the NGO that they need whatever they believe 
the NGO intends to provide (such as a new ablution block) so as to secure their right to 
receive the assistance, even if it is not actually the most crucial or pertinent need in the 
community (Tembo 2003). If this is the case, even if participatory methods are 
considered successful by the NGO, the on-the-ground development carried out will not 
be truly accountable to the needs of the local people. Additionally, poor rural people may 
not participate because they are busy and over-burdened with the daily tasks of life 
(Shepard 1998); and through years of hardship, they may have even accepted their fate, 
and therefore feel apathetic towards NGO initiatives (Mukherjee 1993). 
 Finally, NGOs generally aim to reach the poorest and most vulnerable groups of 
people.  This goal can be a complicated one where meeting the demands of local power 
structures and being accountable to local traditions can undermine the intention to help 
the oppressed and vulnerable. Respecting traditional leaders, cultural values and the 
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existing power dynamics in a community sometimes directly contradicts goals of 
empowering marginal groups, including women, people affected with HIV and AIDS, 
and people of a different ethnic background. In situations where local systems oppress 
and undermine those people who are in the most vulnerable positions, it is difficult and 
potentially impossible for NGOs to be accountable to both local traditional values (and 
the local systems of governance these justify) and the marginalized groups they aim to 
help. Unless NGOs are sensitive to this, they may simply reproduce existing power 
structures.  
 
2.5 Caught in the Middle: NGOs as an Organizational Form 
The operational structures of NGOs as organizations are complex and driven by 
ambivalent responses to contradicting social interests, as outlined in the previous section. 
Both the achievement of their goals and their means for survival are conditioned by this 
broader social field marked by competing pressures. NGOs as organizational structures 
are different to other organizations in that achieving their intended purposes and 
organizational goals (including empowering communities) are not directly related to their 
own sustainability; in other words, they may not achieve those purposes and goals, but 
they may still sustain themselves as viable organizations (as long as donor funding 
continues to flow their way). Though they attempt to be accountable to the various 
stakeholders in their social domain, perhaps the strongest accountability they show is to 
themselves; not in the sense of holding themselves accountable to achieving their stated 
goals, but in the sense of following directions that best enable their own survival.  Still, 
the realization of this priority does not necessarily imply that NGOs are illegitimate or 
ineffective.   
The answer to that question can be addressed through considering whether their 
efforts towards ensuring their own survival stand in the way of or undermine achieving 
their stated objectives, or whether the two priorities are merely disconnected but not 
contradictory. Mitlin et al. (2007:1700) argue that “[in] countries in democratic transition 
… the NGO sector has been seeking to find a new role to enable survival, and does not 
appear to be concerning itself with higher order questions.” These higher order questions 
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about downward accountability and the reality of implementing empowering and 
sustainable development are very much a concern of development policy.  
Such policy, however, is necessarily separated from practice (Mosse 2006). The 
necessarily separated character of policy and practice displays a disjuncture between 
NGO operations as envisaged and portrayed in NGO discourse and NGO on-the-ground 
practices. This disjuncture implies the timing-specific and situation-specific character of 
NGO organizational operations. This means that despite (ideally) pursuing the accepted 
discourse surrounding development policy, the actual practices of NGOs will depend on 
the context of the time and location of their work, particularly with regard to donors and 
states. In other words, NGOs’ actions are context-specific, which may explain historical 
and spatial discrepancies in NGO presence and effectiveness.  
Bebbington (2004) suggests that any authentic analysis of NGOs should consider 
not just their organizational form but should also examine them in terms of their broad 
historical, institutional and social structures, recognizing that they are created as a means 
to pursue strategic goals through the strength of a formal organization with legal and 
social recognition. This means that the significance of NGOs depends not only on their 
inner structures (their policies, values and objectives) or the achievement of stated 
objectives, but also on their interactions with the broader structures which surround them, 
and that such structures must be considered with regard to their historical significance. In 
recognizing this historical context, Bebbington (2004) also emphasizes that NGO 
development assistance (or ‘big D’ development) appears in response to the unequal 
spatial distribution of poverty and opportunity that inevitably results from immanent 
development, or structural, political and economic development under capitalism (‘little 
d’ development). These contexts play a role in directing NGOs in their reactions to 
contrasting stakeholder demands.  
Helliker (2008) suggests that NGOs are both the victims and initiators of the 
ambiguous and complicated web of social relations in which they operate; infused within 
the contradictory pressures defining their situation and inclined to sustain themselves 
instead of engaging in sustainable development. Their role as victim is evidenced above 
in the discussions of accountability to donors, states and local communities. However, the 
very condition of responding to conflicting pressures that victimizes them, as well as the 
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significance of the position that they have etched and staked out for themselves in 
delivering development (that is now deemed essential to poverty reduction), may in fact 
provide NGOs with some space to determine their own direction as well as some 
grounding to direct, or at least influence, the outside forces that apply pressure on them.   
Considering the legitimacy of the interests of NGOs as they maneuver through 
their complicated social environment, this thesis argues that although they do not always 
act in the best interests of their beneficiaries and in a manner that best achieves their 
stated goals (promoting empowerment and sustainable livelihoods), NGOs do pursue 
these goals with considerable vigor to the extent that they do not compromise their own 
survival, and therefore generally speaking, they do perform a legitimate and important 
function in the development sector.  Due to the various pressures of accountability, they 
are often not capable of meeting the requirements of all of their contradictory 
stakeholders; hence they are caught in the middle of such stakeholder requirements. 
Nevertheless, they do have some freedom and latitude as well as great potential to control 
the defining factors of their organizational practices. By delivering development 
assistance, they are the institutions that bestow the development industry or system with 
its ethical legitimacy and, by way of this, they possess some power to influence the 
decisions of their donors (Tvedt 2002).   
They also have the potential to use alternative and informal forms of motivation 
for carrying out more participatory, downward accountability. Mebrahtu (2003) provides 
an excellent example of this potential, where the junior field staff of a development NGO 
creatively worked alternative, participatory methods of M&E into their schedules for the 
purpose of improving their own performance. This evidences not only the potential 
flexibility of NGOs to have some control over their ‘ambiguous’ situation, but also the 
desire from within themselves, at least at the ground level, to effectively incorporate 
participatory forms. Although power relations between states and NGOs remain 
inconsistent, particularly in countries with hegemonic, authoritarian regimes, NGOs 
which avoid controversial positions can still foster empowerment and self-reliance 
through facilitating mainstream development projects. Additionally, aside from whether 
or not they always consistently achieve their stated goals of catalyzing sustainable 
development and fostering empowerment, arguments can be made to legitimate their 
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existence, merely on the grounds that they make contributions to the economies of the 
communities in which they operate by providing employment (Harsh et al. 2010) and 
bringing in international money.   
This claim about the potentially significant role of NGOs in participatory 
development does not deny that their very existence may have a tendency to undermine 
their own goals and that their development initiatives can be, in the long run, ultimately 
unsustainable and ineffective, in that they perpetuate the status quo and legitimize state 
institutions in countries with incompetent, corrupt or oppressive governments by picking 
up the slack where those governments have failed to deliver basic services to their 
citizens (Clark 1997, Makoba 2002, Brett 2003). This type of argument suggests that 
development NGOs alleviate problems just enough for people to accept the 
circumstances of their poverty, rather than taking a stand against their governing powers 
to bring about fundamental institutional changes. NGO imperatives, though, still suggest 
and contend that such governmental changes can be brought about through grassroots, 
local empowerment, and need not arise from a revolution of dissatisfied, desperate and 
suffering people. 
Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn here is the importance of 
constant re-examination, comparing the discourse and actual practices of development 
NGOs and considering their legitimacy as organizations for development in a contingent 
and context-specific manner.  A general acceptance of NGOs as miraculous alternatives 
to failing markets and governments, and which generally ‘do good’, oversimplifies their 
position within social networks and systems of accountability and leaves them as a ‘black 
box’ phenomenon whose internal processes and mechanisms are left uninvestigated.  
Such an acceptance would ignore the fact that NGOs are complex social organizational 
forms that have agendas of their own (whether or not those agendas are legitimate or 
questionable).  It is also important not to oversimplify the structures within NGOs, as 
their internal structures are also complex and political and they augment the contextually-
specific nature of NGO decisions and actions. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has contextualized NGOs within the concept of intervention-based 
development (‘big D’ development), the discourse surrounding that development, and the 
ways in which NGOs are accountable to the stakeholder groups affected by and affecting 
their efforts. Participatory methods are generally accepted throughout development 
discourse as necessary for achieving the goals of fostering empowerment and 
sustainability in livelihoods, and are therefore the basis of approaches taken by NGOs.  It 
is important, however, to recognize the discursive character of participation and the 
importance of constant multi-loop learning in questioning development discourse in order 
to work toward legitimacy and effectiveness in approaches to development by NGOs  
The ability of NGOs to carry out accepted norms of development discourse, particularly 
regarding participatory methods, and NGOs’ effectiveness in promoting empowerment 
and sustainable livelihoods are heavily impacted by the social and political environment 
in which they exist, one in which they must constantly respond to various and changing 
levels of accountability to stakeholder groups (donors, the state structures existing where 
they work, and the beneficiaries whom they aim to support and empower). While this 
environment, in which they must respond to conflicting interests, may require 
compromises toward different stakeholder groups, NGOs continue to maneuver their way 
through this difficult social terrain with the goals of achieving their stated objectives and 
maintaining their own organizational sustainability. 
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Chapter 3: NGOs in Zimbabwe – Crisis, Communal Lands and the Role 
of NGOs 
 
  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The current context of Zimbabwe is marked by political tension and uncertainty, 
widespread poverty, and a dilapidated economy struggling to recover from crisis. This 
situation is felt heavily in rural areas, where the majority of the Zimbabwean population 
lives and attempts to sustain their livelihoods from agriculture and other livelihood 
strategies. This is particularly difficult in communal areas, where a history of exploitation 
and manipulation by central governments (colonial and post-colonial), as well as 
inconsistent land tenure and poor quality of land, has led to livelihood instability 
characterized by food insecurity, absence of sufficient infrastructural resources (including 
health and education), uncertain land tenure and overcrowding. NGOs operating in 
Zimbabwe, both national and international, have played a large part in attempting to 
alleviate poverty and improve livelihood security, particularly among the rural poor 
within communal areas. The direction and priorities of their involvement have been 
effected by opposing pressures, including donor priorities and trends, political tensions, 
government control through legislation and intimidation, and glaring economic and social 
crises. All of this has contributed to an NGO reaction of disengagement from 
controversial and confrontational aspects of Zimbabwean socio-economic development 
and a cautious ambivalence toward the Zimbabwe government.  
This chapter discusses the following themes: the context of the economic crisis 
and the state of poverty and political uncertainty in Zimbabwe; a brief history of the 
communal areas and the livelihood uncertainty and development deficiencies in these 
areas; and a discussion of NGO roles in Zimbabwe pertaining to relations with the state, 
donors, and beneficiaries in communal areas. This culminates in an analysis of the 
legitimacy and appropriateness of NGOs working in Zimbabwe. 
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3.2 Political Economy of Zimbabwe 
The current atmosphere in Zimbabwe is characterized by a struggling economy, political 
uncertainty, and widespread poverty involving food, health, and livelihood insecurity.  
Although progress toward political and economic stability has been made in recent years, 
particularly due to the Global Political Agreement between the three major political 
parties in 2008, the livelihoods of the majority of the Zimbabwean population remain 
characterized by poverty and uncertainty. The economy has begun to stabilize but is still 
struggling for recovery from severe crisis which was catalyzed by economic structural 
adjustment in the 1990s and a radical land reform program from the year 2000. This has 
created an environment of economic crisis, livelihood insecurity and high political 
tensions. 
 Zimbabwe is in a state of recovery from what is known as the crisis period, from 
2000 to 2008, which was characterized by three primary dimensions: massive economic 
meltdown, collapse of social service delivery and state authoritarianism (Murisa 2010).  
The economic meltdown involved significant shrinkage in the gross domestic product, 
hyperinflation and a massive reduction in formal employment coupled with the further 
development of an already large informal employment sector. Between 2000 and 2007, 
the gross domestic product (GDP) shrunk by 40 percent and – in 2003 – unemployment 
was measured at 62 percent and was estimated to have reached 80 percent in following 
years (UNDP 2010:2, 4-5) because of the ongoing dwindling in the sheer size of the 
economy and loss of employment. However, it should be noted that these figures do not 
account for informal employment, which made up a significant component of economic 
activities. The informal sector (often involving illegal and dangerous activities) became a 
critical means for survival by people in both urban and rural areas (Jones 2010). Jones 
(2010) argues that even many of those who maintained formal sector, or ‘decent’ 
employment, took up informal and illegal means of making money, as the hyperinflation 
-- reaching 231 million percent in 2008 (Chimhowu 2009:14) – devalued their formal 
employment paychecks to the point where it was not enough to support a livelihood. In 
addition, the crisis economy saw the Human Poverty Index (HPI) rise from 17 percent in 
2000 to 40.9 percent in 2006, with the percentage of people living under the total 
consumptive poverty line in 2003 standing at 72 percent (Chimhowu 2009:11,19). 
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Greatly affecting urban and rural livelihoods, in 2003 the extent of people living below 
the Food Poverty Line reached 58 percent, a figure that increased in following years 
(UNDP 2010:6).  
This collapsing economy fed into a breakdown of social service delivery, 
particularly affecting education and health, which had already been instigated by the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), a set of neo-liberal economic policies 
that was put in place in the early 1990s. This program, which instigated the initial fall in 
the economy, involved the introduction of health center fees and school fees (Murisa 
2010). After independence and into the 1990s, the Zimbabwean government had invested 
significantly in education, making huge headway and improving both enrollment 
statistics and the quality of education. However, due to ESAP and the further socio-
economic crisis between 2000 and 2008, the government’s education budget (combined 
budgets for Ministries of Education and Culture, and Higher Education) declined from 
approximately 22 percent (of the national budget) in the 1980s to 15 percent on average 
from 2000 to 2006, bringing the level of education down with it (Chimhowu 2009: 77).   
 This decline in social service delivery was particularly exacerbated by the 
hyperinflation which led to what is known as a ‘brain drain,’ or mass exodus of educated 
and trained professionals to other countries with more stable economies, better working 
conditions and better professional opportunities. This most severely affected the medical 
and educational professions (Murisa 2010, Chikanda 2007), which in turn worsened the 
already declining standards of social service delivery. In 2006, it was estimated that three 
million Zimbabweans were living outside of the country and that three quarters of 
Zimbabwean-trained doctors migrate soon after receiving their medical degrees (Shumba 
and Mawere 2012: 108).  In 2010, Zimbabwe could only claim 21 percent of the required 
number of medical professionals (Murisa 2010). This immense brain drain has had 
serious negative consequences on both the quality and availability of medical care and 
education, among other professions. 
Multiple other factors contributing to the economic and social-services meltdown 
crisis, including declining international donor funding and a decline in export revenue, 
can be linked to issues of state authoritarianism, particularly around the controversial Fast 
Track Land Redistribution Program (FTLRP) which began in 2000. The late 1990s were 
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characterized by a general dissatisfaction with the authoritarian single-party political 
regime, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), and a rising 
opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Fast track land 
redistribution arose in the broader context of tensions between the two main contending 
political parties. Whether or not sanctioned by the ZANU-PF government (this issue 
remains controversial), the initial physical acquisition of land was largely characterized 
by widespread invasions of white-owned farms, many of which involved violence 
towards not only white farm owners but black farm workers.  
Fast Track was the culmination of years of tension over the politically and 
emotionally charged issue of land reform.  From independence up until FTLRP, white 
commercial farmers remained in possession of the majority of arable farm land, having 
owned 39 percent of land in Zimbabwe at the time of independence (Masiiwa 2005: 217).  
After independence, efforts at land reform were slow, and land reform goals set by the 
state were not met. Original goals were to resettle 162,000 families onto 8.3 million 
hectares of acquired land; however, by 1989, only 52,000 households had been resettled 
on 2.6 million hectares (Thomas 2003: 697). Due to a ‘willing seller-willing buyer’ 
agreement and a lack of government funding, additional efforts at reform were limited 
and slow. In 2000, the land occupation movement (led by veterans of the war of 
liberation) finally brought the issue of land reform to a head, and the state responded with 
the formulation and implementation of the fast track program.   
The land reform involved the redistribution of white-owned farms to new black 
farmers, both for small-scale household subsistence farming and larger-scale commercial 
farming. The fast track program is still very controversial, with both the methods used in 
carrying it out and the motivation behind it, remaining subject to debate.  Some argue that 
it was a political ploy, possibly even a last resort reaction, by President Robert Mugabe 
and his political party (ZANU-PF) to retain political power, authority and popularity by 
benefitting political and economic elites as well as retaining support from war veterans 
(who had been a large support base for ZANU-PF) and rural communities at a time of 
high political tension and when the majority of the nation was questioning the party’s 
legitimacy and hegemony (Hammar et al. 2000, Campbell 2007). Others (including 
Thomas 2003) argue that the FTLRP, although co-opted by ZANU-PF at an 
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advantageous time, was a progressive and necessary step initiated by societal pressure, 
and that after some transitional time, it will prove to be a successful piece of Zimbabwean 
development. 
Despite this debate over the political corruption of resettlement and alleged 
motivations for implementing Fast Track, certain linkages between the FTLRP and the 
demise of the economy during Zimbabwe’s crisis period are incontrovertible. The two 
most obvious links between FTLRP and Zimbabwe’s crisis are the sudden massive 
decline in the commercial farming sector and the withdrawal of international donor aid 
and investment. The sudden drop in agricultural production significantly cut export 
revenue as well as diminishing tax revenue flow which was previously coming in from 
commercial farming on a significant basis (Masiiwa 2005); it increased national food 
insecurity by no longer providing sufficient quantities of staple grains (Masiiwa 2005, 
Murisa 2010); and it fueled unemployment with an estimated 200,000 job losses among 
commercial farm workers (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2010).  
Economic problems further exacerbated low agricultural productivity post-fast 
track, as the government lacked capacity and did not support the newly resettled family 
plot holders and commercial farmers after land acquisition. Donor funding was also not 
available. In fact, donor aid for land reform began to decline in the 1990s after the 
Zimbabwean government refused to produce a clear and transparent land policy for 
implementing the Land Acquisition Act, which allowed compulsory acquisition of land 
and moved away from the ‘willing buyer-willing seller’ agreement that was characteristic 
of the post-independence land reform up until that point (Zimbabwe Institute 2005). 
However, the most significant drop in foreign aid and foreign investment resulted from 
Fast Track and a widespread international disapproval of the program. This again hit 
particularly hard the delivery of social services as well as development programs, as 
donor aid financed 18 percent of the budget for such programs before the land invasions 
began (Chimhowu 2009: 18). 
 A political impasse following the elections in 2008 resulted in the three leading 
political parties of Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF and the two factions of the MDC – MDC-T and 
MDC-M) signing a Global Political Agreement and, in February 2009, an Inclusive 
Government (IG) or government of national unity was formed (UNDP 2012a). The IG 
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was a positive stride toward economic and political stabilization. Hyperinflation has been 
dealt with by the change over to the US dollar as the main currency, and subsequently the 
IG has launched recovery schemes intended to stabilize and re-build the economy and 
social sectors.  These include the Short-Term Emergency Recovery Program (STERP) of 
2009 and the Medium-Term Plan (MTP) for 2011 to 2015, launched in 2011 (UNDP 
2012b). Despite these efforts, however, the country still suffers from an external debt of 
US$6.9 billion, an estimated 72 percent of the population live under the poverty line, and 
a large informal employment sector exists with four out of every five jobs being informal 
(UNDP 2012b:2,3, African Economic Outlook 2012:12). Positive strides have been made 
toward health and education and some GDP growth is occurring, although it decelerated 
to 6.8 percent in 2011 and a projected 4.4 percent in 2012 (African Economic Outlook 
2012: 2). 
Despite the official Inclusive Government status of politics in Zimbabwe, 
evidence has shown that ZANU-PF continued to retain political control and any efforts 
made toward a more transparent and accountable government are disappointing. The 
Human Rights Watch (2009) reported that more than six months after the IG was formed, 
a series of human rights violations took place, including: violent attacks of MDC 
supporters by ZANU-PF supporters and police, unfair arrests of MDC officials, and the 
refusal to charge and arrest ZANU-PF legislators with known involvement in political 
violence in 2008. The same report also claimed that ZANU-PF remained in control of 
most senior ministries (including security ministries) and that the MDC has been unable 
or unwilling to push for human rights due to its desire for the survival of the power-
sharing agreement. Subsequent reports (Human Rights Watch 2011, Human Rights 
Watch 2012) reported continual violent action or arrests against MDC supporters and 
human rights activists in 2010 and 2011; however, the occurrences reported declined 
significantly between yearly reports, evidencing positive progress. The parliamentary 
elections held in July 2013, which saw a victory for ZANU-PF, were highly controversial. 
A late challenge to the legitimacy of the election was made by the opposition MDC party 
which accused ZANU-PF of general dishonesty, lack of transparency and rigging the 
polling stations. At the time, various general news networks reported that this challenge 
was dropped and election results were not overturned (Smith 2013, BBC 2013). 
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The struggles swirling around the Zimbabwe crisis are far from resolved. The 
strides that have been made towards stability, including the Inclusive Government and 
the implementation of the US dollar as the key currency, have been important. 
Nevertheless, the dilapidated formal employment sector and the gap in professional 
resources left from the brain drain continue to affect education and health services, 
particularly in rural areas.  Questions as to the success of the IG and the legitimacy of the 
2013 elections exist and political uncertainty keeps tensions high. The struggle for 
livelihood security for the majority of Zimbabweans remains a serious concern.  
Although moving in a positive direction, the country remains weakened from its crisis 
and an uncertain political and economic future.   
 
3.3 Conditions in Communal Areas  
Of Zimbabwe’s 386,000 square kilometers of land, 42 percent (approximately 16.4 
million hectares) is designated as communal areas (CAs) (USAID: 4). Before the year 
2000, 60 percent of Zimbabwe’s population lived in CAs (Zimbabwe Institute 2005: 6).  
As of 2008, 63 percent of the Zimbabwean population was living in rural areas with 60 
percent of the working population relying on agriculture for food and employment 
(USAID: 4). Given that the case study for this thesis is based in a communal area, I detail 
the history and contemporary conditions of CAs.  
Communal areas were originally established as Native Reserves under the 
colonial Rhodesian government and many are located in drought prone, low agricultural 
productivity areas.  The various governance policies both pre- and post-independence and 
precarious balances in power between traditional leaders and elected councils post-
independence have created inconsistent systems of land tenure and allocation within CAs. 
Due to overpopulation, poor quality of land, and these inconsistent land allocation 
processes, living conditions for residents of communal areas are characterized by poverty, 
hunger and instability and require diverse livelihood practices for means for survival.  
Further exacerbating the situation and the natural lack of arability of the land, communal 
areas are in large part environmentally degraded from deforestation and overgrazing 
(African Economic Outlook 2012), making agricultural productivity even more difficult.  
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The complexity, precariousness and poverty of communal area livelihoods are the effects 
of exploitation, land scarcity and an inconsistent history of governance. 
 Native Reserves were originally established in 1898 as a supposed means of 
protecting the indigenous majority populations from becoming entirely landless, although 
the reserves were located in agro-ecological regions IV and V, which are agriculturally 
and productively marginal and were “considered unsuitable for European settlement” 
(Mbiba 2001:427). According to Mbiba (2001:428-429), the 97 percent of the population 
in 1930 which was black was apportioned nine million hectares of land in the native 
reserves under the Land Apportionment Act, which allowed 20.4 million hectares of land 
for white settlers. Although the nine million hectares was later increased to 16 million 
(Mbiba 2001: 429), it remained a ridiculously unbalanced apportionment of land, creating 
overpopulated, crowded and congested conditions in the native reserves. These 
conditions were then fed by rapid population growth, reducing the agricultural capacity 
and environmental quality of the already mediocre land.   
In 1915, the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) was introduced by the Southern 
Rhodesian government as an effort to reduce environmentally-degrading practices of 
cultivation and to introduce individual land rights within native reserves as a means of 
incentivizing investment and commitment to conservation-friendly cultivation methods 
(Nyambara 2001:771). While widely opposed in rural areas due to its effect of creating 
additional landless households by force, the NLHA recognized a group of master farmers, 
or those who adhered to the training and methods laid-out by the law. This created a 
“differentiated nature of communal area society” due to new land asset holdings and 
unequal productivity (Mbiba 2001:429). In 1967, the Rhodesian government abolished 
the NLHA and its individual rights-based concept, replacing it with the Tribal Trust Land 
Act (TTLA), which placed the power of land allocation with traditional leaders and 
stressed the concept of ‘communal’ land tenure, rather than individual landholding.  This 
remained the official policy on the management of land tenure in CAs up until 
independence in 1980.  
After independence, governance over CAs was changed again and the Communal 
Land Act and the District Councils Act removed the official control of land issues from 
the traditional leaders and placed it in elected Rural District Councils, making the 
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individual sale of land illegal, vesting land ownership in the state, and placing 
administrative powers, including settling disputes over land, with the District Councils 
(O’Flaherty 1998). In 1986, land resettlement and reorganization within CAs was 
included in the Zimbabwean government’s Five Year Plan (O’Flaherty 1998). Then, in 
1999, the Traditional Leaders Act restored authority over land issues to the traditional 
leaders, with decisions remaining subject to Rural District Council approval (Chimhowu 
and Woodhouse 2010). In addition to these inconsistencies of governance affecting land 
allocation and tenure, overcrowding in CAs was severely affected by a population 
explosion occurring between 1982 and the late 1990s (Hartnack 2005) and, by 2000, 
fewer than five percent of households in communal areas had access to infrastructure and 
irrigation resources (Moyo et al. 2000: 66).   
Issues of overcrowding, land allocation and governance were further exacerbated 
with events following 2000, though fast track was supposedly intended to decongest CAs 
by moving a large number of CA residents to fast track farms. Of significance is that 
some 200,000 farm workers lost their employment on commercial farms when the 
FTLRP reallocated formerly white-owned large-scale farms (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 
2008). In this regard, some workers took to communal areas in search of residence 
(Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2010) while others migrated to urban informal settlements 
or back to their country of origin for those who had previously migrated (including 
decades before) from another country (Hartnack 2005, Campbell 2007). According to 
Kinsey’s study of population movements in Zimbabwe’s communal areas and 
resettlement areas (2010: 340), “in CAs, [the] mean household size remained constant 
over the period 1997 to 2000. Between early 2000 and early 2001, however, mean 
household size in CAs increased dramatically – by 100 per cent.” This timing 
corresponds with the first year of the fast track program, suggesting that there is a link 
between those who were displaced as a result of the resettlement program and the 
population growth in CAs. It has also been claimed that workers who were displaced 
from their previous residences on commercial farms were in large part excluded from the 
target groups of fast track, which were ‘landless peasants’ and ‘war veterans’ (Chambati 
and Magaramombe 2008). Further, evidence suggests that many of those targeted 
beneficiaries from CAs who did receive land under the FTLRP still maintained their 
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rights to land in the CAs (Makura-Paradza 2010); therefore by maintaining dual 
households, the quest of reducing overcrowding in CAs was undermined. This claim 
supports Mbiba’s statement (2001: 426) that “Zimbabwe’s national land debate 
[neglected] land problems facing communal land.”  
Another significant historical event with evidence of affecting CAs is Operation 
Murambatsvina, or Operation Restore Order, which occurred in 2005 and involved the 
destruction of homes, communities and informal employment sources of mass numbers 
of urban poor populations who were living in informal backyard structures or illegal 
squatter settlements. This military-style operation, carried out by the Zimbabwe 
government, led to the mass displacement of approximately 570,000 people (or 133,534 
households) from informal urban settlements (Potts 2006:276). This aggressive and 
extreme state intervention left an unspecified number of people seeking residence in 
communal areas. The combined effects of the operation and FTLRP have further 
increased the strain, poverty and livelihood insecurity in communal areas.  
This history of CAs helps to explain the origins of the variety of complex systems 
of land tenure in communal areas. The basis of how land is allocated in communal areas 
today is a remnant of the former colonial government’s NLHA and TTLA, with the 
NLHA having allocated land into individually-possessed plots and communal grazing 
areas (Makura-Paradza 2010), and the TTLA placing land allocation authority with 
traditional leaders. Before independence, and since the TTLA, traditional leaders were 
responsible for local governance in the communal areas. Further, despite the fact that the 
Communal Land Act and District Councils Act removed the control of land issues from 
the traditional leaders and placed it with elected Rural District Councils, traditional 
leaders retained local support, with communal area residents continuing to go to 
traditional leaders with land issues. Through this, traditional leaders illegally reacquired 
land allocation authority, which caused tension with the legal authority of the elected 
councils (Ncube 2011) until the introduction of the Traditional Leaders Act restored 
authority over land issues to the traditional leaders, with decisions remaining subject to 
Rural District Council approval (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2010). 
The way land tenure is managed in communal areas cannot be generalized across 
Zimbabwe because of local variation. However, studies of particular CAs have shown 
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evidence of informal land markets, where communal grazing land is commoditized and 
allocated land is bought or rented in response to growing populations.  According to law, 
communal land may be transferred through marriages, across generations and in the case 
of death. But, in some communal areas, traditional leaders have been accused by families 
of targeting grazing areas for the sale of land to ‘outsiders’ (Matondi and Dekker 2011: 
16). In their case study of Svosve communal area, Chimhowu and Woodhouse (2008) 
found that the sale of grazing land and renting of land to newcomers, particularly those 
displaced from former commercial farms and urban areas, is common practice. They also 
found evidence that those displaced from urban areas were most vulnerable in terms of 
paying higher prices for use of land, as they “were likely to be opposition supporters, and 
should not be allowed to settle in communal areas” (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 
2008:295).  Such informal land markets are potentially problematic in terms of livelihood 
security for communal residents, not only because they contribute to overcrowding and 
vulnerability, but also because their informality creates a precarious tenancy where land-
holders are reluctant to engage in long-term investments in the land (Matondi and Dekker 
2011) or to practice sustainable land use methods because of possible future loss of the 
land. This lack of incentive to invest in conservation and sustainable practices, brought 
on by these systems of tenure, increase degradation of the land to the detriment of 
livelihoods (Vivian 1994).  
Overcrowding, land scarcity and land degradation are central issues defining the 
context of communal area livelihoods. The lack of land and the necessity to seek 
supplementary and external employment (that is, employment outside CAs) has been 
characteristic of communal areas ever since their establishment under the colonial 
government, but this need has intensified with time. The absence of incentives for 
investment in land (that has resulted from variations and inconsistencies in land 
allocation and tenure) coupled with overcrowding puts significant strain on the already 
marginal land, further degrading its quality and arability and making farming efforts 
difficult and often unproductive.  Because of this lack of arability and the fact that only 
nine percent of communal land can support consistent production of the staple crop of 
maize (Makura-Paradza 2010: 69), communal area livelihoods depend on diversification 
away from farming into non-agricultural and non-farm activities.  
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Agricultural efforts for supporting CA livelihoods include personal subsistence 
farming, casual labor on neighbors’ fields and the sale of crops (Chimhowu and 
Woodhouse 2008, Maroyi 2009). Urban connections also make up a significant part of 
livelihood diversification, particularly urban wage remittances, which have historically 
played a large part in supporting rural agricultural endeavors in communal areas. Other 
methods of livelihood diversification for people living in communal areas include 
informal trading and more dangerous and illegal activities, particularly prostitution, 
illegal beer brewing and in some places gold panning. In addition to its contributions 
toward overcrowding coming from displaced commercial farm workers, the FTLRP also 
led to a decrease in seasonal employment on commercial farms which had provided an 
important source of income for many living in communal areas (Makura-Paradza 2010). 
In other words, fast track has inhibited opportunities for livelihood diversification. This 
condition – the insecure tenure, low productivity of the land, overcrowding and therefore 
the necessity to diversify livelihoods – is the outcome of deficiencies in state policy and 
programs towards the CAs from their inception under colonial rule up until the current 
time. 
In concluding this discussion of CAs and in order to contextualize the current 
conditions of communal area livelihoods, it is important to consider the ways in which 
the state, including both the colonial Rhodesian state and the post-independence 
Zimbabwean state, has used CAs as mechanisms to serve its purposes as needed. The 
Native Reserves created by the Rhodesian colonial government were used as a means of 
furthering racial segregation, controlling the indigenous population, denying Africans 
urban citizenship (Mbiba 2001) and ensuring a reserve pool for cheap labor for the white 
economy. By locating the reserves in the worst regions with the least potential for 
agricultural productivity, the colonial state ensured the dependency of the reserve 
population on urban and commercial farming communities for labor wages to support 
their livelihoods (Makura-Paradza 2010). According to O’Flaherty (1998), a worker-
peasant system was created in the early colonial days whereby reserve residents (or 
peasants) needed one foot in the market economy (as workers) to pursue household 
livelihoods. At the same time, the un-arable conditions in the reserves were a means of 
preventing significant productive farming from arising in the reserves in competition with 
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white agriculture and therefore inhibiting the economic independence of reserve peasants.   
Furthermore, the concept of ‘traditional’ land tenure used for reserve (or 
communal) governance both pre- and post- the NLHA was a “colonial construction” to 
aid in providing the state with a system of “indirect rule” (O’Flaherty 1998:538, 
Nyambara 2001:772). According to Nyamabara (2001: 772), the concept of communal 
rather than individual land tenure enforced through the TTLA, and the placement of 
issues of land allocation in the hands of traditional leaders, not only transferred 
responsibility and accountability for land shortages in CAs from the central state to local 
leaders, but also attempted to mask blatant land shortages (hoping to make lines of 
individual tenure less defined) in order to “ward off the rising tide of African 
nationalism.”  Additionally, the power vested in traditional leaders is seen as a means of 
creating a system of control, giving power to local leaders who “were seen to be friendly 
or at least malleable to the particular needs of colonial administration” and thus creating a 
colonially-constructed property regime of ‘communal tenure’ (O’Flaherty 1998:542, 545). 
In fact, traditional chiefs showing loyalty in standing against African nationalism were 
rewarded with positions of greater power.  This manipulation of land tenure and local 
systems of governance allowed the Rhodesian state to dampen growing tensions and 
maintain social control, although it should be noted that varieties of political ideologies 
developed among various chiefs and that some used their local power in order to 
undermine policy, rather than acting merely as ‘government stooges’ (Nyambara 2001: 
780). 
After independence, communal areas continued to be used advantageously by the 
state. Ncube (2011:93) notes that, in many cases, locally-elected governing bodies 
designed for pursuing development in CAs (namely, Village Development Committees 
and Ward Development Committees) did not hold regular elections but were “imposed in 
accordance with ZANU-PF party cells at the local level.”  It has also been claimed that 
the Traditional Leaders Act which returned land allocation authority to traditional leaders, 
as well as other state tactics such as providing food and drought relief, have been political 
moves made by the ruling ZANU-PF party in order to rally rural constituencies (Ncube 
2011, Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2008, Makura-Paradza 2010). This exemplifies the 
manner in which communal area leadership and local governance have been adjusted 
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according to the convenience of state prerogatives. As well, Operation Murambatsvina 
has been identified as another way in which the Zimbabwean government has used 
communal areas in order to achieve its own agenda, including as a form of urban 
management. The argument is that the Operation was largely used towards political ends, 
by sending urban dwellers to CAs as retribution for their presumed support of the 
opposition MDC party (Potts 2006, Makura-Paradza 2010). These suspected motives for 
the operation concord with Mbiba’s statement (2001: 427) that “communal areas are a 
‘political resource’ whose control will not be relinquished without a fight.”   
 As has been evidenced in this section, people living in communal areas are 
victims of a long history of exploitation and manipulation. The outcomes of this history 
have penetrated every aspect of livelihoods for communal area residents, including 
income, food, agricultural security and tenure instability, which in turn prolong a cyclical 
pattern of land degradation and therefore a growing necessity for livelihood 
diversification. The resulting poverty has been a major concern of aid organizations 
(including NGOs) whose involvement in communal area development is discussed in the 
next two sections of this chapter. 
 
3.4 NGOs in Zimbabwe and their Relations with the State and Donors  
Since independence, NGOs have played significant roles in development in Zimbabwe.  
They vary significantly in size, focus, orientation and priorities, but all share a common 
dependency on donor funding, as well as a cautious attitude toward relations with the 
Zimbabwean government. In the last decade, NGOs in Zimbabwe have had to work 
within and respond to a crisis environment involving food and livelihood insecurity, 
political oppression and restrictive legislation, and changes in donor trends. All of these 
factors are important in considering the influence and legitimacy of their actions and the 
significance of their existence in Zimbabwe. 
NGOs in Zimbabwe vary in size and function, but can broadly be described 
within a few overlapping categories. There are smaller regional or local NGOs which are 
often associated with larger umbrella NGOs; national Zimbabwean-based NGOs, both 
intermediary and implementing, which vary in size and often channel funding and 
facilitate relations between donors and more localized NGOs; and international NGOs 
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(INGOs) which often take on both the roles of intermediary and implementing NGOs. 
Size varies significantly among both national and international NGOs and NGOs of all 
types function primarily on the basis of international donor funding.  Functionally, these 
NGOs can be (very broadly) classified as either development NGOs (DNGOs) or 
advocacy NGOs (ANGOs). DNGOs work mainly in rural areas. Their focus may include 
a range of projects dealing with agriculture, water and sanitation, education, health, basic 
infrastructure, environment, credit and loans programs, and income-generating projects. 
The main orientation of development NGOs is community mobilization through 
development projects. ANGOs are generally based in urban areas in Zimbabwe and focus 
on advocating for policy change on a range of issues including human rights, 
environmental issues and constitutional reform. 
NGOs in Zimbabwe communicate with each other and with larger donor 
organizations through a system of clusters, which group together NGOs with similar 
focus areas. These clusters include Agriculture, Early Recovery, Education, Food Aid, 
Health, Logistics, Nutrition, Protection, and WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) 
(OCHA 2009). According to NGO staff members interviewed from World Vision, 
Operation Trumpet Call and Tear Fund (Appendix 1), these clusters meet on a regular 
basis to discuss national strategies and to gain information about funding opportunities.  
Government officials, sometimes very high in political rank, also periodically attend 
these meetings. The clusters are also used as a forum to share and combine data and 
assessment information gathered by various NGOs. Such meetings usually take place in 
Harare, rather than rotating the location, which makes it difficult for any smaller, locally-
based NGOs who are not Harare-based to attend (although they are invited), due to lack 
of funding and transportation. Due to this issue, the cluster system, while providing an 
excellent opportunity for organizational learning and exposure to secondary data which 
may be helpful in conducting needs-assessments, places large-scale NGOs at an 
advantage over smaller, locally-based NGOs in terms of exposure and access to funding 
opportunities as well as recognition from government, therefore creating a necessity for 
intermediary NGOs in acting on behalf of these smaller NGOs. 
Before independence in 1980, NGOs were few in number and were primarily 
welfare-oriented, targeting disadvantaged groups. However, after independence, the 
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number of NGOs increased significantly (supported by a large increase in international 
donor money) and the primary focus changed to development work (including food 
security, rural and urban energy, housing and employment schemes) with a particular 
emphasis on communal areas (Moyo et al. 2000). During the 1980s, much social service 
delivery was carried out though NGOs in partnership with the government, accounting 
for health, education and income-generating projects in notably rural areas (Murisa 2010). 
Government acknowledged these NGO activities as complementary, in filling gaps in 
areas that government programs were not reaching (Helliker 2006). In the 1990s, local 
government entities in CAs had come to rely on NGOs for implementation of 
development and they themselves were part of those “being developed” (Bornstein 2005: 
121). This relationship between NGOs and the state, however, was also characterized by 
the avoidance of politically confrontational issues.   
Into the 1990s, much NGO direction shifted towards advocacy work. In the late 
1990s, accompanied by rising political tension, the National Constitutional Assembly 
(NCA), a large coalition of over a hundred NGOs, along with churches and trade unions, 
was formed in order to pressure the government for constitutional reform and public 
transparency (Dorman 2003). In response, the government sought to exclude NGOs and 
the general public from engaging publicly in constitutional, political and civic issues; and 
accusatory propaganda against ANGOs as being foreign-inspired became the dominant 
discourse of the state (Dorman 2003). After 2000, DNGOs responded to fast track by 
refusing to engage with fast track farmers in development projects; additionally, because 
of the growing crises in the economy,  their work in CAs shifted significantly towards 
humanitarian relief, such that many mainstream development projects were suspended 
(Helliker 2006). Since then, NGO work, both among DNGOs and ANGOs, has been 
marked by a cautious avoidance of issues which might lead to direct confrontation with 
the Zimbabwean state and specifically the ruling party.  
NGO activities in Zimbabwe can be better understood within the context of their 
relationship with the state. By and large, NGO-state relations in Zimbabwe have been 
marked by a cautious ambivalence on the part of NGOs (Moyo et al. 2000). The 
Zimbabwean government has used several tactics for controlling NGO activities, 
including first an inclusive corporatism followed by extreme exclusion, intrusive 
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legislation, slander and bad press, and intimidation. From independence and into the 
1990s, while the numbers of NGOs were growing and NGO activities were recognized by 
the state as opportunities for filling development gaps, the Zimbabwean government 
employed a corporatist strategy of control through NGO-government partnerships.  Some 
successful desired effects included a variety of groups becoming “almost subservient 
wings of the ruling party” (Helliker 2008: 244). Government tactics towards NGOs 
turned more intrusive during the late 1990s in response to NGO policy advocacy and as 
the land question became more sensitive and volatile. In 1995, for instance, the Private 
Voluntary Organizations Act was passed, which contained restrictive and repressive 
sections which gave the government significant controlling powers over NGOs (NGO 
Consultancy Africa n.d.). Although highly independent political groups had always “felt 
the wrath of the state,” the treatment previously reserved for direct political opponents 
was increasingly extended to any non-ZANU-PF group, including NGOs such as the 
NCA; and this state action included violent raids on the offices of NGOs (Dorman 2003: 
856-857). Suspicion and accusations by the state of supporting British colonialism were 
launched at NGOs and donors who had been involved with the NCA.  Mugabe accused 
NGOs of being imperialist puppets used to further foreign and specifically Western donor 
interests (Moyo et al. 2000). This anti-NGO propaganda in large part accused NGOs of 
carrying out foreign agendas based on Western standards and ideals of democracy and 
prolonging colonial oppression and control over Zimbabwe. 
In addition to accusations from the state that NGOs were agents of foreign 
agendas, the Zimbabwean government subsequently took, and particularly after the 
emergence of fast track, more legislative measures in order to control the actions of 
NGOs and other groups. The Public Order and Security Act of 2002 gave the government 
significant power to punish any acts of subversion, which was defined vaguely enough to 
include peaceful protests against human rights violations and any form of political 
advocacy (NGO Consultancy Africa n.d.). The most directly targeted NGO legislation 
was the NGO bill of 2004. Despite the fact that it was never signed into law, it had a 
significant impact on the actions and operations of NGOs in Zimbabwe. The NGO bill 
specifically targeted human rights-related organizations along with broadly targeting all 
NGOs (Tsunga and Mugabe 2004) and the many restrictive provisions proposed by the 
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NGO bill would have allowed excessive state control of NGO registration and actions, 
specifically the provision to prohibit foreign funding of any activities related to issues of 
governance and human rights (Zimbabwe Institute 2008). Although it did not become law, 
this affected NGOs in two distinct ways: it caused donor skepticism towards committing 
to medium- and long-term funding of NGOs in Zimbabwe, therefore limiting NGO 
ability to carry out meaningful work; and, by increasing apprehension and cautiousness 
amongst NGOs themselves, it limited the impact and quality of NGO work (Zimbabwe 
Institute 2008). These effects, particularly the influence of the bill on international donors, 
were detrimental to both development NGOs and advocacy NGOs. 
Currently, NGOs working in both development and advocacy carry on the 
cautious role of avoiding direct confrontation with the state. Murisa (2010) argues that 
there is some opportunity for meaningful engagement with the state, but at the risk of 
cooptation. There is evidence, at the same time, that the state is still engaged in 
exclusionary and intrusive strategies, including the unexpected suspension of 29 NGOs in 
Masvingo province in February 2012, including both ANGOs and DNGOs (such as 
CARE International) on the grounds that they had not complied with elements of the 
registration requirements (OCHA 2012, Chinaka 2012). Regardless of whether the 
charges were accurate, this occurrence caused international concern and it contributes 
further to NGOs continuing their cautious approach. 
NGO actions in Zimbabwe must also be understood within the context of donors, 
donor funding and organizational sustainability, which – as indicated – has been affected 
by the state’s approach to NGOs as described above. In this respect, oppressive and 
vague legislation, along with a relationship of mutual distrust between NGOs and the 
Zimbabwean state, have influenced donors to invest in short-term, specific projects to the 
detriment of longer term sustainable investment in development. This is marked by the 
change from funding provided for development-based projects to funding provided for 
short-term relief projects for the period following the year 2000.   
NGOs in Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, are primarily funded by international donor 
money coming from both INGOs and larger donor agencies, including European Union 
(EU), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Department for 
International Development (DFID) and United States Agency for International 
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Development (USAID) (OCHA 2012, UNICEF and ECHA 2011).  Because the majority 
of NGO funds come from these international donors, NGOs are subject to global 
development trends and the values and priorities of the international donors’ countries of 
origin. International intermediary NGOs, which are responsible for channeling funds 
from larger agencies to national NGOs, must also respond to the priorities of the 
governments and organizations in their country of origin. To give one example, because 
international donors largely disapproved of the FTLRP, it became difficult if not 
impossible for NGOs to receive funding for projects in the fast track resettlement areas. 
Some major donors, including USAID, DFID and SIDA, refused outright to give funding 
for such initiatives (Helliker 2008). Also, due to the high demand for transparency, 
donors require quantifiable results and audits which not only require significant resources 
to produce, but are difficult to measure for projects that focus on promoting sustainable 
development. The drying up of donor funding post-2000 compromised the possibility of 
such detailed monitoring and reporting.  
This demand, combined with the necessity to align with donor values and 
development trends, led Zimbabwean NGOs to cater their projects toward what would 
bring in funding, which at times led to the planning and implementing of projects that did 
not address the true needs of rural communities, or reflect the most effective methods for 
addressing on-the-ground development deficiencies. Examples of experiencing pressure 
from donors to approach projects in this way and as a means simply to acquire funding 
(as well as frustrations with such pressure) were expressed in interviews with World 
Vision Zimbabwe staff, as discussed in the next chapter (Appendix 1, Interview 1). 
Additionally, many of the smaller indigenous NGOs suffered even more because many 
donors fail to recognize the necessity of funding to cover core administrative costs 
(Helliker 2008).  
In order to manage these pressures, NGOs diversify their funding among multiple 
donors. Other forms of income streams, including research consultation, government aid 
or returns from investments, are difficult to achieve in a sustainable manner. In 
Zimbabwe, these methods are mostly unachievable and unsuccessful at providing enough 
income diversity to move away from dependence on international donors. Such 
diversification is taking place though, as discussed later in the case of World Vision (and 
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its connections with government in carrying out monitoring and evaluation in order to 
stretch limited funding for project implementation). While government support is 
sometimes received in non-monetary forms such as carrying out NGO project-related 
responsibilities (such as monitoring and evaluation) or free access to office space and 
facilities, monetary support is rarely received in Zimbabwe (Moyo et al. 2000). 
Diversifying income sustainability through returns on investments is also near impossible, 
as the majority of people benefiting from NGO development projects are in the 
communal areas, where the income base is shallow and the beneficiaries have few 
materials to contribute to NGO projects. Attaining donations from the private sector is 
also problematic, as Zimbabwe does not offer tax breaks to private businesses on such 
donated funds, and there is thus limited practical incentive for private companies to 
support NGO activities (Moyo et al. 2000). 
Another factor affecting NGO activities and priorities in Zimbabwe is the 
increasing professionalization and careerism that the NGO sector as a whole is 
experiencing. The NGO career field has created a competitive job market for 
development experts, consultants and trainers (Moyo et al. 2000). After the Economic 
Structural Adjustment in the 1990s, professionals from government ministries “flooded 
the staff of transitional NGOs” and the late 1990s saw NGOs as “prime employment for 
educated Zimbabweans” (Bornstein 2005: 101). This professionalism remains present 
today. Further, NGO employment has come to possess a sense of professional status and, 
as this employment is relatively lucrative, most expertise on development policy and 
practice resides within the sector (Murisa 2010). NGOs are traditionally and ideologically 
considered to be charitable organizations with the purpose of helping people, but 
professionalism and careerism increasingly mean that NGOs are sites of employment and, 
as such, sustaining NGOs as employment sites may be first and foremost in the minds of 
NGO staff. 
 NGOs in Zimbabwe are currently precariously located in a tension-riddled field, 
including responding to a social and economic crisis, the politics of state control over 
their actions, and international donor interests. Due to such a precarious political and 
economic context, DNGO action in contemporary Zimbabwe has been directed towards a 
fluctuating mixture of development and relief work, seeking to maneuver their way in 
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accessing whatever donor funding is available and acting in a kind of ambivalent 
avoidance of politics and state involvement. These conflicting interests and pressures 
affect the motivations, impacts and legitimacy of their work. 
 
3.5 NGOs in Communal Areas 
As indicated, a significant amount of NGO work in Zimbabwe has been rural 
development work in communal areas focusing on community mobilization for 
sustainable development. These sustainable development projects involve food security, 
agricultural production projects, income-generating projects, health and basic 
infrastructure projects, water and sanitation projects, and education and training on a 
variety of subjects.  They promote values of self-help and community-based development 
and their long-term goals include capacity-building and self-sustainability. 
As noted in the previous section, NGOs in Zimbabwe were few prior to 
independence. In addition, for a long time, the responsibility for and efforts toward 
development in communal areas were largely carried out as a form of non-governmental 
aid through churches and missionary efforts (including a focus on schooling). The current 
role played by development NGOs in Zimbabwe’s communal areas and the expectations 
that accompany that role are the product of a long evolution away from church ministries 
and mission efforts during the colonial era to the independence period which became 
dominated by NGOs and large international donors. Both the colonial era and post-
independence were characterized by the government relying heavily on foreign assistance 
for the development of CAs. Since independence, the role of DNGOs in communal areas 
has been significant; however, their methods, priorities, reliability and sustainability have 
fluctuated with, and been affected by, changing political and economic conditions which 
impact on livelihoods in CAs and on NGO-state relations in Zimbabwe. 
In late nineteenth-century southern Rhodesia, ‘development’ and ‘welfare’ of the 
black Zimbabwean population was left up to colonial missionaries as a charitable act, 
which “complemented the colonial state” and was “characterized by a paternalistic 
concern for the natives through the civilizing mission” (Bornstein 2005:10-11).  
Bornstein (2005: 11) suggests that such historical ties between mission churches and the 
state are the foundation of current development efforts, stating that “Christian missions 
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worked arm-in-arm with the state to provide education and agricultural training in 
attempts to ‘civilize’ Africans, and at the same time, to create a docile, productive rural 
labor force for colonial capitalism”.  This role and connection with the state was affected 
detrimentally particularly during the war of liberation in the 1970s, with church missions 
moving towards support of pro-African leadership and efforts shifting toward relief aid 
for those affected by the war. Bornstein (2005) also argues that, after independence, 
international NGO efforts focusing on development in Zimbabwe mirrored those of 
mission churches in the past, suggesting that the state still relied upon such efforts in 
providing development to the CAs, but with the “civilizing” agenda replaced with 
neoliberal market initiatives. This history set the context for the role NGOs currently play 
in Zimbabwe’s communal areas and the state’s continuing reliance on that role for the 
delivery of development. 
Since independence, communal areas have been specifically targeted as 
beneficiaries of NGO work due to their lack of social services, poor quality of land and 
overall high levels of livelihood insecurity. Particularly since the FTLRP, with some 
exceptions, communal areas have taken precedence over resettled farm areas because of 
the controversial nature of land reform. I have also noted that, despite the FTLRP 
supposedly having been designed in part to decongest communal areas, these areas 
remain overcrowded and people living in communal areas remain vulnerable to poverty 
and food insecurity. Because of this, NGOs remain involved in communal area 
development projects in communal areas all over the country.   
The economic crisis following 2000 and the political tensions associated with it 
impacted on the work of NGOs in communal areas. As the rural areas of Zimbabwe 
provide the majority of the support base for ZANU-PF, NGO work in communal areas 
was subjected to suspicion from government over project motivation, particularly in CAs 
with historically anti-ZANU-PF sentiment, such as many of those located in 
Matabeleland. This is particularly true regarding needs-assessments and beneficiary 
targeting, as such actions are easily labeled by the state as entailing some sort of biased 
political agenda. During election periods, World Vision, along with other NGOs, has 
been accused of involvement in rural politics (Helliker 2006). Such accusations 
particularly contribute to the cautious character by which NGOs approach their work.  
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Leading up to and during the most recent election period in July 2013, NGOs working in 
multiple CAs were requested to cease their activities and remove themselves from the 
areas to allow room and time for unhindered campaigning by political parties, 
undisturbed by the presence of NGOs (Appendix 1, Interview 3). In addition to political 
tensions, the economic crisis occurring throughout the first decade of the 2000s shifted – 
as mentioned earlier – much development work to short-term emergency relief around 
food insecurity as well as the HIV and AIDS pandemic (Helliker 2006). This in large part 
is due to changes in agendas of donors, who are only now slowly re-opening the idea of 
long-term funding as opposed to very short-term funding. Even as the economy has 
begun to stabilize, both political tensions and poverty remain prominent in communal 
areas. As a result, NGO development projects in communal areas are precarious in terms 
of answering to both donors and the state.   
NGOs contribute significantly to communal area livelihoods in a variety of areas.  
They are a key source of finance, supplementing communal area inhabitants’ incomes 
and livelihoods through income-generating projects, food relief, and loans for farming 
inputs (Moyo et al. 2000); and they also engage in infrastructural projects. Examples of 
NGOs in communal areas include Plan International, World Vision, Lutheran 
Development Service and Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) 
(Helliker 2006).  Plan International focuses on child health care, food security and food 
relief aid, agricultural production of crops and livestock, and income-generating projects 
(Plan Zimbabwe 2012).  World Vision carries out a variety of development projects, both 
input-related and training workshops, focusing on water and sanitation, education, HIV 
and AIDS, health and nutrition, agricultural production, and dam construction and 
irrigation (Helliker 2008). Lutheran Development Service focuses on water and food 
security, microfinance and economic development, environmental management, 
sanitation, HIV and AIDS, rural infrastructure development, information and 
communication technology, and emergency response and disaster preparedness (DSW 
2012). And ITDG focuses on rehabilitating rural water points, agricultural production 
(including dairy, mushrooms and guar beans) and bee keeping (Helliker 2006). These 
examples represent only a very small number of the many NGOs working in Zimbabwe’s 
communal areas. Often, though, these NGOs operate in an uncoordinated fashion and 
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often through patchwork development in which some communal areas receive greater 
development assistance than others.   
Participation is generally expressed by most of these NGOs as central to their 
development methodology and values systems. The approaches taken toward 
participation vary among NGOs and between different communal areas. Most claim to 
engage in deep participatory methodologies but often this is not the case. Further, 
approaches are particularly specific to the district in which the communal area is located, 
as all NGO work must be approved by the District Administrator (DA) and the Rural 
District Council (RDC) for each specific district. Such state entities and personnel seek to 
determine the NGO’s intentions prior to their direct involvement with communities in the 
CAs, and also require that NGO actions work toward or at least complement the district’s 
development plan. In addition to this element of determining project direction prior to 
contact with intended beneficiaries it became evident through my fieldwork that, due to 
the cluster system (as explained above) and donor funding limitations, participatory 
needs-assessment and in-the-field project planning appears to be limited in actual practice, 
with much of the assessment and planning taking place prior to connections with 
intended beneficiaries.   
As well, while some NGOs (such as those mentioned above) cover a wide variety 
of sectors and are therefore equipped to respond to a variety of needs, many NGOs are 
specialized in their efforts and therefore they enter a particular CA with a pre-determined 
intervention plan. An example of this is the NGO called Operation Trumpet Call, which 
works alongside partner churches in CAs throughout the country in order to teach a 
specific method of conservation agriculture (Appendix 1, Interview 17). Such NGOs use 
the cluster system in addition to official reports, such as those from the Zimbabwe 
Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC), as well as reports from their partner 
churches, to seek out and assess needs which have already been expressed by specific CA 
communities and that correspond to their pre-set, specialized interventions. They 
therefore approach participation from an involvement-based perspective rather than the 
catalytic empowerment-based approach (where the beneficiaries would determine and 
plan their own project with the aid or guidance from the NGO).   
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Another approach taken to participation in development interventions is a 
training- and knowledge-based approach which involves limited to no physical inputs.  
This knowledge-based approach attempts to achieve – as articulated by the NGOs 
involved – empowerment-based participation in project implementation by attracting 
motivated individuals who are willing to attend training workshops regardless of 
receiving inputs.  Both World Vision and Operation Trumpet Call carry out these types of 
interventions in Zimbabwe’s CAs.  
Participation by rural communities with regard to monitoring and evaluation also 
varies considerably among NGOs working in CAs. As will become evident in the next 
two chapters, World Vision has taken on a practical, resource-saving approach to much 
of their monitoring and evaluation by saving the bulk of their donor funding for project 
implementation, and outsourcing much of their monitoring and evaluation processes and 
mechanisms to local government ministries. Again, however, such methods are restricted 
and depend on the particular CA and the district in which it lies, as relationships with 
local authorities (both elected government and traditional authorities) must be trusting, 
conducive and supportive for this approach to be achieved. As is evidenced in the above 
discussion of the historical and contemporary context of NGOs in Zimbabwe, such 
trusting and positive relationships are often non-existent.   
The ability of NGOs in CAs to achieve participatory methods is also affected at 
times by the beneficiaries themselves. Witchcraft in rural areas is a concern for NGO 
effectiveness, as economic success for communal households can be treated as suspect 
and responded to with apprehension, with the improved livelihoods of household 
members becoming subjected to the believed affects of witchcraft (Bornstein 2005). In 
this case, the very goals that NGO development efforts are attempting to achieve are 
working toward breaking down or changing such local beliefs.  
In summary, DNGOs continue to be an important source of development 
provision in Zimbabwe’s communal areas, but their work in contemporary Zimbabwe is 
marked by deep tensions and contradictions. As a result, they struggle to match the 
practical requirements of accountability to the state and to donors with their proclaimed 
ideals of empowerment and participatory development.  This will be exemplified later in 
my case study of World Vision in Matabeleland.  
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3.6 Social Space of NGOs in Zimbabwe: Legitimacy and Effectiveness 
Despite the sparse literature on NGOs, and specifically DNGOs, in Zimbabwe, critical 
questions have long arisen over the motivations, legitimacy and effectiveness of NGOs in 
Zimbabwe. Their inherent dependence on international funding and therefore the implicit 
international influence over the direction of their projects, goals and priorities is 
problematic in-itself though not unusual for NGOs worldwide. This dependence has also 
been used by the Zimbabwean state to justify tactics of oppressive control over NGO 
actions. Additionally their disengagement from controversial issues, both before the 
FTLRP and dramatically after it, has been questioned. This includes their seemingly 
absent role in advocacy for significant land reform prior to 2000, their lack of 
development work within ‘newly’ resettled areas post-2000, and their avoidance of direct 
confrontation with the state. Other questions relate to the need and legitimacy of the role 
of NGOs, particularly in rural communal areas, in filling in gaps where the competence 
or willingness of the state to address development and social services deficits has fallen 
short. In this respect, there are two concerns. First, it can be argued that such 
development activities by NGOs play the role of an unsustainable bandage for gaps in 
state delivery, whereas NGOs could be involved in building state capacity for 
implementing sustainable rural development initiatives. Secondly, in engaging in 
development work, NGOs may be patching up public service deficiencies to a point of 
minimal acceptance from the perspective of rural communities and therefore dampening 
rural opposition to state inadequacies and standing in the way of any potential for more 
far-reaching and empowering development. In addressing these complex questions and 
concerns, which I also pursue in and through my case study, I briefly consider NGOs in 
the context of their social space in Zimbabwe and, in so doing, reiterate some of the 
points made already. 
 Donor funding has been a critical aspect of NGO activity in Zimbabwe on 
multiple levels. On the level of project design and implementation, it has been a 
determinant in focus areas, methods and longevity of development projects. This is 
problematic in realizing the integration of deep participatory methodologies into projects 
as well as toward implementing long-term sustainable projects. As well, donor priorities 
create the potential for excluding from projects a number of people or even entire 
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communities who are in dire need of development assistance. As mentioned above, fast 
track resettlement areas have been excluded, with minor exceptions, from internationally-
funded development aid due to disapproval of the program by the international 
community. This is particularly troublesome in that, regardless of the debate over the 
motivations and methods pursued through FTLRP, the 127,192 households which were 
resettled onto family plots under what is called the A1 scheme (Zimbabwe Institute 2005: 
14) could benefit greatly from development projects given the state’s failure to provide 
proper post-settlement support. Also, even in communal areas, where most development 
NGO projects are concentrated, shifting donor trends and international responses to 
Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis have impacted on the sustainability of ongoing 
projects. 
Judging from these influences, NGOs appear to be a subordinate group in the 
international (‘big d’) development system, at the mercy of international trends and top-
down donor driven methods. Helliker (2008:266-268) however points out that although 
NGOs are subordinate partners in their general relationship with donors, donors do not 
coercively impose themselves on NGOs, as NGOs in fact “tactically ‘negotiate' their 
dependence” on donors. This means that NGOs are not simply victims, but are aware of 
their inherent dependence and therefore hope to manage that relationship in a way that is 
most advantageous to their own goals, which could be a mixture of goals focusing on 
sustainable development in rural communities and those focusing on their own 
organizational sustainability. In other words, they are not merely doing the bidding of 
‘others’ (in this case, donors), but are attempting to make adulterated decisions that go 
some way to realizing their goals and that often involves compromises vis-à-vis their 
visions and missions. This also holds true within their relationship with the state.  
While NGOs may be criticized for complementarily filling development gaps 
instead of taking a more active role in contesting the hegemony of the state (and 
particularly an authoritarian state), it should be recognized that they are inhibited by the 
culture of fear – not always a fear of violence and repression necessarily, though this 
sometimes happens, but the fear of organizational insecurity if subjected to a state 
crackdown. As Moyo et al. (2000:85) point out, NGOs “cannot apply pressure against 
officials who are known to engage in unethical conduct unless an appropriate, free and 
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democratic environment exists in the society”. It has already been pointed out that, as a 
result of intimidation, false accusations and oppressive legislation, such an environment 
does not exist in present-day Zimbabwe. DNGOs therefore have chosen to follow the 
cautious direction (or the course of least resistance) that leads to mobilizing development 
initiatives in rural areas that are neglected by the state, rather than head-on confrontation 
where they risk further oppression and exclusion. That, however, leads to a large 
overarching question as to their legitimacy: does filling in gaps truly benefit people and 
catalyze the development of more sustainable livelihoods, or does it merely ameliorate 
deeply-engrained issues in the short term, therefore prolonging a state of uncertainty 
instead of allowing true, long-lasting, fundamental change which arguably must penetrate 
the realm of government? 
 The argument that criticizes NGOs for filling gaps implies that if people no longer 
received humanitarian and development aid, they would refuse to tolerate their situation 
and rise up against the state, catalyzing revolutionary change. This argument, however, is 
simplistic and unrealistic. Even if such a reaction could occur, the results would be 
uncertain and the brunt of the costs of such changes could be born mostly by the poor and 
vulnerable, first through the increased livelihood insecurity from the likely withdrawal of 
aid and, second, through the uncertain impacts of such a situation (Bird and Busse 2007).  
In the case of Zimbabwe, such a situation would be particularly felt by those located in 
CAs, which have a history of bearing government manipulation. If this argument for 
social frustration leading to revolutionary change is not appropriate or feasible and if 
long-term development change and increased livelihood security must involve 
fundamental changes at the state level, a key question then arises: how can NGOs in 
Zimbabwe not only fill in gaps but influence change in government development policies 
and practices whilst maneuvering in a social space in which the fear of exclusion makes 
confrontational advocacy impossible?   
It was argued earlier in this chapter that, despite the positive progress made in 
2009 when the power-sharing agreement was signed, the political tensions remaining still 
shape an NGO attitude of ambivalent avoidance of controversial issues. Therefore, the 
true root of this question regarding NGOs’ legitimacy in Zimbabwe is whether or not 
they are capable of, and are active in, maintaining a constant process of self-reflection 
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that critically scrutinizes their decisions and their impacts, as well as recognizes 
opportunities for instigating meaningful change. As part of organizational learning, such 
a demeanor of reflection and readiness is what is necessary for NGOs to have at least the 
possibility of remaining on the progressive and appropriate side of the fine line between 
the superficial alleviation of development discrepancies (and therefore the perpetuation of 
the status quo) and meaningful development assistance that catalyzes sustainable 
livelihood practices and social change. In this respect, Helliker (2008:266) notes that 
“failure to reflect regularly and meaningfully on organizational practices is considered to 
be one of the ‘biggest weaknesses’ of NGOs in Zimbabwe because ‘we are operational all 
the time’”. If that weakness exists, then the fundamental flaw in the priorities and 
practices of NGOs in Zimbabwe must be resolved if they are to carry out an appropriate 
and meaningful role in the socio-economic development of Zimbabwe and a role that 
brings to the fore empowering participatory methodologies.  
 
3.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has discussed the role of NGOs in Zimbabwe and the contexts in which they 
carry out their work. Due to its complex and tension-riddled history in addition to recent 
economic crisis and political uncertainty, NGOs in Zimbabwe have experienced great 
precariousness in their pursuit of funding, adhering to government restrictions and 
requirements and ensuring their own organizational survival while attempting to carry out 
meaningful development assistance (namely in communal areas). If these NGOs are to 
achieve meaningful and appropriate practices in carrying out their central role in 
development in Zimbabwe, continual self-reflection and scrutiny that questions their 
methods and the very character and existence of that role is necessary. In this context, the 
following chapter looks more specifically at World Vision, both globally and nationally 
in Zimbabwe.    
 
81 
Chapter 4: World Vision – Globally and Nationally 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses World Vision, in both the global and Zimbabwean context.  In the 
first part of this chapter is a contextual basis for understanding World Vision as a global 
partnership by briefly describing its historical background and philosophical base, as well 
as its organizational structure. Then a careful consideration is taken of World Vision’s 
official policies around development approaches, practices and accountability, all of 
which shed great light on the legitimacy and appropriateness of its role both globally and 
in Zimbabwe. This provides a basis for both understanding its existence and legitimacy as 
a voluntary organization, and in contextualizing my study of its work in Umzingwane 
district in Zimbabwe which is discussed in Chapter Four. 
 
4.2 World Vision: Introduction and History 
World Vision International (WVI) is a large-scale, international, Christian NGO which 
focuses on working against the causes of poverty with a particular focus on children.  It is 
primarily a development NGO, but also conducts work in relief and advocacy. World 
Vision’s values and directives are rooted deeply in evangelicalism. It was formed by a 
group of evangelicals with close ties to the Fuller Theological Seminary (California, 
USA) in the late 1940s to early 1950s as an answer to the growing push from 
evangelicals to spread Christianity throughout the world and throughout all aspects of 
social life (Bornstein 2005). According to WVI’s history statement (WVI 2013a), the 
inspiration to form the organization came from a Reverend Pierce’s experience on a 
mission-based trip to China, in which he met an abused orphan named White Jade and 
pledged to send a monthly support stipend for the girl’s care. After that, the organization 
was officially established in 1950 (Gwynne and Miller 2011:26) and, from then, began to 
spread throughout the world.  
In 1977, World Vision International was formed as a global partnership, creating 
a structure to govern and connect World Vision work throughout the world, with a board 
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of directors, advisory council and an organizational headquarters (Gwynne and Miller 
2011:26, Bornstein 2005).  At that time, WVI was also incorporated as a non-profit 
religious corporation in California, USA (WVI 2011a). The evangelical values and the 
atmosphere of the time in which WV began (post-World War II) connect WV’s roots 
with Western (namely American) ideals that tie together material and economic 
prosperity with Christianity and moral behavior (Bornstein 2005). These values are still 
evident in WV’s work today, particularly in their development-based efforts and their 
microfinance subsidiary, VisionFund, the purpose of which is to provide small loans to 
people where access to fair banking is unavailable.  From its beginnings to the present, 
the work of World Vision has grown from direct aid and evangelical efforts to economic 
and social development, as well as advocacy and emergency relief, but always keeping 
within the context of evangelical values. Such values are relevant to the existence and 
character of the NGO itself and the justification for its role. Within these values, the 
priority of addressing the needs of children (as with the story of White Jade) has 
remained central to World Vision’s activities. 
 
4.3 World Vision’s Global Structure and Presence 
The organization and its affiliates are present in 97 countries around the world (Gwynne 
and Miller 2011:25), with 53 national offices that, in signing World Vision’s Covenant of 
Partnership, make up a “federated network” which adheres to a common vision and 
mission statement (WVI 2011a:5). This network, the World Vision Partnership, involves 
multiple types of organizational relationships at varying levels. World Vision recognizes 
its partnership through signing the Covenant of Partnership, which is a commitment by 
all World Vision entities. This covenant is an informal agreement, rather than a legal 
agreement, in which mutually-dependent bodies have all committed themselves to the 
same four covenant principles: empowerment of each (national) entity and its right and 
ability to make decisions and be held accountable; interdependence, or the recognition of 
the necessity of the global World Vision Partnership and all intrinsic values and missions 
that accompany such an international commitment; twin citizenship, recognizing 
allegiance to both the global and the national entity; and accountability in upholding the 
values and missions of World Vision as individuals and as national bodies. 
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Understanding the structures which constitute WVI helps to contextualize the ways in 
which the organization channels learning and funding, as well as maintains organizational 
continuity and integrity through internal accountability structures.  
Before looking into the global, regional, and national structures of the 
organization, as well as the tiers of leadership and accountability within such structures, 
there is much that can be learned about World Vision by considering these four key 
Partnership Covenant principles to which all World Vision partners must commit. They 
are seemingly contradictory, placing great value simultaneously on both the individuality 
of each WV entity (such that decisions and actions made are appropriate to local 
contexts) and the dependence and subservience of these same entities to World Vision 
International and its Global Partnership in order to achieve coherence, consistency and 
accountability throughout the organization (such that the direction of all World Vision 
work is based on the same set of values and priorities). According to World Vision 
International, the first principle, empowerment, “ensures that bureaucracy does not 
impede the rights of the local entity” whereas the third principle, twin citizenship, 
acknowledges that there are times when “the immediate interests of the smaller unit must 
be sacrificed to interests of the whole and to the ultimate benefit of all” (WVI 2011a:11). 
What this contradiction signifies is that while World Vision hopes to prioritize local 
values and directives – a necessary aspect for participatory and empowering development 
to occur – and therefore attempts to allow a degree of local independence, WVI also 
wishes to maintain what it sees as its organizational integrity and accountability to 
official values and objectives. 
 In order to achieve this, World Vision International operates on three levels: 
global, regional, and national.  Within a country, national offices also operate on a variety 
of levels.  At the global level, WVI is governed by the WVI Board of Directors, the WVI 
President, whom the board oversees, and the WVI Council.  The board is responsible for 
overseeing the global partnership operations, creating WV policy and making sure WV 
offices worldwide are aligned with policies. The president implements the board’s 
directives through the Global Center (or headquarters), which is responsible for the 
following: financing, including resource allocation, fundraising, and monitoring and 
accountability; building global continuity and infrastructure, as well as operational 
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strategy; promoting, protecting and advertising the World Vision identity; and any other 
areas which may highly impact the organization globally. The vision and philosophies of 
World Vision, also determined at the global level, are the responsibility of the World 
Vision International Council. 
The governing bodies listed above – the World Vision International Board of 
Directors, made up of voted-in, regional representatives who serve on the board 
voluntarily (there is no pay for sitting on the board), and the World Vision International 
Council, made up of the WVI board members and a representative from each WV 
national office – decide the direction, objectives and policies of WVI. The WVI Council 
evaluates the organization’s values, goals and achievements; then, based on these 
assessments, it recommends policy changes to the WVI Board for the latter’s 
consideration. While unable to create or amend policy, or control WVI operations, the 
council is influential in determining the direction and philosophies of the organization, as 
it has the authority to make changes to WV’s official mission and values, including core 
documents and the covenant of partnership. The WVI Board may in fact amend policy 
and control the operations of WVI, but cannot make amendments to the values, mission 
and direction of the organization as contained in core WV documents. The board meets 
two times a year and has an executive committee that meets two additional times 
separately. The covenant of partnership includes a commitment from national offices to 
follow the policies and core documents made by the board and the council. 
At the regional level, WVI is broken up into regions with eight regional forum 
areas and seven regional offices (WVI 2011a:15). Regional forums are made up of 
representatives from national offices and national advisory boards. These regional forums 
do not hold governing power over national offices (as the global center and the board of 
directors hold this power); however, they bring national representatives together to 
develop regional strategies as well as strengthen the connections between the national 
level and the global level. Finally, the regional forums allow national offices to be 
represented at international board level. Out of the national representatives who make up 
each regional forum, a regional representative is chosen by vote, and these regional 
representatives make up the WVI Board of Directors. The regional areas include Africa, 
two Asian regions, Australasia, Europe and the Middle East, Latin America and North 
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America. Other than North America, which is allowed five board directors, each region 
elects three directors (regional representatives) for the international board (WVI 
2011a:12). Unlike the regional forums, the regional offices do hold some direct 
governing powers which are delegated from the international president to the regional 
leaders. These include regional resource allocation, approving national office strategies 
and aligning regional strategy. 
At the national level, there are four types of offices: program offices, national 
office branches, intermediate national offices and interdependent national offices.  
Program offices are smaller offices which are managed by WVI line management (at the 
international level) and are located in countries where WVI has decided to carry out 
specific work. These offices generally conduct relief work, rather than development or 
advocacy work, and they do not have a vote in the WVI Council. National office 
branches have an advisory council which may vote in the WVI Council, and may send a 
member to run for a position on the WVI Board of Directors. They are, however, a 
dependent part of the overall WVI entity and therefore report to WVI line management. 
An intermediate national office is an entity of its own, separate from WVI, which has its 
own board of directors; nevertheless, some decision-making powers are still regulated by 
WVI. This type of office may vote in the WVI Council and its board members are 
eligible for election to the WVI Board of Directors. Finally, interdependent national 
offices are legally separate entities, and are governed by WVI only through their 
commitment to the Covenant of Partnership. An interdependent national office has a vote 
in the WVI Council and its board members are also eligible to be elected onto the WVI 
Board of Directors.      
Under a national office, World Vision may have multiple offices dispersed 
throughout a particular country, the number and location of which depends on the size of 
the national office and the number and extent of programs and projects they are 
conducting. Their larger offices will usually be in large cities and places where they are 
able to meet with national government, other NGOs and larger organizations such as 
UNICEF, European Union, and Food and Agriculture Organization. World Vision will 
also often have small offices located within the areas where they are working, sometimes 
including office space in government office blocks. 
86 
World Vision’s organizational structure also involves means for intra-
organizational support amongst national offices, specifically in regards to funding, in 
order to support organizational stability and consistency and to enable offices to adhere to 
global policy and accountability requirements. These systems include Support Offices 
located around the globe, which act as intermediary NGOs, channeling monetary support 
to implementing WV offices in other parts of the world. 
Finally, in addition to World Vision International’s global, regional, national and 
local structures, there is the subsidiary entity VisionFund International. In 2003, after ten 
years of carrying out microfinance programs for small business owners and entrepreneurs, 
World Vision decided to develop a specialized subsidiary in order to address the 
complexities within this area of need and create fair banking and loan opportunities for 
the “economically active poor” in areas where fair banking is not available (WVI 
2011a:17). VisionFund International is registered as a non-profit religious corporation in 
California, USA and is governed by its own board of directors, who are appointed by the 
WVI Board of Directors. It must also align to the WVI global partnership policies and 
strategies. 
 
4.4 Philosophy, Approach and Policy 
World Vision maps out its policies, practices and philosophies in a series of published 
statements, handbooks, guides and diagrams. Found within these are the Mission 
Statement, Vision, Ministry Framework, Ministry Goal, Integrated Focus, Core Values, 
Ministry Pillars, Development Program Approach, Transformational Development 
Indicators and LEAP (Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning).  
These published standards include further breakdowns of philosophy and practice, some 
more specific than others, such as the Child Well-Being Outcomes, which are a set of 
benchmarks for measuring the quality of a child’s life. Some of these have remained 
consistent over time in both substance and rhetoric, such as the mission statement, while 
others have been altered in either wording, substance or both, in order to keep in 
agreement with current discourse surrounding what is deemed acceptable by international 
development assistance standards.   
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World Vision claims six core values which join with the mission and vision 
statements as the ideological foundation for its work. These are as follows: Christianity, 
commitment to the poor, value for people, stewardship, partnering with other 
stakeholders and responsiveness. In working toward those values, World Vision has three 
main areas of focus which they call ministry pillars. Those refer to three types of NGO 
work: development (Transformational Development Pillar), direct aid and relief 
(Emergency Relief Pillar), and advocacy (Promotion of Justice Pillar). Within each of 
these areas, the work is, theoretically, either directly or indirectly working toward the 
organization’s ministry goal, which is “the sustained well-being of children within 
families and communities – especially the most vulnerable” and toward its vision 
statement, which is to achieve “life in all its fullness” for all children (WVI 2010:1).   
Programs that fall within its advocacy pillar, while growing, are not as prominent 
as programs for emergency relief or development. The largest of its advocacy programs 
are those advocating for behavioral change (particularly in relation to preventing the 
spread of HIV), and the Citizen Voice in Action program model. The latter is a 
development-related advocacy program intended to be carried out with other WV 
development projects for the purposes of identifying the local causes of poverty and 
empowering people to organize and engage with government and various stakeholders 
for improving essential services, such as health and education services (WVI 2012b). It is 
also significant to note, that despite the name of its advocacy pillar (Promotion of Justice), 
the advocacy programs are not particularly designed to excite political engagement, but 
rather focus more on tangible development-based goals which may or may not involve 
engaging with government and political authorities.  
The behavioral change programs also run hand in hand with other development or 
relief programs, targeting the same people, rather than being conducted as solely 
advocacy exercises. Additionally, while World Vision is a large contributor to direct food 
aid and other direct aid services, many of its relief programs are development-focused, as 
they involve post-disaster or post-conflict development and the development of pre-
disaster or pre-conflict preparedness (which involve livelihood impact prevention 
methods) (WVI 2011a). These examples, Citizen Voice in Action, behavioral change and 
emergency impact prevention, exhibit World Vision’s emphasis on development, even 
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within its advocacy and relief based pillars. Finally, its development pillar, 
Transformational Development, is incredibly prominent within World Vision efforts and 
is multi-faceted, involving a variety of program types. 
 
4.4.1 Transformational Development 
Transformational Development is the conceptualization of Word Vision’s approach and 
philosophy toward development aid. As stated on its website, World Vision’s mission is 
to “follow [the] Lord and Savior Jesus Christ in working with the poor and oppressed to 
promote human transformation, seek justice and bear witness to the good news of the 
kingdom of God” and – as indicated – its overall vision is “life in all its fullness” (WVI 
2013b) for all children. In other words, its goal is to provide a better life for children 
through transformational development and evangelism. In order to keep up with global 
expectations about development methodologies and accountability as well as its own 
desire to continually better its programs and act as a learning organization, World Vision 
continues to adapt and fine-tune its approach to development within the values of its 
consistent mission statement, valuing child betterment and human transformation as 
critical.  
Transformational development, which is defined as an approach which focuses on 
holistic processes of change in order to “move toward wholeness of life with dignity, 
justice, peace, and hope” through the actions of children, families and communities 
(Byworth 2003:103), has been the ideological framework for World Vision’s ever-
adapting approach. In 2002, World Vision International Board policy included 
transformational development as a “required core competency of World Vision” and it 
has since remained central to the organization’s approach (WVI Board 2002:1).   
The foundation of transformational development involves two principles: the 
belief that the presence of Jesus Christ in someone’s life involves a continual 
transformational process of betterment (a Christianity-based justification for the necessity 
of development); and the belief in a holistic approach, meaning that all the factors and 
systems affecting development are interlinked such that the process of change must 
continually involve all aspects of life through cross-sectoral development. This emphasis 
on holism supports two key aspects of World Vision’s work.  
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The first is its aim to keep the key focus on children while recognizing them as an 
integral part of a broader group (from the level of family up to community and country). 
World Vision therefore works with and for those broader groups rather than excluding 
them by limiting its work to children only. In other words, while targeting a specific 
group, children, WV has chosen to work holistically (across a variety of groups) to 
benefit all those who influence or affect children (the target group). This aim is evident in 
its Ministry Goal, which is “the sustained well-being of children within families and 
communities – especially the most vulnerable”; this explicitly places children within their 
surrounding social environments (families and communities) (WVI 2011a:5). It is also 
evident in World Vision’s Integrated Focus, which states that the organization is 
community-based, Christian and child-focused, implying both an inability to separate a 
child from its community and an inability to separate Christ from development.   
The second key holistic aspect is the wide range of development sectors covered 
by World Vision’s projects, including water and sanitation, education, health care, 
agriculture, small business/financial support, and behavioral change. WV supports this 
holistic aspect with its concept of Area Development Programs, which are long-term 
programs that aim toward improving all aspects of life within specific geographical 
vicinities over a period of 15-20 years. Not all World Vision projects are part of an Area 
Development Program and many efforts are carried out as independent projects; however, 
even those separate projects are often carried out within close vicinity of each other with 
overlap of their targeted beneficiary groups.   
 In order to form the concept of transformational development into tangible goals 
and measurable outcomes, World Vision defined five Domains of Change, or areas where 
change in the quality of livelihoods should be assessed and measured and, within those 
domains, created Transformational Development Indicators (TDIs) as outcomes to be 
measured against. The five Domains of Change are: the well-being of children, 
particularly regarding physical and spiritual health and opportunity; empowered children, 
as having an important role in the development of their communities; transformed 
relationships, entailing relationships within target communities and relationships between 
communities and other stakeholders involved in development (such as government, 
churches, and other organizations, including WV); interdependent and empowered 
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communities; and transformed systems and structures, which are related to policy-based 
and culturally-based institutions (such as governments and churches) (WVI 2003). The 
TDIs involve specific measurable standards at household and community level regarding 
the following areas: immunization, nutrition, primary education, water, diarrhea 
management, household resilience, HIV and AIDS prevention, caring relationships, 
evidence of hope, Christianity, community participation in development, and social 
sustainability (Byworth 2003:106).   
Some years after putting TDIs into practice for assessments and evaluations, they 
were found by WV itself to be very useful for bettering national-level organizational 
awareness of communities as well as recognizing transformational change. At the same 
time, they were found to be weak in linking that change to World Vision and its programs.  
In 2009, these TDIs were found to be difficult to measure (requiring too much technical 
capacity, time and labor), and they had only been measured in about 60% of area 
development programs worldwide (WVI 2009:5). These challenges led World Vision to 
begin developing a second edition of revised TDIs, which should align better with other 
World Vision policies and frameworks and make clearer World Vision’s specific impact 
on transformational change.  
 As mentioned above, World Vision’s policies are intertwined in a series of 
handbooks, definitions, programming guides, publications and statements which exist in 
order to unify WV’s values and practices and to guide its staff in achieving partnership 
policies and approaches. Most of these fall under or run hand in hand with its 
Development Program Approach. 
 
4.4.1.1 Development Program Approach 
The Development Program Approach (DPA), outlined in its handbook for development 
programs, is the intended approach for all WV projects (both sponsorship-funded projects 
in Area Development Programs and donor grant-funded projects outside of these 
projects). The handbook highlights the importance of the principles and goals laid out in 
the ministry framework as the basis for the approach. This Development Program 
Approach is the product of the organization’s efforts as a learning organization to 
produce a model for programming which is based on learned experience from WV 
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projects across the globe, with a particular emphasis on the learning achieved from local-
level staff experience (WVI 2011b). The approach has four areas of focus: contributing to 
child well-being which requires a clearly reported connection between the project and 
child well-being outcomes (discussed below); working with communities and ‘partners’, 
particularly involving local authorities including government; equipping local-level staff, 
in terms of training, resources, reflective evaluation and facilitating their close 
connections with the beneficiary community; and basic program parameters, which 
include the requirement of a manageable geographic area corresponding to government 
boundaries already in place (for example, a district or county) and the resources 
necessary to meet World Vision expectations. 
The DPA includes a set of fifteen goals for the quality of life of children, deemed 
the Child Well-Being Outcomes (CWBOs). These are World Vision’s central objectives 
and are the basis for project design. They are also the benchmarks upon which WV has 
set achievable targets (the Child Well-Being Targets) and these are the standards against 
which WV projects are measured during evaluation for fulfilling accountability 
expectations.  The CWBOs are categorized into four key ‘aspirations,’ which are built 
around World Vision’s ministry goal of sustained child well-being, particularly for the 
most vulnerable children. The four aspirations are: that children “enjoy good health”, “are 
educated for life”, “experience love of God and their neighbors” and “are cared for, 
protected and participating” (WVI 2011b:10).   
 These CWBOs are the basis for the child well-being targets, which are central to 
the current World Vision Partnership strategy. The targets, which World Vision hopes to 
achieve by 2016, are that: children “report an increased level of well-being” (in terms of 
the CWBOs); there is an increased number of children from birth to age five who are 
well-nourished; there is an increase in the number of children of that same target age 
group who are protected from disease and infection; and there is an increase in the 
number of children who can read by age eleven (WVI 2011b:10). Not all WV projects 
involve all four of these targets. In this respect, the targets to be prioritized are decided on 
regionally and then nationally, as part of both regional and national strategies, in order to 
maintain relevance to the local context. Additionally, WVI claims that rather than 
imposing CWBOs, it uses the CBWOs as a starting point to guide discussion which leads 
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to a “shared vision and priorities of child wellbeing” among the community and other 
stakeholders, and therefore it does not require all targets to be worked on and achieved at 
one time (WVI 2009:2). 
 Finally the CWBOs, while intended for all children, target the ‘most vulnerable’.  
World Vision defines that group as: 
Children whose quality of life and ability to fulfill their potential are most 
affected by extreme deprivation and violations of their rights. These children 
often live in catastrophic situations [where] relationships [are] characterized by 
violence, abuse, neglect, exploitation, exclusion and discrimination (WVI 
2011b:12).   
While recognizing that this definition is of a general character, and that practical 
application will be different between different local contexts, WV adheres to the belief 
that interventions which are not specifically focused on the most vulnerable take the risk 
of supporting the existing structures which lead to that vulnerability in the first place. 
 Under the DPA, these targeted aims are carried out through two project model 
types, which are outlined for World Vision staff as “technically sound approaches” which 
do not necessitate designing “completely new projects” (WVI 2011b:5). The first is 
through specialized project models, which are specific to a sector or theme, for example 
educational improvement. The second type, the ‘enabling project model’, involves 
combining specialized project models to create holistic project models which work 
toward wider goals. 
 
4.4.1.2 Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning 
To be used hand in hand with the Development Program Approach and as a practical 
framework for applying TDIs and CWBOs within programming, World Vision uses a 
program policy framework called Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and 
Planning (LEAP). While the DPA provides a guide to thinking about and carrying out 
programs and projects, LEAP outlines World Vision’s approach for carrying out its work 
and achieving accountability in design, monitoring and evaluation. Much can be 
understood about World Vision by studying the LEAP policies, as they present both 
actual requirements and discursive perspectives regarding World Vision’s ‘take’ on 
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development and poverty. By looking within LEAP and comparing its requirements with 
its recommendations and explanations, it is possible to compare the ideological base of 
World Vision work with what is prioritized and required on the ground. LEAP also 
exhibits a practical perspective with flexibility between what is desirable in project 
methodology and what it actually achievable on the ground.  
 LEAP provides the framework for all of World Vision’s work and adherence to it 
is required of all World Vision offices. It was introduced in 2005, has been since updated 
based on feedback and evaluations and, according to WV, it has led to improvement in 
project effectiveness (WVI 2009:1). The LEAP approach was developed from an 
extensive review of development literature and lessons learned from WV’s work and the 
experience of other NGOs and organizations, including Oxfam, UNDP, CARE 
International and European Union (WVI 2007). LEAP outlines a six-step process 
approach to development projects, where each step includes required standards (what 
staff must do in each step of the process) and advisory guidelines (what WV recommends 
that staff do whenever it is possible and efficient, but is not required of all projects and 
interventions). While the general requirements of the approach are to be used across all 
World Vision projects world-wide, the approach requires context-specific action.  Rather 
than a project format or outline to be followed, it is a step-process specifically related to 
unifying values and minimum standards throughout the global World Vision partnership. 
It also requires specific aspects of accountability to be measured for the purposes of 
meeting international and local accountability standards and achieving reflection and 
active learning as an organization.  According to World Vision, LEAP’s purpose is to 
align organizational strategy with actual action on the ground (WVI 2007).  
 The six steps in the LEAP process are assessment, design, monitoring, evaluation, 
reflection and transition. While they are put in this order, WV recognizes that each step 
involves significant overlap and that, within each step, there are necessary aspects of the 
other five. The first step, assessment, involves producing a report which includes a 
description of the assessment process, findings, analysis of findings, recommendations, 
lessons learned and a plan with a budget for use during the design phase.  LEAP outlines 
seven steps within this assessment phase, which are: (1) to ensure everything done is in 
alignment with national strategy; (2) hold initial discussions with major partners (which 
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include government at various levels depending on context, community leaders, NGOs, 
churches, other organizations and other World Vision partners) in order to understand 
what is already being done to address poverty and to assign who should carry out other 
assessment objectives; (3) agree with WV support offices to secure funding for the 
assessment; (4) conduct an analysis of power among the various stakeholders (or 
partners) in order to identify authority, conflict, and capacity that already exists; (5) 
collect and review information about the community to understand local issues; (6) 
analyze the data and write the assessment report; and finally (7) reach an agreement with 
all partners (both World Vision and local partners) to go ahead with designing a project 
(WVI 2007).   
 As mentioned above, each step in the LEAP process contains required standards 
and advisory guidelines. Among the advisory guidelines for the assessment process, two 
stand out as being particularly prioritized. These are that secondary data is the preferred 
type of data for collection and analysis (for understanding local needs and the poverty 
context) and that assessment should only be undertaken where there is a strong likelihood 
that the intended work will indeed be carried out. The second of these is clearly in place 
as a means of avoiding any disappointment or distrust that would inevitably arise from 
conducting assessment with local partners and then being unable to move forward with 
any project design (due to lack of funding or other reasons). The emphasis on secondary 
data has other implications. The first implication is that primary data is costly and time-
consuming, and can also be a means of inadvertently raising false expectations among 
potential partners and beneficiaries. World Vision suggests that the benefit of quantitative 
data is derived from good analysis, rather than collection processes, and therefore 
emphasizes the use of secondary data, particularly quantitative secondary data, as a first 
step. WV then suggests that, after analyzing secondary data, and if it is deemed necessary, 
qualitative data as well as any primary quantitative data may be used as a means to 
understand gaps or reasons for what is discovered through the secondary data analysis. 
While both time- and cost-efficient, as well as avoiding the development of 
misunderstandings and false expectations in the field, this strategy takes the risk that 
valid information, which may arise during primary data collection (particularly 
qualitative collection), and which may have been beneficial in understanding important 
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aspects of local context, is overlooked. This priority of secondary, quantitative data also 
implies that participatory assessment with general community members may not even 
take place, if it is not deemed necessary for filling in ‘gaps’ from secondary data.   
 The design stage of the LEAP six-step process involves building on the 
assessment to develop a program plan. LEAP requires this plan to emphasize the 
following: alignment with National Office strategy and guidelines; a strong 
understanding of local issues and context-specific causes of poverty; establishing local 
power relationships among stakeholders (government, community leaders and local 
organizations); ensuring shared responsibility between WV and local partners in the form 
of assigned roles for program actions; local project ownership; explanations of local 
capacity enabling anticipation of sustainability after World Vision’s withdrawal from the 
area; anticipated risks and risk management; and criteria that will be used to judge 
program success. Emphasis is also placed on the responsibility of government as the 
“primary duty-bearer for issues arising in an area” (WVI 2007:42). If working toward an 
entire program design, this process involves creating a program-specific framework and 
mindset which are supported by secondary data.  If working on a specific project design, 
the project must align with the overall program under which it falls. It is also required, 
within WV standards, that the design process involves participatory approaches with 
beneficiaries “whenever practical and cost effective” (WVI 2007:38). This provisional 
statement is revealing, for practicality and cost-effectiveness once again places efficiency 
as a priority over participation, just as in the assessment stage. That being said, the 
advisory guidelines (which are not explicitly required) do acknowledge participation of 
all local stakeholders (including general community members) to be conducted in such a 
way that WV merely facilitates the process. Additionally, the guidelines during this 
design stage, unlike during the assessment stage, do specifically emphasize the promotion 
of leadership among vulnerable groups such as women, children and disabled people.   
 While adhering to the above, designs must include the following: day-to-day 
management and implementation plans, specific monitoring and evaluation plans which 
outline the accountability information which must be gathered and indicators of 
achievement, plans that emphasize sustainability based on the risk analysis, fully 
developed transition plans for World Vision’s withdrawal of support and an explanation 
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of how the program or project will be funded. It is also required that the entire design 
plan be written in such a way that is clear and understandable to all project partners.  
Importantly, when this document is completed, all the partners (for instance, local 
government, partner NGOs and churches) must agree on the design’s approach, practical 
plans and proposed budgets in order to move forward with implementation. 
 The monitoring step of LEAP involves a constant practice of gathering feedback 
and comparing it to the project design, ‘baseline indicators’ (measurements of the 
situation taken at the start of implementation for the purpose of measuring change) and 
design objectives. LEAP requires specific monitoring report formats, and any additional 
reporting that donors may require must be done alongside (and not in place of) LEAP 
reporting mechanisms. In such cases, LEAP policy indicates that the implementing office 
that entered into the grant contract with the donor is responsible for the additional 
communications and reports. LEAP monitoring reports are periodically fed back to the 
national office level and are used toward informing national strategy. 
 While LEAP clearly states the monitoring objective of influencing national 
strategy, it is vague in regards to the influence of monitoring reports on current 
implementation (i.e. making necessary changes as a project progresses based on 
beneficiary feedback). All that is specified in this respect is the statement that 
“monitoring informs decision making” (but it is not specified at what level – national, 
local or project level) and that if such actions are carried out (if monitoring actions 
change design and implementation plans in response to beneficiary feedback) then all 
changes must be reported. Neither of these points though is discussed as a requirement 
for project implementation. At the same time, a clearly participatory and locally-focused 
guideline (again, not required but suggested) within the LEAP monitoring step is that 
monitoring should be carried out by local project partners (although that does not 
necessarily mean beneficiaries, as it could mean government or smaller partner 
organizations).  
That being said, while not discussing it specifically as a requirement, LEAP does 
suggest that the time lapses between collecting data from monitoring, analyzing it and 
“application of learning” should be short, such that problems can be addressed quickly 
(WVI 2007:60). This means that WV is to some degree (be it minimal) acknowledging 
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the need to address project implementation issues which arise from feedback. It is also 
suggested, however, that it is better to prepare for addressing problem scenarios ahead of 
time, rather than reacting at the time, in order to be more efficient.  This however could 
lead to generalizing problems and solutions, rather than truly listening to beneficiary 
responses during participatory exercises and acting based on such participation. This 
shows that, while WV may consider the application of feedback suggestions to be 
important, it has still not required such action as a priority, nor has it prioritized the 
quality of participation over efficiency. Finally, if monitoring is to be carried out by local 
partners, but responses to issues are to be anticipated and planned in advance for 
efficiency purposes, it begs the question as to whether any power is given by WV to 
those local partners who are conducting the monitoring so as to allow them to directly act 
on implementing suggested changes which may have come to light through monitoring 
practices. 
 The evaluation stage of LEAP involves measuring the successes of projects and 
programs in reference to World Vision’s organizational objectives (such as 
transformational development goals), the program or project’s actual outcomes compared 
with its projected outcomes (developed during the design stage), and the project or 
program’s general relevance with regards to tackling the causes of poverty. These 
evaluations are conducted at the close of a project, according to time specifications of 
specific donors, or every five years (which is the specified length of a program cycle) 
(WVI 2007:63). They include going through previous monitoring reports as well as 
carrying out additional evaluation processes with local partners. LEAP requires 
evaluation reports to provide details about partner input and explain World Vision’s 
specific inputs and achievements (essentially, indicating what in the project can be 
specifically attributed to World Vision’s involvement). While evaluations are intended to 
be useful to the local partners during and after transition (World Vision’s withdrawal 
from the area), this purpose is yet again merely suggested as one of LEAP’s advisory 
guidelines and not a requirement. That being said, it is a required standard that all 
partners agree on the evaluation report before it is finalized (here “all partners” would not 
necessarily include the direct beneficiaries but may include local government, other 
organizations and the WV National Office). 
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 The reflection stage is closely tied with evaluation and is geared toward both 
single- and double-loop learning, with the purpose of assessing impact and relevance at 
both the project level and National Office level by juxtaposing experience with policy.  
Finally, transition is the last step in the LEAP program, which refers to preparing for and 
implementing World Vision’s withdrawal from the area. LEAP suggests that all the steps 
leading up to transition should involve anticipation and planning for the sustainability of 
the project goals, but the transition step specifically involves preparation in conjunction 
with local partners who commit to the responsibility of sustaining the project’s 
imperatives. That collaborative process involves identifying potential risks to 
sustainability and designating who (of the local partners and beneficiaries) is responsible 
for addressing issues that may arise and in what capacity those issues will be handled. 
 Throughout all the stages of LEAP, one required standard is that all partners who 
contribute tangible inputs (financial or other resources) must return reports and responses 
within a timely fashion and using the formats and tools provided by World Vision. The 
tools and time requirements are specific to each step (for instance, for the assessment step, 
partners are required to return reports and responses within four weeks of receiving the 
tools and formats for reports) (WVI 2007:26).  
 
4.4.1.3 World Vision’s Strategic Mandates 
In addition to TDIs, the DPA, and LEAP, World Vision’s ministry model highlights five 
organizational Strategic Mandates. These include reinforcing and witnessing its 
Christianity; strengthening “grassroots field capacity”; growing in resources and 
organizational influence in order to increase organizational impact; being an 
“authoritative voice” that drives change; and building up organizational sustainability 
(WVI 2007:95). Its strategy also names six themes to be prioritized throughout its 
programs including the recognition that its interventions may impact men and women 
differently; a value for environmental sustainability; the protection of fundamental rights 
of people; peace building, which it defines as “restoring broken relationships between 
people engaged in destructive social conflict, as well as preventing escalation of 
conflict”; equal and fair inclusion of disabled people in participation; and being Christian 
(WVI 2007:24-25). 
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4.4.1.4 WV and Participatory Development 
In this regard, WV has made its recognition of participation clear by listing participation 
as one of its core values and by making statements throughout its literature (including the 
introductory statements within the LEAP publication) which claim that participation of 
all partners is included in all steps of the development process. However, the actual 
outline and explanation of requirements of the six-step process of LEAP (assessment, 
design, monitoring, evaluation, reflection and transition) does not reflect such a value to 
the extent that is claimed within the LEAP introduction or in other WV discourse. While 
there is a great emphasis on partner involvement and consultation, as well as joint 
decision-making and agreement between partners with almost each step of the process, 
that emphasis generally comes out within the advisory guideline sections (which are not 
explicitly formulated as requirements) and not as required standards.  
Additionally, the emphasis on partners and joint decision-making, while both 
valuing local input and emphasizing sustainability after transition, seems to place more 
importance on local leaders rather than direct beneficiaries. For example, within the 
assessment section of LEAP documentation, the list of “important partners” includes 
“government at local and national levels, community leaders, community-based 
organizations, non-government organizations, faith-based organizations (including 
churches, if present), appropriate institutions of higher learning (for example, 
universities) and World Vision partners (National, Support and Regional Offices)” (WVI 
2007). But this list does not include target beneficiaries. In a local context, there may be 
overlap with members included in this list and direct beneficiaries, but it is relevant to 
note their lack of explicit mention. The LEAP outline does go on to include a generic 
definition of partners which does recognize groups or individuals who are interested in or 
responsible for poverty issues; however, there is no explicit reference to intended 
beneficiaries in these assessment, planning and decision-making activities. 
In this respect, it is evident throughout the policies, programs and ideologies 
discussed above, that World Vision’s philosophy towards participation involves the value 
of collaboration and partnership with local entities and recognition of the necessity of 
supporting local structures if development initiatives are to be sustainable. According to 
its own documentation, its most valuable roles include bringing existing groups in an area 
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together in collaboration toward locally-oriented child well-being objectives, “and then 
[strengthening] their capacity if necessary” (WVI 2011b:14). This collaboration 
particularly extends to churches, local civil society and various levels of government. The 
form, extent and capacity of this partnering is to be determined by four factors, including 
the outcomes desired by each group, the willingness of each group to work 
collaboratively, the compatibility of values and the available timeframe for working 
together. This partnering, when connected with local government, is where World Vision 
sees opportunity for local-level advocacy in addressing policy changes that affect 
livelihoods.  
In agreement with the concept of bottom-up empowerment through development, 
WV sees local advocacy as contributing to higher-level policy change, because “it 
provides legitimate evidence on which policy dialogue can be based” (WVI 2011b:17). 
World Vision not only speaks about this bottom-up view of capacity-building for 
enabling and promoting empowerment, but it also visualizes more top-down approaches 
as well. In the end, WV refers to promoting empowerment in four ways (two top-down 
approaches and two bottom-up approaches). The top-down approaches are to promote 
policy change through engagement with those in power and to support policy 
implementation by supporting those in power to fulfill promises; and the bottom-up 
approaches include engaging in awareness of individuals’ rights and responsibilities, and 
mobilizing vulnerable groups to build confidence and engage in influencing policy (WVI 
2007:21).   
 When these philosophies enter into actual practice through the application of 
LEAP, advisory guidelines and required standards provide additional insight into WV’s 
value for, and approach to, participation. The advisory guidelines throughout LEAP often 
indicate aspects of participation that ideologically should be required, rather than merely 
recommended. What is advised through these guidelines is often less tangible than what 
is required through LEAP standards, and it requires context-specific information. This is 
most likely the reason that such advised guidelines are not written into LEAP as required 
standards. Therefore, while the guidelines claim that participation is a foundational 
principle of LEAP, when considering the standards versus the guidelines, it seems that 
participation is regularly considered to be only applicable when it is timely and cost-
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effective in the local context, and the reference to participation only vaguely implies its 
inclusion of direct beneficiaries who do not already hold a leadership role. 
 The Development Program Approach documentation does make explicit mention 
of “communities and partners” as fully owning a “Shared Program Plan,” which does hint 
toward genuine beneficiary participation (WVI 2011b:28). LEAP, however, and not the 
DPA, is the actual policy that is required throughout the global WV Partnership for 
informing practice on the ground. The DPA also mentions that shared program plans may 
include projects which do not fall within national strategy, in which case World Vision 
may decide not to contribute toward those specific pieces of a program but still may 
contribute to other projects within the shared program plan that do align with WV 
national strategy. The mention of this is significant as it demonstrates the potential for 
true local ownership of the planning process (because WV would not specifically plan 
projects with aims outside of their national strategy).  
 Despite the often contingent character of participation in the LEAP outline as a 
guideline rather than a standard, the introduction contained in the LEAP documentation 
claims that “design, monitoring and evaluation explicitly include participation by all 
partners” which includes “children and their families, local communities and their 
organizations, local and national governments, local faith-based organizations, businesses, 
National Office staff (field and support), and donors” (WVI 2007:13). World Vision also 
acknowledges participation as a means of building capacity among partners, claiming that 
LEAP is an empowerment-based approach. What this contradiction suggests is that while 
WV is thinking about development in terms of participation, empowerment, sustainability 
and ethical appropriateness, it is sticking to a practical application of its approach which 
is adaptable to local constraints.    
 
4.5 World Vision Funding 
Globally, the Word Vision Partnership acquires and spends over one billion dollars each 
year, including gifts-in-kind. In 2012, World Vision spent roughly $1,062,261,000, with 
over $902,000,000 spent on program services and almost $160,000,000 spent on 
overhead costs for management and fundraising (KPMG LLP, 2012:5).  WV has two 
primary means of acquiring funding: child sponsorship funding and grant-funding from 
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donors (including donation and grant funding from both the private and public sector). In 
addition to such funding, the organization also accepts and allocates gifts-in-kind (GIK), 
meaning non-monetary resources which have been donated. The largest fraction of its 
income comes from sponsorships, with the next largest fraction coming from both private 
and public sector grants and donations (WVI 2010a:34). Its large size, global presence, 
and reputation allow the organization, to some extent, greater stability and potentially 
greater flexibility than other aid organizations in acquiring donor sources. 
 The size and breadth of the organization supports the success of its sponsorship 
funding programs by making the efficiency of its sponsorship accountability methods 
possible as well as supporting consistent financial support from individuals from the 
general public. While sponsorship programming and accountability is resource-
consumptive, it also inherently provides mass-scale advertising and positive 
reinforcement to World Vision’s global image. Additionally, child sponsorship programs 
provide the organization with a regular and steady funding stream for a variety of 
development projects that are located in sponsorship areas, so long as those projects have 
some connection to affecting the livelihoods of the children who are sponsored. Child 
sponsorship funded programs are carried out through Area Development Programs, in 
which sponsorship money not only affects the sponsored individuals, but also affects 
their entire community. This type of sponsorship also gives WV full control of 
monitoring and reporting requirements, as it determines the timing and extent of 
reporting to be given to the individual sponsors. Although these traits (child sponsorship 
programming, a large size and global recognition) may allow World Vision more 
independence than other NGOs, the organization does still experience many of the 
funding difficulties that prevent true participation and effective developmental practice 
on the ground. 
 Donor funding, whether public or private, is less consistent than sponsorship 
funding, as it is acquired on a program- or project-specific basis. Again, because of its 
size and global reputation, the organization may have some flexibility when seeking out 
donor funding, and such flexibility could potentially relieve some of the implications that 
usually accompany the processes for receiving and maintaining donor funding. As 
explained above under the discussion of World Vision’s structure, the size of the 
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organization has allowed it to create Support Offices, whose purpose is to acquire 
funding and enter into agreements with national or smaller offices in order to fund and 
support programs in doing assessments and covering administrative costs which often 
would not be approved by donors. These support offices help to fill the gaps in funding 
that may not be covered by donor-grants. World Vision may also be in a position to 
influence donors to align their values and requirements with systems that World Vision 
already has in place (for example, reporting mechanisms, focus areas and methodological 
requirements), as donors may be willing to adhere to the monitoring, evaluation and other 
accountability measures of a long-standing, reputable organization.   
The type of funding (through sponsorship or donor grants) used for a project is 
determined by the type of project or program. Area Development Programs (ADPs) are 
funded primarily by child sponsorship. ADPs are WV programs which take place in a 
specified geographical area and involve a variety of interventions across multiple sectors.  
The national office, usually in conjunction with government and other stakeholders, will 
decide where the ADPs will be located, based on its national strategy, levels of poverty, 
and other considerations outlined by WVI (WVI 2011b). These offices also look at 
available services and infrastructural facilities to aid in communication, and they prefer to 
place ADPs in areas where the local people consider themselves as forming a community 
or sets of communities (where there is some continuity or social connection between the 
local people in terms of values and needs). These ADPs are long-term, cross-sectoral 
programs, usually lasting about 15 years (and they need to be at least 10 years for funding 
feasibility).   
The child sponsorship funding involves private donations of the same amount 
made monthly for the support of one particular child.  The private donors (often families 
or individuals who live in a more economically-developed country) are connected to a 
specific child from an ADP area to whom their donation is allocated.  The sponsorship 
money is then broken down into funds that go toward community development work 
which benefits the entire ADP area, and funds that go directly to the specific child’s 
needs, including school fees, hygiene products, medicine, food and other personal 
necessities.  The sponsored children are usually chosen from a smaller area within the 
ADP area which has a high concentration of vulnerability. That area then becomes the 
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primary focus area of the ADP, and allows WV to practice the ideal of “depth before 
breadth” (WVI 2011b:21). This type of funding helps to guarantee long-term stability for 
use in other projects (such as education, health, water and sanitation, and agriculture) 
within the primary focus area.   
Grant funding from donors is achieved on a project-by-project basis, and is used 
toward independent projects in a variety of areas as well as to boost projects within ADPs 
that are partially funded through child sponsorship. This grant donor funding is 
ascertained through the proposal process required by the specific donor (as discussed in 
chapter two). In keeping with the WV ideals of holistic development, individual donor 
grant funded projects which are not part of ADPs are still often carried out in groupings 
within close proximity to each other (both in time and space) and with an overlap of 
beneficiaries. These grant funded development projects vary in size, duration and focus.  
As noted earlier, child sponsorship is a means of both receiving funds and advertising for 
fundraising at the same time, and can therefore positively benefit donor-grant funded 
projects by means of building up WV’s reputation and global recognition. This is an 
indirect way of sponsorship-funded programs affecting individual projects funded 
through donor grants.  
That being said, WV projects funded in this way are limited by the parameters set 
by the donors who have put out a call for proposals, as is the case with other NGOs.  
Sometimes adhering to World Vision policy and requirements, particularly those laid out 
in LEAP, creates great difficulty in acquiring grant funding from donors. While World 
Vision’s size and reputation may sometimes influence donors to be flexible with 
requirements, this is not always the case. World Vision’s Development Program 
Approach requires grant-funded programs to participate with local stakeholders in 
identifying needs and priorities and in coordinating monitoring and evaluation, just as 
they require from ADPs. However, donor requirements (especially when funding is 
contingent upon the results of monitoring reports) and the necessity to write specific 
project proposals before acquiring the funding, can prove challenging. This is one 
explanation for the contradictory requirement found in LEAP policy that assessment be 
based primarily on secondary data. If cost effectiveness and efficiency in assessment 
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practices are prioritized, there will be less overhead costs prior to submitting funding 
proposals.   
LEAP budget requirements involve additional significant implications for how 
project design processes will work and how they are funded. LEAP requires that all costs 
for assessment, design, monitoring and evaluation are included in project budgets as 
direct program costs. It also requires, however, that the entire design process (within the 
requirements laid out in the design step of the six-step process) must be completed before 
producing a donor proposal for acquiring resources, as “donor proposals should 
contribute to National Office strategy and program objectives” (WVI 2007:49). While 
this allows assessments and design processes to be more thorough and truer to the local 
imperative, as they are carried out before donor requirements can limit program or project 
aims or methods, it presents a serious issue regarding how to fund assessment and design. 
World Vision does recognize that there is still need for front-end resources to be 
available for use during assessment and project design if participatory objectives are to be 
pursued, which is why support offices should provide core funding to enable national 
offices to adhere to LEAP standards. The issue still persists, though, particularly if an 
agreement with a support office cannot be made. Front-end funding is also accessed 
through internal funding from national offices. Such funding, though, is limited and 
difficult to ascertain, as it must be taken in pieces from here-and-there on an almost ad 
hoc basis in the national office’s budget. 
Donor grant funding also involves the added pressure of M&E requirements from 
the donor, in addition to World Vision’s internal requirements within the Development 
Program Approach and those laid out in the LEAP policy. Because of this, WVI urges 
national offices to: seek out donors whose strategies are compatible with the national 
office strategy; influence donors to align their proposal requirement strategies with more 
community-led strategies; use appropriate and realistic timeframes when designing the 
project; and design project structures that are as flexible as possible with the ability to 
downsize or grow depending on funding and contextual fluctuations (WVI 2011b:24). 
While LEAP policy does point out that the aims to align donors with national strategy are 
“not always practical”, it sticks to the imperative that adapting assessment and design for 
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the purpose of accepting funding from external donors should not affect the direction or 
quality of the program (WVI 2007:50). This, however, is much easier said than done.  
These budgetary LEAP requirements (to complete all assessment and design 
procedures before producing a funding proposal) also present a potential contradiction 
with the LEAP assessment guideline which indicates that assessment and design should 
not be entered into unless the intended work is highly likely to be carried out, as there is 
great potential that funding from donors whose objectives align with World Vision’s 
national strategy might not be available. Such a risk is sometimes lessened if WV can 
ascertain a sense of the donor’s interest by submitting a concept paper which is written 
based on very initial discussions with important partners before significant assessment or 
design takes place (WVI 2007). This situation could still present challenges if the project 
direction takes significant turns as assessments and partner dialogues are carried out. An 
additional budgetary requirement of LEAP is that those who enter into a funding 
partnership with WV must provide the necessary funding for adhering to all LEAP 
requirements and activities, including staff costs for the life of the program or project. 
This requirement may be geared toward WV support offices which would be more likely 
to agree to such a condition. With other funding partners, this imperative may create 
significant difficulty for attempting to obtain donor agreement. 
 
4.6 World Vision and Accountability 
World Vision sees accountability in various ways, and assesses its work from a variety of 
perspectives. It works toward achieving accountability to the following: its beneficiaries 
(including an ethical imperative for integrity); other international organizations and 
thereby current standards of acceptable methods and practice for charitable development 
aid organizations; and donors, with a particular emphasis on accountability for the sake of 
financial stability. In doing so, it seeks to achieve general transparency with all partners 
(those who work with WV in various capacities), which WV sees as a biblical imperative 
(Gwynne and Miller 2011). WV is also accountable to the state, often as a development 
partner and particularly with regard to local governments and major local partners. WV 
has set many expectations for itself with regard to accountability, and discussions of 
accountability measures are very prevalent throughout its policy and discourse.   
107 
 At the global level, World Vision has prioritized accountability to current 
expectations as found in development literature, adherence to international standards for 
development aid organizations, and keeping with ethical standards of society at large. In 
this regard, it works toward accountability in two ways. The first is by seeking 
transparency and defining accountability as “allowing others to know us well, with the 
hope that this transparency will bring greater freedom” (Gwynne and Miller 2011:2). The 
second is through continually analyzing and updating its policy, methodology and 
discourse, with an emphasis on practicing “active learning” as an organization. 
 In order to achieve the initiative for transparency, World Vision has become a 
member of the International NGO Charter of Accountability (an international group that 
researches and sets definitions and requirements for NGO actions), as well as over a 
dozen other regulatory organizations and initiatives (including Humanitarian 
Accountability Principles International, or HAP International, which is dedicated to 
ensuring that NGOs are accountable to beneficiaries) (Gwynne and Miller 2011).  To 
meet the requirements of such organizations, WVI periodically publishes Accountability 
Reports. In this respect, an extensive report evaluating and explaining WVI’s policy and 
practice was undertaken and published in 2010, and since then there have been yearly 
booster reports which update variable information. As well, it publishes audited financial 
statements (WVI 2011a, Gwynne and Miller 2011, KPMG LLP, 2012). These statements 
and reports include explanations of programs, reports on donations and spending, salary 
figures, and other information on WVI globally (although they do not include specific 
project-level discussion or evaluations, and are only concerned with the global World 
Vision Partnership as a whole and the WVI entity).  WV has also published third-party 
case study reports on accountability measures and methods and procedures from specific 
project areas for handling beneficiary complaints, although these reports have been vague 
in description, and are introduced with the disclaimer that they are not actual evaluations 
but rather are presented for discussion purposes with the goal of instigating reflection and 
general organizational learning (Wood 2011a, Wood 2011b). Regardless of the lack of 
more specific publicly available case studies, these commitments and efforts display a 
desire for reflection and improvement based on learned experience, as well as the intent 
for openness and transparency, at least at the international level.   
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As another basis for accountability, World Vision’s practice of constantly 
updating its discourse and policy expresses and demonstrates a great emphasis on 
learning as an organization. This learning emphasis is also seen through its organizational 
structure, with national-level representation at the policy-making level. Within the 
national context, project and program reports are the baseline for creating national 
strategy, which in turn is the foundation of project-level practice. The reason for 
developing LEAP came out of this priority for learning from and adapting to feedback.  
Before LEAP, World Vision policy was framed around the Transformational 
Development Indicators, which measured WV’s work toward the five domains of change 
(explained above). But after the TDI framework for reporting and evaluating (which was 
in place from 2003) was deemed overly laborious and technical, as well as incapable of 
linking World Vision’s specific inputs to local change over time, it became clear that new 
policy was necessary. While TDI indicators are still used, the monitoring and evaluation 
reporting systems have been re-done as a part of LEAP.   
The first edition of LEAP was later adapted in response to staff feedback and a 
second edition was put into policy. Since then, additional updates and amendments to 
LEAP have been made, and another updated and adapted version of the policy was being 
developed at the time of the most recent LEAP publication in 2009 (WVI 2009:5). 
Additionally, the Development Program Approach is an update of a former approach 
framework (the Integrated Programming Model). This adaptation of programming once 
again stemmed from feedback and learning, which was passed upward through the 
organizational channels from project level to national strategy level and on to discussion 
in international forum.  WV has also recognized both the lack of integration and the 
redundancy in its various interconnected policies and frameworks (such as LEAP, TDI, 
and DPA), stating that “the large number of different initiatives being introduced at the 
same time and their lack of integration has caused confusion for staff” (WVI 2009:7) and, 
in response, it claims to be working toward addressing this issue. 
 World Vision also seeks to achieve internal accountability through transparency 
in addition to external transparency. Roughly every three years, internal reviews are 
carried out for each World Vision Partnership office. These reviews include peer reviews, 
which assess the effectiveness of governance in local offices, boards, and advisory 
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councils and involve both self-assessment and an assessment by a separate team made up 
of global World Vision staff from outside of the local office. There are also program 
capability reviews, which assess the relationship between local implementing offices and 
fundraising offices in terms of their capability to achieve strategic goals. These reviews 
likewise include both self-assessment and assessment by global WV staff. As well, there 
are operational and finance audits, which involve the Global Center auditing local 
offices’ finances and their compliance to WVI policy and procedure (WVI 2011a:17). 
Furthermore, for the purpose of achieving internal transparency, World Vision developed 
what it calls a ‘traffic light dashboard’ in 2010 which is supposed to report the 
accountability status of each office (in terms of its reviews of governance, capability and 
operational and financial audit results) onto the World Vision intranet for the senior 
management team to view. 
 At the national level, World Vision works toward accountability to the relevant 
national context by constantly feeding evaluation feedback into national strategy 
development. National strategies and priorities are based on feedback from ADPs, 
government ministries, local (national-level) peer organizations, and larger organizations 
(such as the UN). This input of experiential feedback from ongoing, long-term and on-
the-ground WV projects and programs as well as similar feedback from other 
organizations into national strategy development creates, at least to a minimal degree, a 
level of accountability to beneficiaries that may actually affect program direction and 
design. 
 At the program and project level, World Vision discourse addresses two types of 
local accountability: accountability to local ‘partners,’ which includes local government 
structures, traditional leadership, churches, and other organizations, and accountability to 
‘children and communities,’ which includes the direct beneficiaries.  For the former, WV 
defines accountability as “demonstrating responsibility to provide evidence to all partners 
that a program or project has been carried out according to the agreed design” (WVI 
2007:10). For the latter, WV discusses accountability in terms of ‘key principles’, 
including transparency, project results, appropriate reporting systems for local concerns, 
being open to listen and willing to learn, and informed consent, meaning that WV has 
provided enough information to enable informed decision-making (WVI 2011b:18).   
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Regarding both groups (however particularly regarding direct beneficiaries), WV 
seems to place more emphasis on consultation, representation, and agreement rather than 
local ownership. This is seen in the Development Program Approach, which suggests that 
CWBOs are used to “inform dialogue” which leads to a “shared vision and priorities of 
child wellbeing” between WV and community and other stakeholders (WVI 2011b:10). 
This recognizes participation as consultation and information-sharing and not local 
ownership, as it exhibits a semi-manipulative disregard or lack of flexibility in catering to 
local needs and values; as true accountability to beneficiaries should ideally result in not 
a shared vision that aligns with WV, but a vision entirely owned by the ‘target’ 
community. WV does recognize that, through discussion, values and needs that do not 
align with WV national strategy may present themselves, in which case WV would not 
take part in design or implementation of efforts toward addressing such needs. In such a 
case, it still would have played a positive role in facilitating or catalyzing their 
identification and assessment. 
 In regards to monitoring and quality of project implementation, World Vision 
exhibits accountability to its beneficiaries through the priority it places on the receiving 
and handling of complaints, particularly through its commitment to HAP International, 
which involves adhering to a set of “standard benchmarks” or requirements for practice.  
WV’s complaints-handling policy is based on the HAP international benchmark, which 
requires that complaints-handling procedures are “effective, accessible, and safe for 
intended beneficiaries”; are developed through consultation with the beneficiaries and 
local community; are clear, consistent and documented; are understood by the 
beneficiaries; offer confidentiality without fear of retaliation; are responded to; and are 
handled according to what is agreed upon (WVI FPMG 2009:11). 
 At the same time, World Vision recognizes accountability not only as an ethical 
imperative but also as a practical means of global support. The definition of transparency 
given by WV (explained above) clearly expresses that practical objective when it states 
that transparency and accountability will provide WV with greater freedom. This implies 
a tactic of using accountability as a way to assist in organizational sustainability. 
Throughout its literature, WVI constantly makes the point that accountability to the 
public and upholding the ethical standards of current societies contribute to securing 
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funding stability for the organization. This emphasis is one means by which WV is 
accountable to itself as an organization. Much of its policy involves emphasis on 
adherence to the global World Vision Partnership’s values and agendas, which are carried 
out through adherence to expectations laid out in various levels of its organizational 
structure. For example, LEAP (WVI 2007: 96) emphasizes that: 
When it comes to local programming, the most important connection is back to a 
national strategy. The model of ministry informs national strategies, then LEAP 
processes use those country-specific programming approaches to tailor programs 
and projects towards objectives in the national strategy. Local strategies and 
designs are checked for alignment with national strategy, so that a program 
reflects organizational strategy. 
This emphasis, however, inherently involves a level of accountability to beneficiaries at 
the local level, as national strategies include learning inputs from local-level program 
monitoring and evaluation feedback. 
 Finally, accountability to the state is seen prominently throughout LEAP in terms 
of support of and partnership with local government through the continual mention of 
agreement with local ‘partners’. The list of local partners given throughout LEAP 
documentation always includes local systems of governance (WVI 2007).  Partnership 
with the state is valued as both a practical means to conserve resources by taking 
advantage of government-produced secondary data, and a means of achieving 
development sustainability through building the capacity of government structures to 
enable them to support and sustain initiatives after World Vision has withdrawn itself 
from a program or area. As will be evidenced in the next section and in chapter five, 
World Vision in Zimbabwe has taken on an almost corporatist strategy of placing itself in 
a supportive role to government in order to do the following: gain access to rural areas 
and facilitate its ability to carry out its work; manipulate the use of short-term funding for 
carrying out longer-term projects through outsourcing monitoring and evaluation to local 
government ministries; and promote sustainability of projects after World Vision’s 
funding stream for a specific project has finished. 
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4.7 World Vision in Zimbabwe 
World Vision International first entered Zimbabwe in 1973 and, at that time, focused on 
relief aid for those who were victims during the struggle for liberation, with a specific 
focus on orphaned children (Bornstein 2005). WV worked closely with churches to 
conduct both relief work and evangelism. Throughout the 1990s to the present, it has 
continued to work with churches and also with the state. Currently, it is present in each 
province throughout the country (OCHA 2009), conducting projects and programs in 28 
districts (OCHA 2012). WV actions a multitude of individual donor-funded projects 
throughout the country, and has twenty-four ADPs (WVI 2011c). In doing so, it has a 
close working relationship with the state, both at higher national levels and at local levels. 
In fact, much of its work is carried out in conjunction with or through government offices. 
Within the global World Vision Partnership, World Vision Zimbabwe (WVZ) is a 
national office branch, which means that it votes in the WV Partnership and has an 
advisory council whose members may be elected for representation on the WVI Board, 
but it still reports to a regional leader for WVI line management (see section above 
discussing organizational structure) (WVI 2011a). 
World Vision Zimbabwe’s national strategy is what prioritizes its opportunities 
and intentions for programs and projects, and the work it does is built around its priorities.  
The national strategy is developed based on three elements: secondary information from 
national-level assessments (for instance, the yearly vulnerability report from the 
Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee); program and project evaluations and 
feedback from ADPs; and input from other national stakeholders including government 
ministries, peer organizations, and larger international organizations such as the UN. The 
strategy is re-evaluated every three to five years, in order to consider the current 
alignment with local contexts, WVI’s global organizational priorities, local opportunities, 
and geographical conditions. The strategy’s objectives are based on the four child well-
being targets (children are well-nourished; children are protected from disease and 
infection; children feel an increase in well-being; and children can read by age 11) as 
well as local context, and it places significant emphasis on behavioral change, 
particularly in regard to HIV and AIDS prevention and personal sanitation (WVI 2011c). 
Additionally, according to the WV Zimbabwe’s Grants and Human Affairs Director, 
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since 2009 its national strategy has involved the following six strategic goals: health, 
nutrition and HIV; livelihoods and economic development; education; policy advocacy 
“to some extent”; child well-being; and organizational effectiveness (Appendix 1, 
Interview 1). 
WVZ’s input toward improving health, nutrition and HIV has been focused on the 
following: increasing food availability (through agricultural and income-generating 
projects), increasing access to safe water and sanitation (through borehole drilling, input 
of sanitation facilities, and providing education on hygiene, sanitation and water-related 
diseases), improving health facilities (through rehabilitating clinics, inputting drugs for 
disease treatment, and promoting immunization), and valuing issues of HIV and AIDS 
prevention as a separate, prioritized target sector (through educational programs, raising 
awareness, and improving nutrition for those already affected by HIV) (WVI 2011c). For 
its strategic objective to improve livelihoods and economic development, it has primarily 
carried out agricultural projects, particularly involving livestock inputs and educational 
programs for conservation agricultural methods. In relation to the third strategic objective 
(improving education), it has worked on classroom construction, improvement of teacher 
homes and sanitation at schools, paying school fees, and inputting textbooks and reading 
materials. Recently, WVZ negotiated significant funding for education through UNICEF, 
European Union (EU) and Department for International Development (DFID).  
In regards to the objective for policy advocacy, WVZ’s most recent published 
report (WVI 2011c) does not address any progress; however, through working toward the 
child well-being objective, it has reported on social advocacy, including the promotion of 
child birth registration and children’s rights, with an emphasis on orphans. According to 
its child well-being report (WVI 2011c), WVZ places more emphasis on the most 
vulnerable children (namely orphans, children-headed households and those affected by 
disease or disability) within each of the other strategic goals. While its programs and 
projects (both ADPs and individual grant-funded) are intended to benefit various 
community members, priorities are placed on the most vulnerable, by supplying direct-
aid (for example, school fees and food inputs) in addition to the development-based 
projects taking place around those most vulnerable. As will be evidenced from the 
discussion in chapter five, this focus on the most vulnerable children specifically is in 
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some cases more of a national objective that is worked toward and achieved in the sense 
of holistic community development and not an explicit focus of the individual projects on 
the ground at the local level. 
With regard to the strategic goal for organizational effectiveness, WVZ’s child 
well-being report (WVI 2011c) indicates that that the projects and overall work of the 
national office have been successful in some aspects, but are in great need of 
reprogramming to address other aspects where WVZ’s interventions are not having 
enough impact. Its report found that food programs, mainly focusing on food availability 
rather than nutrition, have not improved the number of children with stunted growth and 
those who are malnourished, and it suggested that programming is inadequate due to a 
lack of baseline data on nutritional measurements during design, monitoring and 
evaluation. Immunization programs have also had difficultly, although the report found 
this to be greatly affected by religious paradigms, as some religious sects do not believe 
in immunization. Additionally, it reported that HIV awareness in WVZ project areas is 
high; however, there is a great need to improve baseline assessments with HIV testing 
and nutrition programming for those affected by HIV. Regarding its strategic objectives 
to improve livelihoods and overall child well-being, WV Zimbabwe reports shortfalls of 
various kinds within their program and project areas, including a high percentage of 
children without birth certificates, a high percentage of houses which are supporting 
orphaned children, and a high percentage of agricultural difficulties (particularly limited 
inputs, draught power and local markets). Finally, the report found that, with regard to 
education, WVZ (along with government and other NGOs) has helped address issues of 
textbook to student ratios and school drop-out rates, but has not addressed what it sees as 
the largest issue – demoralized teaching staff – in design, monitoring and evaluation. 
The next section examines World Vision Zimbabwe and accountability to 
beneficiaries, donors, the state and World Vision International.  
 
4.8 World Vision Zimbabwe and Accountability  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, World Vision globally promotes beneficiary 
participation throughout its publications, but its actual organizational requirements (laid 
out in LEAP) seem to take a more practical and efficiency-based approach, placing the 
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use of secondary data and avoiding more resource-intensive methods of assessment at a 
higher value than achieving truly empowerment-based participation. In Zimbabwe, to 
some extent, WV seems to have found a compromise between the two which allows it to 
carry out data collection and use data from meaningful, participatory assessments 
collected over long periods of time in conjunction with secondary data in order to 
influence national strategy, project design and grant funding proposals. This process, 
however, is mainly only applicable in ADP areas and therefore does not mean that each 
WV project carried out has involved participatory assessment and design.   
WV Zimbabwe conducts assessments for project design in four ways: the analysis 
of secondary information from national-level assessments; community-level participatory 
engagement within ADPs; gathering information from other stakeholders (such as 
government, peer organizations and the UN); and, on occasion (this is often not possible 
to do within budget and time constraints), participatory community-level engagement 
with intended beneficiaries of grant-funded projects located outside of ADPs (Appendix 
1, Interview 1). Due to their long-term nature and funding stability from child 
sponsorship, ADPs are in a better position to carry out meaningful, empowerment-based 
participation for assessment, design, monitoring and evaluation than are other shorter-
term grant-funded projects. ADPs are also in a good position to guide national strategy 
development and organizational learning, as their locations are spaced throughout the 
country and their five-year program cycles are scattered, such that while some are 
working on redesign, others are evaluating. This allows for a constant application of 
current learning, both retrospective and prospective, on the ground. Unfortunately, this 
idyllic situation of continual participatory application of learning over long periods of 
time is not applicable to many of World Vision’s shorter-term projects and programs 
outside of ADPs, as these endure funding and time-limiting constraints. While sometimes 
it is possible to instigate funding opportunities, generally funding must be accessed 
through answering a call for proposals from the donor. As discussed in chapter two, these 
calls for proposals often involve specific requirements and allow a very limited amount 
of time for drafting and submission.   
Whenever possible, WVZ attempts to conduct focus group discussions with 
community members and any other participatory means of assessment through what the 
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WV Grants and Human Affairs Director described in an interview as “quick and dirty 
consultative processes” (Appendix 1, Interview 1). For this purpose, WV has teams who 
are ready to carry out such processes at short notice. While at least inclusive of 
beneficiaries, these necessarily rushed methods do not allow for relationship-building, 
joint understanding, community engagement and sense of project ownership which is 
often deemed necessary to incite empowerment. Additionally, WVZ is not always able to 
carry out these “quick and dirty” assessments due to lack of funding or time. When that is 
the case, WVZ bases its funding proposals on the local district government’s strategic 
plan.  This is the most common practice for conducting project assessments. While not 
involving beneficiaries directly, this method of assessment is based on local government 
stakeholders, who would ideally carry out their own regular participatory assessment and 
monitoring of the local context, though this is not necessarily the case. 
 In addition to the constraints with timing that make the participation of 
beneficiaries difficult, WVZ employees expressed frustration with donors and donor 
perspectives on Zimbabwe in noting that, since 2002 (when only short-term emergency 
funding was available), donors are only now just beginning to be prepared to get involved 
in longer-term projects, thus making the acquisition of donor funding incredibly 
competitive (Appendix 1, Interviews 1,2,7). The general attitude of donors toward aid 
agencies like WV, it is claimed, is to keep them “at arm’s length” and pin them up 
against each other, such that agencies and NGOs fight for “bits and pieces” of donor 
funds in a contest to see who can provide the best value for money (Appendix 1, 
Interview 1). In addition to this, WVZ finds itself competing with an increasing number 
of quasi-private NGOs which are run like businesses and act like “roving consultants who 
go after money [without a specific footprint or mandate]”, although such organizations 
struggle with getting permits to operate on the ground as they do not have relationships 
with or approval from local government (Appendix 1, Interview 1). Therefore donors 
shift back and forth between favoring these business-like organizations because of their 
desire for efficiency and avoidance of the uncertainty of the Zimbabwe context, and more 
grounded organizations like World Vision, because of their capacity for local partnership 
on the ground. 
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 World Vision’s funding in Zimbabwe is also affected by the ambiguous nature of 
roles in the development sector and sources of funding. Funds will be pooled into multi-
donor trusts and placed in the domain of the UN and government ministries which, 
according to World Vision employees, do not have a good knowledge of what is actually 
happening on the ground. These ministries will then channel funds down with specified 
priorities for NGOs to pursue, leaving the NGOs unable to voice local context-specific 
priorities. It was noted earlier that input and voice toward funding directives and national 
strategies for development have improved with Zimbabwe’s cluster system, where 
representatives from various NGOs, donors, the UN and Zimbabwean government meet 
periodically. These meetings, though, often simply involve progress reports rather than 
collaborating on development direction and unified national strategies. The recent 
funding for education channeled through the EU (mentioned above) is an exception to 
this, as it was determined and granted through an “across the table” negotiation process 
(Appendix 1, Interview 1). 
 World Vision Zimbabwe’s size of overhead costs, coupled with factors of the 
Zimbabwean context, makes it difficult to access sufficient funding. Within ADPs 
(sponsorship-funded programs), overhead costs are not so much of a problem, as the 
private funding revenues are fairly consistent and predictable. For donor grant-funded 
projects and programs, however, covering overhead costs becomes a very difficult 
struggle. The Grants and Human Affairs Director admitted that while staff members 
strive to manage overhead structures annually, it often ends up being a quarterly issue. 
She attributed some of this difficulty to the short-term paradigm that many donors still 
hold about Zimbabwe (Appendix 1, Interview 1). Staff salaries are the largest issue 
affecting these overhead costs, as WVI requires that direct project staff must be fully 
budgeted for within individual projects, and therefore their contracts are directly tied to 
specific project grants; and budgets for shared staff (including higher-level management 
positions) are to be covered by pulling bits of funding from project grants and general 
administration budgets. In this context, WVZ tries to make up any shortfalls by 
partnering with support offices including World Vision UK, World Vision Germany, and 
World Vision Netherlands. When this is the case, those support offices enter into a 
contract with the donor and into a contract with WV Zimbabwe. In such a case, when the 
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donor does not pay for the entire budget (for example, a line item for WV staff salary), 
the support office has to pay the difference.  The consistency of the necessity for WVZ 
support from other World Vision offices has led to a stigma within these offices against 
entering into contracts with World Vision Zimbabwe, as they would rather assist other 
national offices that have less overhead costs.   
These difficulties see WVZ going after funding opportunities and meeting donor 
priorities for the sake of acquiring funding and maintaining organizational stability rather 
than adhering to the LEAP model which requires World Vision to attempt to persuade 
donors to align themselves with World Vision strategies. This necessity for 
organizational stability was expressed in two ways – the necessity to employ qualified 
experts who are capable of doing the job properly (for example an education specialist to 
write the funding proposals for education-related programs) and the necessity to provide 
employment security for employees. In this respect, the Grants and Human Affairs 
Director saw the WV funding policies as inherently contradictory (Appendix 1, Interview 
1). More specifically, she referred to the requirement that employees be budgeted for 
project-by-project under the specific project proposal as in contradiction with the LEAP 
requirements that WV does not adjust or compromise its methods, requirements or values 
for the sake of receiving donor funding. She claims that she spends a significant 
percentage of her time searching for “bits of funding from here and there” in order to 
fund project assessments and designs, as well as overhead costs and people’s salaries.   
Her concern was especially great concerning the salaries, suggesting that such 
strategy requirements lead to a “disincentive” which makes it difficult to turn down 
funding opportunities that do not align with strategy “because it’s somebody’s job at the 
end of the day”. As well, a large overhead cost issue specific to Zimbabwe is the need to 
pay for taxes. International donors expect their contributions to be tax-exempt and 
therefore do not allow for the incorporation of the cost of taxes into the budget even 
though the Zimbabwean state does not exempt such costs from taxes. These issues with 
regard to financing overhead costs were attributed to a policy issue specific to World 
Vision, and it was suggested that other NGOs are given a budgeted lump sum for 
strategic investment (which would include for example salaries), rather than having to 
pull from individual projects in order to cover those types of costs. 
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Finally with respect to donors and funding, the Grants and Human Affairs 
Director continually expressed a desire for long-term, integrated and holistic 
development, which she argued is not actually achievable within the current 
organizational funding structures (Appendix 1, Interview 1).  In her view, it would be 
necessary to restructure WV Zimbabwe’s funding structures completely. In the end, 
though, she placed the necessary ultimate change in the domain of the donor, suggesting 
the need for donors to be more flexible and more willing to negotiate priorities. 
 Historically, World Vision Zimbabwe and its work has involved a cautiously 
submissive, yet closely tied relationship with the state, marked by both the state’s 
dependence and control over WV and, in certain ways, WV’s dependence on the state.  
Bornstein (2005:101) discusses the close connections between WV and the Zimbabwean 
state throughout the 1990s as being marked by “troubled categorical boundaries between 
NGOs and the state”, including members of the ministry of agriculture sitting on the WV 
board and many WV staff members being former state employees. She also referred to 
government dependence on WV, arguing that the state had limited resources for 
development and that therefore the so-called partnership between WV and the state was a 
“necessary fiction,” meaning that it was not truly a partnership at all (Bornstein 
2005:109).   
Currently, the actual or fictional nature of this ‘partnership’ is different depending 
on the district. All work that is carried out by WVZ within a district must be done under 
the approval of the District Administrator (DA) and the Rural District Council (RDC), 
and the relationships between those state individuals and WV staff, as well as the 
management of the specific district, will determine the tone of the ‘partnership’ within 
each district. At the national level, WV is recognized by the state and has regular 
communication with various government ministries, particularly through cluster meetings.  
As mentioned above, in the discussion of funding, World Vision has developed a 
presence within the country that allows them some stability in terms of achieving permits 
and government approval to conduct development assistance. 
This state-WVZ relationship, primarily characterized by cooptation and 
dependence, has at times involved periods of exclusion, particularly during times of 
extreme political tension. Food distribution and development efforts have been 
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politicized during such times, and WV has been suspended or removed from certain rural 
areas after having been accused of pushing the agenda of the main political opposition to 
the ruling party. In the early 2000s, WVZ was told to terminate its food distribution 
efforts in particular areas on the grounds that its beneficiary targeting and distribution 
systems involved a hidden political campaign (Munyanyi 2005). According to an 
interview with a former WV employee, during the time leading up to the 2008 elections, 
high-ranking WV staff members were arrested on similar charges of pursuing a political 
agenda (Appendix 1, Interview 7). Leading up to and during the 2013 elections, 
exclusions appeared to involve more amiable measures, in that WVZ along with other 
NGOs were asked prior to the election period to suspend their programs until the election 
period finished, in order to allow space for political campaigning (Appendix 1, Interview 
3). These specified incidents appear to only occur during politically-charged periods.  
 One aspect of World Vision Zimbabwe’s work that stood out throughout the 
research is that great faith and responsibility are placed in local government and its ability 
to assess, design, carry out, monitor and evaluate projects in partnership with World 
Vision, and sometimes in place of World Vision. Although it was mentioned that this is 
variable depending on the district, it is WVZ’s objective to involve local government in 
its development projects and to build state institutional capacity in this regard. 
Considerable reliance is therefore placed on the competency of government, particularly 
regarding assessment and monitoring, and sustainability of projects and programs after 
WV’s withdrawal from an area. While WVZ conducts its own monitoring and evaluation 
during the process of projects, both monitoring and support after WV has withdrawn its 
presence from a project is placed in the hands of local government structures. 
Additionally, it appears that the practical ability to ‘get things done’ is more easily 
achieved in partnership with government, or at least with significant recognition of 
government input (regardless of the value of that input) in order to maintain positive 
relationships and good communication. In this light, much of WVZ’s knowledge-based 
aid (including training in agricultural methods) is carried out specifically for building 
government capacity. WVZ thus conducts ‘trainings of trainers,’ by teaching and guiding 
government employees in carrying out projects and development initiatives.   
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In terms of the government’s function and impact in its relationship with WV 
Zimbabwe, there are two juxtaposed sides to government that are at the same time 
separate and integrated. These are local ministry government on the ground and at project 
level, versus higher-scale politically-contextualized government. Both levels carry power 
over World Vision in terms of what it is allowed to carry out and with whom. World 
Vision Zimbabwe appears to support the local ministry side in a vigorous manner, 
thereby carrying out its work through and in conjunction with these ministry offices and 
staff and building state capacity and credibility in the delivery of development. On the 
more politically-charged national side, however, WVZ takes the cautiously ambivalent 
approach, with the goal of sustaining its presence in the country.  
This creates a unique relationship of interdependence between WVZ and the state 
which has both positive and negative connotations. In the positive sense, working so 
closely with government may be the only long-term path to development, as the 
government is ultimately the long-term institution which is responsible for it.  
Additionally positive is the fact that the willingness of WVZ to work with government, 
(including listening to its values and allowing it credit for development) may grant World 
Vision more freedom to carry out its work in agreement with its own organizational 
values, as government may not see WVZ as a threat compared to other NGOs which 
isolate themselves from government. Nevertheless, this close partnership (which allocates 
both responsibility and credit to the government for work that World Vision is catalyzing, 
funding, and guiding) may unwittingly reinforce faith in unfair or corrupt systems of 
governance, particularly reinforcing the popularity of political leaders who claim to be 
the bearers of development. For this same reason, World Vision Zimbabwe may be 
limited in receiving funds and working in partnership with other organizations that refuse 
to work so closely with government. 
 
4.9 World Vision – Legitimacy, Appropriateness and Effectiveness 
The ways in which WV attempts to address issues of appropriateness, legitimacy and 
effectiveness, both globally and in the Zimbabwean context, can be considered by asking 
a series of questions. For example, do its approach and official policies compromise the 
values of empowerment-based participatory methods for purposes of practicality and 
122 
organizational stability, particularly with regards to global donor trends, and if so, is that 
a real compromise of accountability to beneficiaries? Does its relationship with the state, 
marked by caution, cooptation and support (all at the same time) create a false sense of 
confidence in corrupt systems of governance thereby perpetuating a status quo of 
marginal social services and government dependence on aid, or does it catalyze long-term, 
sustainable change and development in government social structures and services by 
building capacity? And finally, do World Vision’s systems and structures of 
accountability and reflective organizational learning at the global and local levels 
legitimize its role in development in Zimbabwe? 
 In addressing the first question, it is clear throughout World Vision’s primary 
policy (LEAP) that, while WV values participatory methods sufficiently to discuss the 
concept’s importance and to include it as an idealistic measure under the suggested LEAP 
guidelines, World Vision takes a practical stance toward its methodology. In addition to 
this, World Vision’s literature also makes evident its value of development partnership 
with local stakeholders, such as government, churches and other local leaders, which it 
sees as achieving local participation, even if beneficiaries are not directly involved in 
such joint assessment and planning. This perspective is practical, as it allows for the use 
of secondary data in assessment and, in particular, for the avoidance of building up false 
expectations. It is also practical in the sense that local authorities will remain after WV 
leaves a project area, and therefore the brunt of social support will eventually fall to them.  
This aspect legitimizes World Vision’s approach to participation which sees 
empowerment-based participation and capacity building as occurring in and through local 
authorities.   
What all of this brings to the fore is the question as to whether or not WV’s 
perspective compromises accountability to beneficiaries. According to the overall 
discourse surrounding participatory development and approaches such as PRA, the 
answer is yes. While such approaches preach the necessity of beneficiary-assessed, 
beneficiary-planned, beneficiary-monitored and beneficiary-evaluated development, all 
of which is merely instigated or catalyzed by the outside aid agent if sustainability is to 
be achieved, World Vision’s approach to development which occurs through local leaders 
and structures of authority seems to question that necessity. Its approach may still be 
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achieving capacity-building, just not in the sense that much of development discourse 
necessitates – which is within and by communities themselves.  
 This leads into the next question as to whether such support and capacity-building 
of official authority structures, particularly local government, create false senses of 
confidence in potentially corrupt or incompetent systems and allow government to 
remain dependent on WV’s support. While such an approach does open up World 
Vision’s aid and assistance to exploitation by government for political or other reasons, 
which could potentially have very negative affects perpetuating the status quo and 
supporting systems which may be unfair, WV’s choice to approach development this way 
seems to achieve two positive objectives, at least to some degree. The first objective is 
practicality, both in the sense that positive relationships with government support World 
Vision’s likelihood of being granted permits and permission to conduct its work and 
assert its values, and in the sense that World Vision can benefit from government inputs, 
such as data collection for situational assessment and monitoring and evaluation. The 
other objective that may be achieved is sustainability of development initiatives, in that if 
WV builds up local government capacity to perform the supportive social services that 
help beneficiaries sustain their development, then that sustainability is more likely to be 
achieved after World Vision has withdrawn from the project area. 
 Finally it was argued in earlier chapters that, because of the constantly changing, 
ambiguous and sometimes fickle atmosphere in which NGOs must adapt and maneuver 
their role and existence, constant reflection and multiple-loop learning is necessary to 
legitimize and add meaningful purpose to their work. As is evidenced above, World 
Vision places great organizational emphasis and priority on organizational learning for 
accountability purposes. Learning is expressed as a priority throughout all of its 
documentation, particularly LEAP. Globally, WV has set up structures in order to 
provide opportunity for ground-level feedback and experience to slowly work its way up 
to the international board level. In Zimbabwe, the cluster system allows feedback from all 
major stakeholders (including WV’s own experience, donors, peer organizations and 
government) to influence WV’s national strategy. Partnered with the staggered cycles of 
program evaluation which bring constant feedback to the organization at local and 
national levels, this provides an opportunity for meaningful learning. These structures do 
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not guarantee meaningful observation and reflection at the ground level, particularly if 
monitoring and evaluation reporting is left up to local partners such as government; 
however, they do emphasize a value of such learning and organizational support for its 
occurrence. 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
The role of World Vision in Zimbabwe is characterized by a long-standing and consistent 
presence which has adapted as necessary to changes in the political economy of 
Zimbabwe as well as global changes in international (‘big D’) development. Its 
organizational values and policies have determined its methods in carrying out 
development assistance in Zimbabwe, particularly with respect to its approach to the state, 
donors and beneficiaries. The adaptations or changes that WVZ has made in order to 
respond to the political economy of Zimbabwe as well as to the local contexts in which it 
carries out development assistance have included the following: careful yet close 
partnerships with government at various levels, compromises (to some extent) for the 
purposes of accessing funding, a locally contextualized practical approach to ‘making 
things happen’ and intra-organization accountability. Such responses present issues as to 
whether true accountability to beneficiaries is compromised through WV’s approach to 
participation, its close connections with government and, ultimately, its pursuit of 
organizational sustainability. 
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Chapter 5: World Vision in Umzingwane 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to understand the work of World Vision Zimbabwe and its contextual situation 
with regards to donors, the Zimbabwean state and beneficiary communities, this chapter 
examines the work of World Vision in Umzingwane District in Matabeleland South 
Province. Because Umzingwane is characterized by increasingly low rainfall, limited 
agricultural output and food insecurity, World Vision has become more involved in 
Umzingwane District since 2009, focusing primarily on agriculture and particularly with 
respect to crop and livestock production under minimal rainfall conditions. My study 
looks at a variety of such projects, across three wards within the district.  
This chapter provides a brief overview of the agricultural conditions and socio-
economic context of Umzingwane district, followed by descriptions and explanations of 
World Vision projects in the district. Seven WV projects with beneficiaries spread across 
four districts are examined individually. The ensuing discussion explains WV’s 
methodology in carrying out its work in Umzingwane, in terms of needs-assessment, 
implementation and monitoring and evaluation, after which there is a critical analysis of 
WV’s accountability to donors, the state, beneficiaries and ultimately to itself. 
 
5.2 Umzingwane District: Local Context 
Umzingwane district, located in Matabeleland South Province, has a total population of 
62,510 people and is divided into twenty wards (Appendix 11.1). The majority of the 
district consists of four communal areas, and the rest is comprised of mining and 
privately-owned land (including ‘old resettled land’ dating back to the 1980s, land 
resettled during FTLRP, and private commercial land which has not been resettled) 
(Zimbabwe Parliament Research Department 2011). In addition, there are five business 
centers in the district.  
Umzingwane is located in agro-ecological zone IV, which is characterized by low 
annual rainfalls, seasonal droughts, and dry spells occurring during the rainy season 
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(FAO 1997). The annual rainfall for the 2012/2013 agricultural season totaled 404.4mm 
which, just like the year before (which totaled 356.9mm), is below the expected amount 
of rainfall per annum (Appendix 11.2). Due to low rainfall, cereal production – including 
maize, sorghum and two types of millet – is low compared to the estimated requirement 
for the district.  The total cereal production for 2012/2013 was 2688 metric tons, marking 
a 4188 metric ton deficit from the determined required output of 6876 metric tons 
(Appendix 11.2). Food insecurity is therefore high, with 44.1 percent of the district being 
food insecure during peak hunger periods (from January to March) (ZIMVac 2013:126).  
Formal employment is low, leading many to take to illegal gold mining for informal 
income (Zimbabwe Parliament Research Development 2011). The district has fifteen 
health centers, 36 primary schools and 22 secondary schools (Zimbabwe Parliament 
Research Development 2011:6, 9-10).   
 
Map 5.1 Location of Umzingwane in Zimbabwe  
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5.3 World Vision in Umzinwane 
World Vision’s work in Umzingwane district focuses primarily on agriculture, 
particularly small-scale agricultural development at the household level. There are no 
Area Development Programs (ADPs) in the district, which means that there are no 
sponsored children and all projects are funded through grants from donors. WVZ also 
carries out some additional work in HIV and AIDS prevention, health and livelihoods in 
Umzingwane. In this regard it recently began a Health and Livelihoods program, 
targeting children from ages five and below. This is part of Umzingwane District’s 
involvement in the Millennium Development Accelerated Program (a new initiative in 
Zimbabwe which has targeted specific districts to work toward additional Millennium 
Development Goals, MDGs). The health and livelihoods program focuses on two MDGs 
of the accelerated program – MDG 4, the reduction of child mortality, and MDG 5, 
maternal health. This WV program also includes early childhood development education.  
Aside from the health program, World Vision’s programs in Umzingwane are  
primary short-term (under three years), are carried out in close partnership with 
Umzingwane district-level government (with whom WV claims a very productive and 
positive relationship) and focus on conservation farming methods as well as livestock 
production. Additionally, all WV projects carried out in Umzingwane involve HIV and 
AIDS prevention training, regardless of sector (for example, both WASH – water, 
sanitation and hygiene – related projects and agricultural projects involve HIV and AIDS 
prevention). Due to the holistic and complementary character of World Vision’s 
development initiatives, the agricultural projects undertaken are closely connected to 
each other with significant overlap in beneficiaries. The fieldwork and the following 
discussion cover a range of World Vision projects in Umzingwane and examine the 
connections and overlap between them. These projects are carried out largely in 
partnership with the state department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services 
(Agritex). 
WVZ’s work in Umzingwane is carried out primarily in communal areas, with 
some work also being carried out in “old resettlement areas” (meaning an area that was 
resettled shortly after independence under the willing-buyer, willing-seller system). It 
does not work in areas that were resettled under fast track, primarily due to the 
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controversy surrounding fast track and the remaining disapproval of the program among 
international donors (as explained in chapter three).  
 
5.4 World Vision Projects in Umzingwane 
The World Vision projects discussed below include conservation agriculture, rabbit 
production, guinea fowl production, goat production, layer chickens for egg production, 
and the rehabilitation of two dam-fed irrigation schemes.  These projects are spread out 
across the district (in wards 5, 8, 13, and 20) and are mainly located in communal areas. 
The project area examined in ward 13 is located in an “old resettlement area”. Although 
my study focuses on CAs, the old resettlement site visited in ward 13 offered some 
interesting and relevant perspectives and is therefore included here. All of the projects 
discussed involved physical inputs or training (or both) as provided by World Vision, and 
implementation was carried out either in conjunction with or through the Agritex 
department attached to Umzingwane district government. For each of the projects 
discussed, WV was no longer monitoring at the time of research, and monitoring duties 
had been turned over to Agritex and were its responsibility. 
 
5.4.1 Conservation Agriculture Projects 
World Vision has implemented conservation agriculture projects throughout 
Umzingwane District.  Its beneficiary constituency for these projects is widespread across 
multiple wards, targeting a large number of farmers. As well, these beneficiary groups 
also benefit from other World Vision projects involving livestock production and the 
receipt of agricultural inputs.  The projects are carried out in conjunction with each other, 
creating significant overlap in beneficiaries among livestock production projects and 
conservation agriculture projects.  Between 2010 and 2012, World Vision carried out two 
large-scale conservation agriculture projects across wards. One targeted 500 beneficiaries 
across nine wards and was funded by the European Union (EU) and the other targeted 
250 beneficiaries and was funded by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Both 
projects were carried out through a Trainer of Trainers (TOT) model, in which World 
Vision provides training and instructional pamphlets to Agritex, and Agritex in turn 
conducts training on the ground with beneficiary farmers. All such programs are intended 
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to have a trickle down affect on the entire rural communities in which they occur by 
means of good examples shown by productive and successful farmers. The method of 
farming which was taught through both of these projects involves zero tillage and 
minimal water usage, and is designed for drought-prone or difficult-to-farm areas of 
Zimbabwe like Umzingwane. 
The project funded by EU was carried out in response to a request from the Rural 
District Council for WVZ to aid in carrying out a plan which the council had formulated 
but did not have sufficient funding for implementation. The project involved both 
trainings (TOT) and physical inputs. Training in the beneficiary communities (carried out 
by Agritex) was made available to all members of the selected communities. But the 
targeted beneficiaries strictly speaking only included those who, in addition to the 
training, also received physical inputs. These inputs included, per beneficiary, 5kgs of 
sorghum seed, 2kgs of cow pea seed, 100kgs of fertilizer, steel trowels and water buckets. 
These beneficiaries were selected based on the following ‘most vulnerable’ criteria: the 
elderly (aged 65 and above), child-headed households, families housing two or more 
orphans and households without a stable income. An additional factor considered in the 
selection process for this conservation agriculture project was the amount of land which 
an individual could farm, seeking out those with at least 0.5 ha.  
Within this project, I visited sites in Ward Five and Ward Thirteen. The program 
in Ward Five targeted 49 beneficiaries to receive physical inputs and, at the time of my 
research, forty-two of the forty-nine beneficiaries were sustaining their farming plots with 
the conservation agriculture methods. The other seven were still farming their plots, but 
had resorted back to conventional tillage methods. Their crops were not doing as well as 
those who were still pursuing the conservation methods. Three beneficiaries were 
interviewed in ward five, of which all gave very positive feedback (Appendix 1, 
Interviews 13, 14, 15). At the time of research (in November 2013), their fields were 
successfully sprouting, and they each claimed success in agricultural output subsequent to 
the training.   
One site from the same project (with the same inputs as in Ward Five) was visited 
in Ward 13, where the farmer had sustained his conservation methods and had continued 
to produce successful crops each season since the project inception in 2010 (Appendix 1, 
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Interview 12). He claimed to have sustained his inputs since 2010 by saving seeds, that is, 
by planting seeds from previous yields. The same farmer had planted a section of his plot 
by means of conventional tillage the year before (in 2012) in order to compare results 
between farming methods. He noted that the section planted using the conservation 
agriculture methods had produced a full yield, while the section planted through 
conventional tillage had completely failed. Overall his feedback during the interview was 
very positive. However, he did suggest one issue with which he struggled each season, 
namely, finding sufficient grass to create the mulch necessary for the conservation 
agriculture methods.  He suggested that, due to lack of rain, the minimum amount of 
grass that could be found needed to be saved for cattle to eat, rather than used in crop 
farming. Despite this challenge, his yields had been very successful in previous years. 
Even so, he remained worried about the current season because he felt that he had even 
less grass for the mulch than he had in past seasons. 
The conservation agriculture project funded by FAO involved mostly training and 
very limited physical inputs. Rather than hosting large training sessions open to entire 
communities, the sessions targeted 250 farmers to receive both inputs and training. The 
farmers, which are called ‘lead’ farmers, were trained through a series of five 
demonstration trainings carried out by Agritex (again, World Vision had trained the 
Agritex officers, preparing them to train community members). After the initial trainings, 
each lead farmer was tasked with training ten other farmers from their respective 
communities. These further trainings involved no inputs for the (non-lead) farmers. 
Finally, the FAO-funded trainings also involved Field Days, where one of the most 
successful of the original lead farmer beneficiaries is chosen to present his field of crops 
to the surrounding community in conjunction with Agritex officers. These field days 
involve an open invitation, where local farmers are encouraged to come and hear the 
success stories of their peers, in the hope that this will inspire others to take up the 
successful conservation agriculture methods and also become more productive. Nearby 
farmers are encouraged to attend field days through the offering of prizes (namely 
farming tools or inputs).  It is not clear whether or not FAO funds the purchase of field 
day prizes; however, many of the field days involved sponsors from seed companies, 
which provided seed packs as prizes. Additionally, field days exhibit farmers who have 
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not been successful despite adopting conservation agriculture, and this is done in order to 
discuss reasons for failure and present problem-solving solutions. These events are 
conducted both at village and district level and occur during the harvest seasons.   
While supportive of course of the training methodology, an interviewed World 
Vision staff member expressed concern over the specific form of participation in the 
training system, suggesting that small-scale farmers are reluctant to participate when 
there are no inputs (although he was very positive with regard to the Field Day events) 
(Appendix 1, Interview 4). In general, World Vision staff considered these conservation 
agriculture training projects to be successful, based on the grounds that non-beneficiary 
community members had also adopted conservation agriculture methods (Appendix 1, 
Interviews 2,4). As well, Field Day functions demonstrated a trend in improvement in 
group management and farming management throughout Umzingwane communities.  
 One issue raised by both WV and Agritex staff was difficulty in getting farmers to 
plant the suggested crops, including vegetables and ‘small grains’ (such as sorghum and 
millet). They claimed that community members preferred to eat and grow maize – which 
indeed is the staple food in the country for making sadza – which requires intensive water 
inputs and is not conducive to conservation methods (Appendix 1, Interview 9). Despite 
this, my field visits indicate that the beneficiary farmers as a whole were very positive 
about small grains and vegetables production (though the selection of visited sites by 
Agritex may have led to bias in this regard). Further, in response to this difficultly of crop 
selection, WVZ has been working toward developing incentives for growing alternatives 
to maize by creating market contracts that stabilize income for farmers from the growing 
and sale of non-maize crops.  
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Fig. 5.1 Conservation agriculture beneficiary farmer exhibiting last year’s crop 
Fig. 5.2 Beneficiary farmer’s recently planted field 
 
          
 
 
5.4.2 Rabbit and Guinea Fowl Production Projects 
The rabbit and guinea fowl projects, both funded through FAO with additional funds 
coming from the EU, were each carried out in conjunction with conservation agriculture 
programs. According to a WV staff member, the projects were initiated by World Vision 
(Appendix 1, Correspondence 5). In other words, there was no specific request from the 
Umzingwane Rural District Council (URDC) for WVZ to implement rabbit and guinea 
fowl production. However, WV initiated the project in order to complement other 
projects which had been requested as part of the RDC’s development plans. Together, 
these two projects (rabbit production and guinea fowl production) targeted 1,026 
beneficiaries across five wards. Beneficiary selection was based on the same vulnerability 
factors that were considered when selecting conservation agriculture beneficiaries. For 
the fieldwork, two rabbit production project sites were visited in ward five, and two 
guinea fowl production project sites were visited (one in ward five and one in ward 
thirteen, with the latter site in an old resettlement area).  These projects were short-term 
projects, with World Vision’s involvement fully carried out during the year 2012. 
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The rabbit production project located in ward five targeted forty beneficiary 
households, and each household was given a set package of inputs, including two rabbits 
(one male and one female), a 50kg bag of rabbit feed, wire mesh for the enclosure to 
house the rabbits, two different types of veterinary medicines (1 x 20g of ESB3 and 33.4g 
of piperazine), a bucket, a garden trowel, a two-liter hand sprayer, and vegetable seed. In 
addition to material inputs, the project also involved training and instructions in building 
an enclosure according to a set design developed by World Vision. This enclosure 
requires minimal materials, such as scrap wood, mud, and the wire mesh that World 
Vision provides. Thirty out of the forty targeted beneficiaries were still sustaining their 
projects at the time of research (November 2013). The reason for failure, as given by the 
ten beneficiaries who had been unable to sustain their projects, was that their two rabbits 
had died of diseases (Appendix 10). The two project sites visited showed great success 
with the breeding and sale of rabbits. The first of these had a current stock of seven 
rabbits and claimed to have sold eighteen since August 2012 (Appendix 1, Interview 15). 
The second had a stock of twenty-five rabbits and claimed to have sold thirty-three since 
the project’s inception (Appendix 1, Interview 16).   
Similar to the rabbit project, households benefitting from the guinea fowl 
production project received both physical inputs and training. The physical inputs 
included four guinea fowl (two male and two female), wire mesh (for the WV-designed 
enclosure), veterinary medicines (1 x 20g of ESB3 and 33.4g of piperazine), a bucket, a 
garden fork, a two-liter hand sprayer and vegetable seed. The farmers were also given 
training in raising methods for guinea fowl as well as in construction of the enclosure 
structure (the same design as was used for the rabbits). Within ward five, 184 
beneficiaries were targeted, and 180 of them were still sustaining their guinea fowl 
production. For the four households who had failed to sustain their projects, their birds 
had been attacked by predators. During the site visit in ward five, the interviewed farmer 
indicated considerable success in her guinea fowl production (involving some sales) and 
she had taken the initiative to invest in a larger production business, raising turkeys in 
addition to her guinea fowls (Appendix 1, Interview 12). She claimed that her turkeys 
were doing very well and that they bring in more money than the guinea fowl, and she 
intended to continue raising both guinea fowl and turkeys. The same guinea fowl 
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production project was carried out in ward thirteen. Inputs reported were slightly 
different in this ward, with only two guinea fowl (one male and one female) provided per 
farmer. The farmer interviewed from ward thirteen had not yet made a profit from his 
guinea fowl, but he still had two live birds and hoped that he would be able to improve 
his project. While he was not yet successful in breeding and selling, he still fell under the 
category of those sustaining a guinea fowl project, as his two guinea fowls were still alive. 
 
Fig. 5.3 WV-designed enclosure 
Fig. 5.4 Beneficiary-designed shade structure for turkeys 
 
    
 
Fig. 5.5 Rabbit beneficiary farmer with self-designed enclosure 
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5.4.3 Goat Production Project 
The goat production project, which targeted 150 beneficiaries across four wards, was 
carried out during 2010 to 2012.  This project was funded by EU and, according to a WV 
staff member, was part of the same RDC request for development assistance that had 
included the request for conservation agriculture training (Appendix 1, Correspondence 
5; Appendix 7.4). Again, beneficiaries were selected based on the same WV vulnerability 
factors as for the other projects. Beneficiary households were given two female goats 
each, and one male goat was provided for rotation between each set of ten households. I 
visited three beneficiary sites in ward five, of which one had failed (Appendix 1, 
Interview 13) and two had succeeded (Appendix 1, Interviews 15, 16). The number of 
beneficiaries who are still pursuing goat production was not provided during the 
fieldwork, although it was requested from Agritex. This could mean that Agritex either 
did not have the requested information or it did not wish to make available the exact 
number (possibly because the project did not seem to be particularly successful). I do not 
have sufficient evidence to determine the exact reason for the non-disclosure of this 
information pertaining to success rates.   
The first of the successful beneficiaries interviewed had sold ten of the fifteen 
goats she had produced since 2010 (Appendix 1, Interview 15). With the money she 
made from her sales, she invested in a cow, which was pregnant at the time of my 
research. She intended to sell the calf. Additionally, some of the goats she had produced 
had been slaughtered for home consumption.  Finally, she claimed that her root stock – 
the two goats originally provided by World Vision – were still alive and producing. The 
second successful beneficiary interviewed had received her goats in 2012, and had 
already grown her herd to seventeen, of which many were still young (Appendix 1, 
Interview 16). She claimed to have sold two goats, and planned to save her profits from 
future sales in order to invest in a cow. Since she began in 2012, the male goat provided 
by World Vision had died, but she had successfully sought out another male for breeding 
with her mature female goats. Finally, at the third site visited, the farmer had been unable 
to sustain her goats. She had received her goats in 2010 and claimed that both goats had 
died within the first 5-6 months of ownership, one having been attacked by a predator and 
the other died for reasons unknown (Appendix 1, Interview 13). Both deaths occurred 
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before the goats had reproduced. The farmer also said that the male goat in her rotation 
had died.   
According to the World Vision District Coordinator, the overall project was 
largely affected detrimentally by lack of rainfall, which may have been the root cause for 
some of the goat deaths (Appendix 1, Interview 4). The interviewed farmer who had 
failed to maintain her goats was in fact doing very well in her efforts at conservation 
agriculture, and her current seeds were all sprouting during the fieldwork. She seemed 
uninterested in the lack of success from her goats. Both of the successful goat farmers 
were experiencing great success in their other agricultural production efforts, with one 
also carrying out successful conservation agriculture (having been involved in World 
Vision’s original conservation agriculture training) and the other benefitting from a 
surface irrigation scheme which had been implemented by a different NGO. This latter 
farmer fed her goats using what she called field residue, which included weeds, dried 
vegetation and excess cuttings taken from the surface irrigation field. This allowed her 
greater security in sustaining a feed supply for her goats compared to other WV 
beneficiaries who were not involved in other agricultural development schemes.   
Based on the interviews with the three goat beneficiaries and discussions with 
Agritex, it appears that the perspective surrounding the goat project was to treat it as a 
high yield (and high risk) investment. The care and keeping of goats requires greater 
investment than smaller animals (such as the rabbits and guinea fowl), with more reliance 
on crop successes (for supplementary feeding for goats) and a significant danger of 
malnutrition threatening goat production. The World Vision District Coordinator’s 
explanation for goat project failure (namely, crop failure due to lack of rainfall) reflects 
the reliance on crops for sustaining goat production (Appendix 1, Interview 4). The 
successes of the two goat farmers who were interviewed (with the one farmer having 
invested in a cow and the other farmer intending to do the same) are evidence of the high 
yield that can occur if the risks are overcome.   
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Fig. 5.6 Goat beneficiary farmer 
Fig. 5.7 Field residue that she feeds to her goats 
 
      
  
 
5.4.4 Layer Chickens and Egg Production Project 
The layer chicken project was funded by the EU and carried out in ward eight between 
August and December of 2012. It targeted 50 beneficiary households, who were again 
selected based on WV’s vulnerability requirements. This project was not in response to a 
URDC request, but was initiated by World Vision. Inputs from World Vision included 
forty-five layer chickens per farmer, food-feeders and water-feeders, mesh wire for 
constructing the enclosure (again, the same design by WV), chicken feed and veterinary 
medicine (type and amount unspecified). This project had an even more negative success 
rate, with only six out of the fifty beneficiary households still sustaining their project at 
the time of research.  
The reason reported by Agritex for the other 44 beneficiary households failing in 
their layer projects was that they had been unable to feed their layers due to a shortage of 
feed. While this was the official reason (as outlined in official Agritex documentation) 
the Agritex officers in the field expressed other suspicions during discussions. These 
suspicions centered on claims that some of the beneficiaries had failed to see the long-
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term potential of the egg business, and therefore had eaten their chickens or produced and 
sold them for meat instead. They also suggested a lack of effort and motivation from 
beneficiaries and were worried that future projects may result in the same failure. This 
was the only project where such an attitude was suspected or mentioned.   
One egg-layer production site was visited in ward eight, where the farmer had 
been very successful in her egg production, having earned substantial profits (Appendix 1, 
Interview 11). Forty of her forty-five birds remained alive and were producing eggs, with 
a collection rate of 39-41 eggs per day. Her records indicated that she received profits 
(money kept after purchasing feed and medicine for her chickens) of between $75 and 
$195 per week, and that she intended to double her layer program in the near future. She 
had already begun construction on an additional enclosure, which she was constructing 
according to the same WV design which had been used for her first set of layers (and the 
same design that WV had provided for the rabbit and guinea fowl projects).  
The farmers included in the layer project have been re-targeted for another World 
Vision project, along with an additional forty farmers, this time for producing broiler 
chickens. According to Agritex, this new broiler chicken project will involve contract 
farming in order to provide a reliable market for the farmers.  During discussion, Agritex 
officers expressed the hope that the contract farming arrangement would provide better 
incentive to those beneficiaries who had failed with their layer production (Appendix 1, 
Interview 9). 
 
5.4.5 Mzinyathini Irrigation Scheme Rehabilitation 
The Mzinyathini Irrigation Scheme is a 32.4 hectare surface irrigation scheme which 
receives its water from the Umzingwane Dam. The access to water from the dam is, for 
the time being, guaranteed by way of an agreement between Bulawayo City Council and 
Mzinyathini Communal Area. The scheme was originally built in 1965 and was 
successful for a very long time; however it became degraded over the years and needed 
rehabilitation. World Vision’s three-year involvement in rehabilitating the scheme took 
place from 2009 to 2012, and this involved rehabilitating the irrigation systems of canals 
and piping. In addition, agricultural training and input provision took place. WV’s 
involvement was in response to a request from the RDC, likewise as part of the 
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development plan mentioned earlier for other projects. The scheme targets 81 
beneficiaries, each with a 0.4 hectare farming plot.  Beneficiary targeting was again based 
on vulnerability factors, with an additional consideration for those who do not own cattle.  
Within the scheme, farmers practice conventional tillage, and not the minimal-tillage 
conservation method.   
World Vision’s funding for this project involved a three-year contract with the EU, 
where the receipt of each year’s funds was contingent upon a yearly audit which would 
compare actual implementation and spending against the original project plan. The 
research revealed contradicting statements as to whether or not this funding system 
created problems for timely and efficient implementation. One World Vision staff 
member suggested that the audit condition and contingency caused serious challenges 
(Appendix 1, Interview 2).  At the time he was interviewed, he revealed that the project 
had been sitting still with no progress for five months while they were waiting to receive 
the next year’s funding. He attributed it to EU’s complex audit system, which requires 
reports to be audited from a support office in Brussels and then approved before the next 
set of funds can be sent, thereby creating severe lag time between yearly accesses to 
funding. Another World Vision staff member supported this view during the course of 
my first interview with him (Appendix 1, Interview 4), suggesting that the project had 
been stopped due to a funding cut. However, in an interview a year later, and after the 
project had been completed, he claimed that the yearly audit system had no affect on the 
project “because implementation was done well” (Appendix 1, Correspondence 5).  
Despite any lag time in funding, World Vision completed its rehabilitation efforts and 
withdrew from the project area by 2013.   
Since World Vision’s withdrawal from the scheme, and until recently, agricultural 
production has been successful under the guidance and support of Agritex. However, 
Bulawayo City Council then refused to honor the water agreement and simply cut off the 
majority of the agreed water supply. During my fieldwork, on average, only eleven out of 
the eighty-one farmers were receiving water each week. When asked if World Vision had 
made any effort to addressing this problem as part of its monitoring function, the Agritex 
officer suggested that the issue was ultimately a legal and even a political matter, and 
therefore attempts by World Vision to address the water supply problem would not be 
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appropriate or relevant (Appendix 1, Interview 9). Although Agritex and the greater 
Umzingwane Rural District Council were unable to make headway in addressing this 
issue, it has since been resolved but not through the courts. Rather, the resolution entailed 
the personal (and presumably political) connections of a concerned and interested third 
party. 
 
5.4.6 Malunika Dam and Irrigation Scheme Rehabilitation 
The Malunika Dam and Irrigation Rehabilitation project also involved rehabilitating a 
surface irrigation area. However, World Vision’s largest contribution in the case was the 
repair of the Malunika Dam wall (which had a large hole) and setting up pipelines for 
feeding water into the surface irrigation scheme. This project was implemented from 
2010 to 2012 and was not requested by RDC but was an initiative of WV. The 
agricultural plot for the irrigation scheme is located in ward eight. The dam is located in 
the communal area but the farming scheme itself is located on privately-owned land. The 
private land owner has donated the use of the land, which is just less than two hectares in 
size. The scheme targets 27 beneficiaries, each with 0.06 hectare plots. The scheme is set 
up with a canal system which is fed by the pipes from the Malunika Dam. World Vision 
inputs included cement, pipes, a siphon system, horticulture seeds and fertilizer.   
All twenty-seven beneficiaries are so far clearly devoted to sustaining their plots 
in the scheme, although a recent break in the valve which controls the water coming 
through the pipelines from the dam has caused concern about the continuous availability 
of water.  According to Agritex, the usual procedure in such a situation would be for the 
27 benefitting farmers to pool together funds to pay to have the valve fixed (Appendix 1, 
Interview 9). The farmers though are unwilling to contribute any funds because “someone 
from government” came and took the valve, promising to have it repaired. The person 
who promised to fix the valve has not arranged any funding, so now the situation sits 
unresolved. The Agritex officer believes that the farmers are in fact not willing to replace 
the valve because they think that if they wait long enough, it will be repaired for free 
(meaning that they will not need to come up with funding) (Appendix 1, Interview 9). 
However, if the promise to fix the valve is ever fulfilled, it may be long after in-field 
crops and income opportunity have been lost. In other words, in the opinion of the 
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Agritex officer, the farmers will suffer more from loss of crop production than they 
would if they simply paid for the valve repairs.  
 
Fig. 5.8 Malunika Dam wall 
Fig. 5.9 Malunika irrigation farming scheme 
 
 
     
 
 
5.5 WVZ Methodology in Practice in Umzingwane 
All of the projects discussed above were originally assessed, implemented, monitored and 
evaluated, through similar systems and all involved great reliance on Agritex. In 
accordance with WV’s LEAP policy (although LEAP was not mentioned by district level 
WV staff), the methods used by WVZ in Umzingwane involved a practical and efficient 
approach with objectives to stretch donor funding through effectively outsourcing 
responsibilities to local government (Agritex) and to enable long-term project support 
through building local government capacity. Such a methodology (involving the close 
connections forged between WVZ and Agritex) and its implications are discussed in this 
section. 
 
5.5.1 Needs-Assessment 
With regards to needs-assessment, there were two different motivations expressed by 
World Vision staff for WV’s involvement in the local area. The first entailed WVZ 
responding to a request for assistance from the Rural District Council in order to 
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implement a development plan which the council already had in place but could not carry 
out due to lack of funding. These included the Mzinyathini irrigation rehabilitation, the 
EU-funded conservation agriculture project and the goat production project. The second 
motivation did not involve a response to a request from the RDC, but related to WV 
initiatives to supplement the development projects which were being requested by the 
RDC. Information used in needs-assessment for determining project direction and plans 
was gathered through Agritex as well as directly by World Vision. According to World 
Vision Zimbabwe, ‘point of entry’ for all its projects is through the Rural District Council 
and the District Administrator (DA)’s office (Appendix 1, Interviews 1,3). World Vision 
also attends thematically-based district-level developmental meetings (food security 
meetings were given as an example) on a regular basis as part of the needs-assessment 
process. Further, any World Vision involvement in the district must be approved by the 
District Administrator before it occurs. The three regional and district-level World Vision 
staff members who were interviewed expressed a solid working relationship with the DA 
and claimed to have never had problems regarding gaining access to areas in 
Umzingwane or having specific projects approved in the district (Appendix 1, Interviews 
2-6). This is unlike other districts, where they noted challenges in this regard.   
Beneficiary selection processes occur as part of assessment processes. As 
mentioned above, when formulating each project, World Vision targets individuals who it 
considers to be the most vulnerable. That vulnerability is marked by age (those who are 
65 years of age and higher), the number of orphans a household is caring for (particularly 
if a household has two or more orphans), child-headed households, and/or a lack of stable 
income. Sometimes, as indicated, additional selection criteria which are more project-
specific will be considered, for example, the amount of land to which a farmer has access 
and possession of livestock by farmers. World Vision works alongside Agritex in 
determining and identifying these factors in selecting project beneficiaries. 
While the Agritex officers who were interviewed seemed to indicate that WV’s 
involvement in selecting project beneficiaries was minimal, they did assert that World 
Vision is in fact on-the-ground interviewing and assessing project beneficiaries in the 
communities of Umzingwane. In this regard, they expressed frustration with World 
Vision’s requirement to target those who are most vulnerable. They suggested that 
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because World Vision is funding the project, they as Agritex must of course ensure that 
WV’s objective related to vulnerability is adhered to, but they did not agree with its logic. 
They felt that, by targeting the most vulnerable, World Vision is in the end setting up 
projects to fail, and these projects will not be sustainable in the long run.  
In this light, one Agritex officer was of the view that farmers who are vulnerable 
because of old age or ill-health (such as suffering from HIV and AIDS) will forever 
remain vulnerable, regardless of whether they receive World Vision’s development 
assistance or not (Appendix 1, Interview 9). He felt that while a specific project might 
help these particularly-vulnerable people in the short-term, the project will not be 
sustainable and will not help entire rural communities. In this sense, the effect is that 
development assistance simply becomes relief aid. While he was not advocating for 
ignoring vulnerable people, he suggested that it would be more appropriate to help those 
who are capable and ready to take on a project with full energy and commitment. He 
suggested that such farmers would not only sustain their own projects but would facilitate 
broader change by inspiring and guiding other farmers in the area. His view, however, is 
based on the view that vulnerable people are not capable of inputting intensive labor and 
time, but this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, not all groups found in World Vision’s 
vulnerability criteria are necessarily weak or incapable. This is particularly true of the 
vulnerability criteria including households that lack a stable income and households 
hosting orphans. The success of some of the beneficiaries interviewed (for example the 
woman with her goat and rabbit projects who had invested in a cow) demonstrates this.   
While this study does not focus on gender, it is useful to note that, of the six 
conservation agriculture and livestock production project sites visited, five of the farmers 
were women. At one household visited, the farmer’s husband was home but he could not 
provide any details about the projects, saying that his wife was the one who was involved. 
World Vision does not specify how gender is factored into beneficiary selection and in 
the analysis of vulnerability in Umzingwane, but women appeared to be prevalent 
amongst all the different WV projects.   
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5.5.2 Implementation 
Implementation of WVZ projects in Umzingwane seems to exemplify some of World 
Vision’s organizational values, including the significance of local partnership with 
government, the use of already-established local structures, efficiency of time and 
monetary investment placed as high priorities and holistic development. The values of 
efficiency, the use of established structures and strengthening the capacity of local 
partners are all seen through WV’s close relationship with Agritex and its overall 
involvement in carrying out agriculturally-based development projects. World Vision’s 
emphasis on holistic development is evident through the overlap which has been created 
among project beneficiaries, with many farmers benefitting from multiple and different 
WV projects at the same time. This holistic approach is also seen in the embedding of 
HIV and AIDS education and prevention in all other project training and implementation 
practices, regardless of the specific agricultural sub-sector within which a project falls. 
Additionally with respect to exemplifying WV’s organizational values, while district 
level WV staff and Agritex officers seem unaware of LEAP and other WV policies and 
official procedures, the requirements and values of such policies and procedures are 
evident through the ways in which projects are implemented. 
Implementation of VW projects in Umzingwane is primarily carried out by 
Agritex although, according to Agritex officers, World Vision is still present – at least to 
some extent – on the ground, meeting with and speaking to community members. In this 
context, one World Vision field officer who was interviewed indicated that Agritex 
officers would be in a stronger position than him to provide details of the multiple 
projects in Umzingwane, suggesting in effect that World Vision takes a backseat role in 
guiding and supporting Agritex as well as building-up government capacity, rather than 
taking on a direct role as implementers on the ground (Appendix 1, Interview 6). When 
asked about this, the WV Regional Food Security and Livelihoods Program Manager 
suggested that working through Agritex allows WV projects to be more sustainable 
(Appendix 1, Interview 3). He argued this on the basis that donor funds for WV projects 
have short cycles of time and, therefore, working with and through Agritex (a permanent 
presence) complements WV’s efforts. Simultaneously, during the length of WV’s 
participation, WV ensures that Agritex has or builds the necessary capacity to monitor 
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and sustain the projects subsequent to WV’s withdrawal. Through building such capacity 
with Agritex, he suggested, World Vision is in effect avoiding the negative implications 
of short-term funding. As such, even if funding streams are short-term, projects 
themselves should not be, in that Agritex remains to see projects through in the long term. 
In fact, of the projects which were studied in Umzingwane, most involved very short-
term (less than a year) funding and implementation periods for WVZ, making the reliance 
on Agritex for any long-term project support very critical.   
At the same time, he highlighted though that, during the funding period, WV is 
involved in implementation of the projects (as well as monitoring) alongside Agritex. 
This is necessary because, ultimately, WV is responsible for these functions as per the 
specifications and conditions of the project funding and must report to the donors 
accordingly. Engaging in this short-term project-based development was also seen by him 
as a tactical adaptation by WV to current donor funding opportunities in Zimbabwe 
(Appendix 1, Interview 3). In this sense, WV is taking advantage of short-term donor 
opportunities, as long-term funding is often not available in Zimbabwe. Additionally, in 
doing so, it is not concerned about the negative implications for the prospects of long-
term participatory-based development that inevitably arise from short-term funding 
(when there is a rush to conclude development projects on the basis of project 
efficiencies) because of the long-term support from Agritex. In this respect, however, the 
food security and livelihoods program manager expressed some concern that Agritex (as 
part and parcel of the contemporary Zimbabwean state with all its incapacities as 
witnessed by the failure to provide post-settlement support to fast track farmers) had very 
limited capacity to perform its role vis-à-vis the WV project (Appendix 1, Interview 3). 
Agritex, he claimed, suffered from a lack of physical mobility (unable to transport its 
officers to different sites in order to monitor and provide support to farmers), lack of 
morale (possibly because of low public servant salaries), and even an absence of 
competency with respect to necessary experience and relevant education.   
By conducting training sessions with Agritex officers (as indicated previously) in 
addition to recently providing a vehicle to the local Agritex office, World Vision is 
seeking to overcome these challenges and, in the process, is working to build Agritex’s 
capacity to carry on with the projects. World Vision also benefits from this relationship. 
146 
In general, given the short-term funding, it is more efficient, both in time and money, for 
WV to work through Agritex. Agritex collects varying types of field data on agriculture, 
has long-term relationships with farmers and has government authority to carry out work 
and access rural areas. Thus WV receives a steady flow of secondary data which can be 
used to develop project proposals at short notice. The cooperation also allows 
communication flows between WV, farmer beneficiaries or intended beneficiaries, and 
local political government (notably the RDC and the DA) to remain open. Perhaps even 
more important, by working through Agritex in the implementation phase, World 
Vision’s presence is legitimized from the perspective of the central state which – as 
discussed – has a rocky relationship with NGOs including at times with DNGOs.  
The holistic character of WV projects in Umzingwane is a clear reflection of 
World Vision’s overall organizational values. In the various projects researched, there 
was significant overlap between beneficiaries of different projects. Most of the livestock 
production beneficiaries had also been involved in receiving both training and physical 
inputs with regard to the conservation agriculture project. Two of the three goat farmers 
visited were successfully growing crops through conservation agriculture methods; the 
two most successful goat project sites visited were also benefitting from World Vision’s 
rabbit project; and both guinea fowl farmers visited also practiced conservation 
agriculture successfully. Additionally, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, all World 
Vision trainings and inputs are accompanied by HIV and AIDS education, therefore 
providing a health dimension (and possibly facilitating behavioral change with respect to 
unsafe sex practices) to all agricultural support projects. The HIV and AIDS counseling is 
significant given that the pandemic has had serious repercussions for agriculture in 
Zimbabwe, including the loss of thousands of economically-active farmers. Hence, it 
contributes to the prospects of sustainable livelihoods rooted in agriculture in communal 
areas.  
As well, by supporting income diversification through implementing a variety of 
agricultural projects among the same targeted beneficiaries, World Vision is providing 
what could be considered a safety net to protect beneficiaries from uncontrollable factors 
that may lead to project failure. For example, one of the farmers visited had been very 
successful with her conservation agriculture but had been very unsuccessful with her 
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goats. Therefore, while she had failed at one project, she was still able to sustain herself 
and improve her livelihood from the other project. At the same time this diversity of 
projects, when successful, exhibits the value in spreading-out agricultural investments 
and may therefore inspire confidence that leads to self-initiative among beneficiaries to 
further expand or diversify their projects. Such success and expansion was seen with the 
farmer who had been successful in her WV rabbit, goat and conservation agriculture 
projects and had therefore invested in a cow, intending to build up a cattle herd over time.  
Finally, the official World Vision organizational policies and procedures laid out 
throughout its documentation (such as LEAP, Child Well-Being Outcomes and the 
Development Program Approach) are not explicitly acknowledged by field or district 
level World Vision staff in Umzingwane, but the objectives of such documentation are 
evident through WVZ’s implementation practices in Umzingwane. It seemed that lower-
level World Vision staff members were not only unconcerned but seemingly unaware of 
the intricacies of policies such as LEAP. Yet, the values those policies put forth, such as 
efficiency, building the capacity of established structures (including government capacity 
– in this case Agritex) and holistic development, were evidently being carried out in 
actual practice.  
The one significant value that was not particularly prevalent on the ground (or in 
the field) was the involvement of and priority for children. Child protection is though 
recognized by lower-level WV staff. For example, when the WV District Officer was 
asked how WVI’s official methods, requirements, training documents and minimum 
standards around children come into actual play in project implementation, he could only 
think of the requirement that children must be protected, and he suggested that WV 
ensures this by “providing guidelines to stakeholders on the right to education, shelter, 
clothes, etc. for the children” (Appendix 1, Correspondence 5) Despite the mention of 
protection, when asked directly how the projects covered in this study tied in with World 
Vision’s Child Well-Being Outcomes, the district officer responded that the projects did 
not tie in with CWBOs at all. That being said, other global WV organizational values 
were evident in the projects studied. 
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5.5.3 Monitoring and Evaluation 
Similar to assessment and implementation, monitoring and evaluation for WV projects in 
Umzingwane are carried out through Agritex. As mentioned above (under 
implementation), WV sees Agritex’s involvement as a path to sustainability, particularly 
regarding monitoring and evaluation, as Agritex must carry on long after World Vision’s 
funding stream for a particular project has finished. For each of the projects considered in 
this study, monitoring was carried out in a variety of ways. What stood out as the most 
prominent means for monitoring were reports from Agritex.  Despite the claim from both 
WV and Agritex that World Vision was also on the ground conducting monitoring, the 
primary means of monitoring was clearly through Agritex. 
When asked how WV receives feedback about projects, three methods were 
outlined by World Vision staff: reports, which are received through Agritex; feedback 
meetings; and direct complaints coming straight to World Vision from individual 
beneficiaries or others within the benefitting community. The report process was 
explained in this way: ward-level Agritex officers assess the situation of the project 
beneficiaries and report to Agritex at district level; then, Agritex at district level in turn 
reports to World Vision (Appendix 1, Interview 3). The WV district coordinator noted 
that this report process may be carried out differently in other districts, but due to (in his 
opinion) the good relationship between WVZ and the Umzingwane district government, 
they are able to receive monitoring reports in this manner (Appendix 1, Correspondence 
5). In the case of feedback meetings, it was not clear whether these meetings consisted of 
Agritex and World Vision attendees only, or whether they also included local village or 
ward-level representatives. It was clear, however, that feedback meetings occur directly 
between World Vision staff and Agritex. With respect to direct complaints, farmer 
beneficiaries are provided with the contact details for the relevant World Vision field 
officers, district coordinator and program manager. If a complaint arises, whether it is 
against Agritex, a local leader or community member, or one of the World Vision staff 
members, beneficiaries may express their concerns directly to World Vision in 
confidence, and they have the option of contacting who they wish to speak to amongst the 
field officers, district coordinator and program manager.   
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Additionally, when asked about feedback mechanisms, the World Vision food 
relief and livelihoods program manager described what WVZ calls ‘information 
provision’ (Appendix 1, Interview 3).  Information provision happens at the beginning of 
implementation, and involves World Vision informing the community about the project 
by summarizing its objectives, targets and plans in the form of information pamphlets and 
meetings which are called ‘inception meetings’. It is in the pamphlets distributed at such 
meetings that World Vision provides the contact details for the field officers, district 
coordinator and program manager that can then be used for receiving complaints. The 
World Vision program manager suggested that inception meetings are a time when 
people can share concerns regarding the project, and he therefore spoke about them as a 
way of monitoring feedback. However, these meetings are more of a preliminary act 
rather than an opportunity to monitor projects during implementation or post-
implementation. Thus, they are not proper feedback mechanisms which can be used as a 
monitoring mechanism for projects. Such consultative meetings imply that World Vision 
addresses and uses participatory methods that derive from an involvement-based 
participatory concept rather than an empowerment-based concept of participation, as least 
with regard to beneficiary participation. Seemingly, if deeper participation is to be 
discovered with respect to the Umzingwane projects, then it is be found in the 
relationship between WVZ and Agritex and not between WVZ and farmers.  
Turning finally to evaluation, project-specific, detailed and measured evaluations 
had not yet taken place for the projects studied. This is not surprising, as the projects have 
all occurred within the last four years and, as mentioned in chapter four, the World 
Vision program and project cycle is based on a five-year time span between evaluations.  
Feedback meetings and theme-based development meetings (for example the drought 
relief committee) do take place on a regular basis with Agritex, the RDC and the DA, 
which creates a regular flow of evaluative feedback and which could provide a basis for a 
WV-driven evaluation of the projects. 
 The trend that is evident among these systems of assessment, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation in Umzingwane is that World Vision’s approach to 
empowerment-based participation and capacity-building is very government-focused, 
centered on empowering and supporting the established systems that exist in local 
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government. This is in contrast to the approach to participation that is taken with 
beneficiaries directly, which seems to be more of an involvement-based approach that 
uses consultation as the means of assessment and feedback. This trend, which is evident 
in projects happening on the ground throughout Umzingwane District, corresponds to the 
approaches laid out in LEAP. 
 
5.6 WVZ Accountability in Umzingwane  
In this section, I discuss World Vision’s work in Umzingwane in relation to the broader 
question of accountability. In its close connection with and support for local government, 
WV appears to have achieved a level of project sustainability and accountability to 
beneficiaries, while manipulating short-term donor funding to achieve longer-term impact.  
As well, WV’s work shows evidence of significant accountability to the organization’s 
own values and policies, even when ground-level staff members are not explicitly aware 
of or concerned with the details of such policies and values. With regard to accountability, 
I examine in turn donors, government and beneficiaries.  
 
5.6.1 Accountability to Donors: Issues of Funding 
Donors and their requirements and the necessity to be accountable to them are a concern 
affecting higher-ranking WV managerial and administrative staff, such as the Program 
Manager and the Grants and Human Affairs Director. Due to World Vision’s approach to 
needs-assessment in Umzingwane that relies heavily on Agritex, WV does not directly 
involve beneficiaries in projects until funding has already been approved. As well, the 
short-term character of the majority of the projects looked at during this study seems to 
have significantly reduced complications associated with meeting donor requirements, as 
funding requirements associated with longer-term projects are more convoluted and 
multi-dimensional. Both the WV district coordinator and the WV food relief and 
livelihood program manager did though highlight the importance of WV’s accountability 
to donors even for short-term projects, and they suggested that this was one reason for the 
necessity of WV’s direct involvement on-the-ground (no matter how limited this was 
compared to Agritex’s on-the-ground involvement in WV projects) (Appendix 1, 
Interviews and Correspondence 2, 3, 4, 5). To reiterate, though donor accountability 
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requirements impacted on WV fieldworkers and their responsibilities, the affects, 
difficulties and challenges associated with these requirements were felt primarily by 
higher-level World Vision staff.   
Of all of the projects in Umzingwane district, accountability to donors in terms of 
responding to specific requirements seemed to have the greatest direct affect on the 
Mzinyathini irrigation scheme rehabilitation project. As mentioned earlier, funding from 
the EU was granted for this three-year project on condition that a yearly assessment and 
audit was undertaken by WV. This led to significant frustrations and a five-month lag 
period in funding and temporary project suspension. Additional frustrations were 
expressed regarding EU’s strict requirements and absence of flexibility with respect to 
adhering to line-item spending plans which were originally specified in the funding 
proposal, as well as EU’s refusal to approve certain necessary line items, such as tollgate 
fees. Frustrations and difficulties specific to the even shorter-term projects (such as 
conservation agriculture and livestock production) were not explicitly expressed. Both 
the very short term cycle of these projects, as well as the reliance on Agritex to carry out 
monitoring and beneficiary support, may have contributed to this.   
WV’s close relationship with Agritex, which builds up the latter’s capacity to 
provide sustainable monitoring and support for beneficiaries, might provide the basis for 
carrying out meaningful projects in the short term, therefore allowing WV more freedom 
to accept short-term funding and with less resource and time intensive commitments and 
requirements on its part. If looked at from another perspective, however, the comparative 
inability or inopportunity in achieving long-term funding may dictate the necessity of the 
reliance on Agritex for fulfilling project sustainability. If short-term funding is all that is 
available or mainly available, WV does not have the option of carrying out long-term, 
meaningful monitoring themselves and must therefore rely on Agritex (because of WV’s 
quick withdrawal from short-term projects when the funding for a specific project is 
finished). WV staff members, as mentioned, did express concern with Agritex’s 
competence and capacity, but suggested that its prominent role is critical to project 
sustainability, as Agritex is able to continue working on projects after WV no longer has 
funding to monitor and support them (Appendix 1, Interview 3, 6). Essentially, the 
general attitude within WVZ district-level staff toward donors regarding these short-term 
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projects is marked by acknowledgement of a necessary system that must be accepted and 
worked around as part of the process, regardless of the complications and difficulties it 
presents. 
Other frustrations regarding funding included the local-level perception that 
NGOs have plenty of funds to spend and therefore are expected to provide generous 
allowances to Agritex and other local leaders who partner with WV in their development 
efforts, but such generous allowances are not in fact accepted as part of funding proposals. 
According to the WV food relief and livelihoods program manager, UNICEF and other 
larger organizations often offer hefty meal allowances to government officials (of 
between $40 and $60), while a WV allowance may be $10 (Appendix 1, Interview 2). 
This creates unrealistic expectations of World Vision. He also suggested that there is a 
general dislike toward WV from local professionals, including both government and non-
government employees (such as doctors and teachers), which is residual from the period 
when many NGOs had access to foreign currency but local professionals were paid in the 
inflated Zimbabwe dollar (prior to the government of national unity); this, he claims, has 
created the misconception that NGOs are flush with funds for ready dispersal. The result 
is that local stakeholders cannot understand the strict expenditure requirements that WV 
must adhere to, for example, when WV staff members assert that they must check with 
their organization and follow formal procedures before spending WV money. Other 
issues of funding and frustrations and difficulties over donor requirements appear to be 
mainly an issue at the national WV level (as was described in chapter four), although 
such issues are still felt to an extent at the district level.  
 
5.6.2 Accountability to Government: Legitimizing WV’s Presence 
Up to this point, in terms of the relationship between WVZ and government in the 
Umzingwane projects, the discussion has focused on local government. But my research 
also shines some light on relationships between WV and provincial and national 
governments with regards to political impact. The emphasis on local government of 
course reflects the WVZ-government dynamic. The most significant aspect of World 
Vision’s relationship with the state is its close connections with local government, 
particularly Agritex and the latter’s role in supporting agricultural development projects.  
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Throughout organization-wide WV policy and documentation (as discussed in the 
preceding chapter), stress is placed on both building capacity of local government 
structures for the purpose of development sustainability as well as relying on secondary 
data and existing systems of assessment for efficiency of time and money. In 
Umzingwane, both of these imperatives are carried out through WV’s close partnership 
and reliance on local government for carrying out each stage in the development projects 
(assessing, designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating). 
The point of entry for all World Vision projects in Umzingwane district is through 
the office of the District Administrator (DA) and the Rural District Council (RDC). These 
state bodies have the authority to grant permission to WV to take action in carrying out 
development projects within the district. The WV program manager, district coordinator 
and field officer for Umzingwane all expressed a high level of satisfaction with their 
relationship with both the DA and the RDC (Appendix 1, Interviews and Correspondence 
3, 5, 6). According to the district coordinator, interactions between WV on the one hand 
and the DA and RDC on the other hand are “very positive,” claiming that “updates 
besides monthly reports are done any time and it’s a good way of monitoring activities of 
NGO work” (Appendix 1, Correspondence 5). The food relief and livelihoods program 
manager commented that WVZ does not have any critical stumbling-blocks in its relation 
with the DA in Umzingwane (Appendix 1, Interview 3). Beyond the DA and RDC, 
World Vision must meet with and gain approval from the local head of Umzingwane 
Agritex, to move forward with any agriculturally-based projects.   
Not only are these channels of consultation and authority required of World 
Vision by government in order to gain permission to carry out projects, but World Vision 
staff considered the WV-local government relationships and partnerships to provide 
legitimization of their projects and motivation for these projects from the perspective of 
the beneficiaries, as well as giving WV projects and WV itself a level of political security.  
The WV district coordinator commented that:  
Workmanship on projects such as construction of fowl runs is monitored and supervised 
by government workers so WV is not blamed for poor workmanship. DA, Council and 
other offices were taken to do project site monitoring regularly, say every three months, 
and that alone was a good motivator to the beneficiaries. The best method to manage 
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political labeling is to plan [site] monitoring with government line ministry departments. 
(Appendix 1, Correspondence 5) 
The WV district coordinator suggests that, because of government’s involvement (and 
even its leading role in monitoring) in the projects, World Vision is protected from two 
possibilities: the first is being blamed for project failure, and the second is being 
considered as having a political presence or promoting a political agenda in the area. As 
discussed in chapter three, the political atmosphere in Zimbabwe is often tense (including 
in rural areas), and foreign or international NGOs have not always been welcome by the 
state in pursuing their work and gaining influence.  
When asked whether or not the parliamentary elections carried out in July of 2013 
had any impact on the progress of WV projects or the presence of WV in the field, the 
WV food relief and livelihoods program coordinator provided a mostly positive but very 
carefully-crafted answer. He said that WV removed its presence during the time 
surrounding elections to allow space for political party campaigning (Appendix 1, 
Interview 3). He also acknowledges that, for certain areas, WV was literally asked to 
remove itself, again to provide space and time for campaigning.  While this seems to 
suggest that WV was removed from the field to the detriment of its activities, it seemed 
to be a welcome removal. The WV program coordinator therefore argued that WV’s 
presence during the time of elections would have been unwise, creating the potential for 
being accused of a political agenda. He said that he appreciated the honesty of the 
political campaigners and the government in asking WV to remove itself from its areas of 
operation.  
 Another struggle, again arising from the tense political atmosphere, involves the 
perception among Umzingwane communities that World Vision’s funding comes from 
the ruling ZANU-PF party as a service from the Zimbabwe government. One World 
Vision staff member indicated that “politicians claim that they can give or take NGO 
money away, [and make] these claims usually to uninformed or uneducated people when 
trying to gain political support” (Appendix 1, Interview 3). This has two potentially 
negative impacts on World Vision.  First of all, this belief leads rural communities to 
develop expectations about World Vision that may not be achievable. Because 
government is seen as responsible for providing infrastructural and social services, if 
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rural communities are told that World Vision is acting under the direction of government, 
they will expect the same from World Vision that they do from their government.   
The second potential negative impact relates to the fact that politicians do not 
want rural communities to know that they are not responsible for the development 
services which are being provided. They are threatened and wary of the presence and 
activity of NGOs like World Vision and hence they propagate the idea that these NGOs 
are working on behalf of – if not at the behest of – government. This was experienced 
firsthand during the research. While visiting a project site with an Agritex officer, we had 
picked up a farmer to view his field, and then returned him to the village center so that he 
could attend a compulsory political meeting. While the purpose of the meeting was not 
made known, the Agritex officer suggested that we leave immediately, as my presence as 
an outsider had been noticed and was very unwelcome. As we were leaving, the Agritex 
officer explained the reason for my unwelcome presence, namely, that the political 
figures who were holding the meeting gained legitimacy from the perception of them as 
the deliverers of development and services, and that the presence of an outsider 
accompanied by and Agritex officer would give the meeting attendees the impression that 
I may be a representative from an NGO. The fear was that, if I had been delivering some 
type of development assistance at the time, people would question the legitimacy of the 
claim made by government officials that development came from government.   
With regard to government, one perspective that became evident through 
discussions with informants, both WV and Agritex, is a semi-dichotomous, semi-
integrated juxtaposition of local government ministries and higher forms of government. 
This is in the sense that local bureaucratic government offices, particularly with respect to 
employees and their actions on the ground, expressed a sense of separation from higher 
forms of government (with specific respect to politics and its negative implications), 
while at the same time implying a sense of cooperation with higher government in order 
to secure power and authority. Although this appeared to be an undergoing theme 
peaking out through various comments which were made by informants, this was made 
particularly evident after the occurrence of the event described in the above paragraph. 
During this happening, the Agritex officer expressed a clear separation between himself 
as part of Agritex (and therefore part of the bureaucracy of the state) and any politically-
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oriented member of government. The implications of this are not entirely clear. However, 
it may explain the comfort World Vision expresses in working with Agritex, while at the 
same time its employees expressed a very cautious approach toward discussing the 2013 
elections as well as toward discussing the procedures for gaining access to rural areas. 
While they claimed to have positive and productive relationships with local government, 
they remained careful and tentative in their comments and approach. 
 
5.6.3 Accountability to Beneficiaries 
World Vision seeks to achieve accountability to its beneficiaries through a variety of 
methods. These entail a method involving a consultative, involvement-based approach to 
direct beneficiary participation combined with an empowerment-based method to the 
participation of local leaders and government stakeholders (which involves an indirect 
form of accountability to beneficiaries). Rather than accountability only being pursued 
through a grassroots system that is in some way beneficiary-led and -owned, 
accountability is attempted in an indirect fashion, through meaningful participation with 
leaders and existing structures (notably Agritex).   
While direct contact and feedback from beneficiaries is welcomed through the 
complaints-reporting system, the projects themselves are not instigated, needs-assessed or 
planned by the direct beneficiaries in any meaningful way. This is in line with LEAP and 
its imperative that beneficiaries should not be involved in a project in any way until 
funding has been guaranteed in order to avoid the emergence of unachievable 
expectations amongst rural communities. This does not necessarily mean that WV is not 
at all accountable to its beneficiaries or the progress of its development projects, but it 
does mean that the methods of participatory accountability that are generally embodied in 
development discourse are not particularly pursued by WV in Umzingwane district. 
It was also noted that the close and positive relationship between WV and 
Umzingwane district government allows for a constant stream of feedback from 
monitoring. This open flow of communication provides World Vision with opportunities 
to respond to challenges that may arise or to positive feedback with reinforcement and 
further support and, in actively doing this, increasing its accountability to beneficiaries. 
An example of WV responding to evaluative feedback is the new plan to implement a 
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broiler-chicken project with the same target beneficiaries who failed in their attempts 
with layer chickens (possibly because eggs were not valued as a lucrative source of 
income). This would also entail contractual arrangements to ensure a more stable market 
incentive for successful broiler production. Another example is the new initiative to 
provide market contracts for alternative grains in response to problems linked to the 
growing of maize by Umzingwane farmers.  
 A further accountability mechanism by World Vision in Umzingwane is the 
prioritization of unforeseen impacts of their projects. The WV food relief and livelihoods 
program manager stressed the importance of WV conducting impact assessments as well 
as conflict-resolution training in preparation for unforeseen impacts (Appendix 1, 
Interview 2). One example he used involved the question of land access and possession, 
suggesting that agreements about plot boundaries and land access have been historically 
subject to change and dispute within communities in Umzingwane and continues to be so. 
Land agreements in one agricultural year may be contested in subsequent years. These 
challenges are particularly relevant to both irrigation schemes described in this study.  He 
argued that accountability, amongst other things, entailed forging connections within 
communities and not dividing them (Appendix 1, Interview 2). 
One reason, as noted, for working so closely through Agritex (rather than directly 
with beneficiaries) is the belief that Agritex will be provided with the necessary capacity 
to support sustainability after World Vision has terminated its project involvement. This 
aim of sustainability, in effect, is a means by which WV is attempting to achieve 
accountability to beneficiaries, as if project success is equivalent to accountability. It 
reduces accountability, therefore, to a product (measurable and quantifiable) and not a 
complex and nuanced process of consultation, deliberation and engagement. This is a 
critical weakness of WV with reference to accountability, at least in the case of the 
projects studied in Umzingwane, and it undermines any genuine participatory 
development methodologies.   
 
5.6.4 Trends in Accountability of World Vision in Umzingwane  
Two types of accountability are evident as the prominent means of accountability for 
World Vision in Umzingwane: accountability to government and accountability to World 
158 
Vision itself.  While accountability to donors provides challenges which are dealt with 
regularly and are accompanied by sacrificing certain priorities, accountability to the 
government and accountability to World Vision itself stand out as prioritized.   
That being said, in the view of World Vision staff, they are being accountable to 
beneficiaries through being accountable to government and themselves. But the 
dimensions and elements of their accountability to beneficiaries do not directly align with 
the generally-accepted norms of even concepts of basic participatory development as 
outlined in chapter two. WV meets the basic requirements of participatory development 
regarding the government and building government capacity, but not at the individual, 
household and community levels amongst beneficiaries. While wary of politics and 
careful to avoid political implications of its work, WV embraces a close relationship with 
government in order to achieve both sustainability in its work and to protect itself from 
the very political implications that it tries to avoid explicitly. 
World Vision’s methods and actions in Umzingwane district do correspond 
however with organization-wide policies and values, particularly with regard to 
efficiency, practicality, holism and building the capacity of local stakeholders. Despite 
the fact that ground-level staff is not concerned with or aware of many of World Vision’s 
official policies and objectives, these staff were faithfully carrying them out.  
Additionally, WV has managed to find a way to manipulate short-term donor funding 
into working toward more long-term projects (such as the livestock and conservation 
agriculture projects) by allocating organizational resources toward equipping the existing 
systems and structures in place (notably Agritex) in playing a support role to facilitate 
sustainability of projects. Though the short history of these projects makes it difficult to 
come to any definite conclusions, and because World Vision is still to withdraw from 
some of them, WV’s efforts at preparing Agritex to support the beneficiaries seem to be 
achieving the intended goals, with the exception perhaps of the highly unsuccessful 
chicken layer project.  
Finally, World Vision appears to exhibit accountability both to beneficiaries and 
local stakeholders through long-term, positive relationships with the government 
structures that it has capacitated. The outcome of the potentially-negative impacts of such 
close connections to the state are yet to be seen, but the immediate effects have been 
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positive as understood in terms of the agricultural productivity emerging from the 
projects studied. As noted though, this is to understand success as a concrete product and 
not an intangible process. The fact that WV does not necessarily see this as a critical 
problem and that it does not even go against WV’s organizational policies and strategies, 
is problematic and disregards the very intangible concept of empowerment. In this end, it 
implies the existence of a marked divergence of WV policies and values from well-
recognized participatory methodologies within the development industry (‘big D’ 
development). 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
World Vision plays a significant role in small-scale agricultural development in 
Umzingwane district, which is characterized by a climate that is not conducive to farming.  
Its work stays true to WV policies and its efforts in pursuit of practicality and efficiency, 
as well as its value for holistic development. It implements its wide variety of projects on 
a large scale which is dispersed across multiple wards with overlapping beneficiaries, and 
it relies heavily on local Agritex in order to carry out such work. 
 World Vision’s methods in Umzingwane and its efforts toward accountability are 
carried out through top-down approaches which support the state structures and do not 
involve empowering, bottom-up participation. The implications of this approach involve 
many potential issues with respect to downward accountability. Not only does this create 
potential for supporting possibly corrupt, incapacitated or demoralized structures which 
may perpetuate current conditions of vulnerability, but it does so also at the cost of aims 
to catalyze empowerment and self-reliance. In allowing efficient use of donor funds and 
maintaining positive relationships with local government, WV facilitates its own 
organizational stability. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this thesis is to understand and explain the work of World Vision 
in Zimbabwe, particularly in Umzingwane district, with specific respect to participatory 
methods, accountability and effectiveness. In so doing, the thesis contributes to a deeper 
understanding of NGOs as an organizational form. In working toward the main objective, 
the thesis has considered the following: global theories and approaches toward 
development, particularly with regard to deep empowerment-based participation; the 
socio-economic and political atmosphere in Zimbabwe and its communal areas, and the 
Zimbabwean history and context of NGOs working toward ‘big D’ development; the 
approaches, methods and priorities of World Vision globally and in Zimbabwe; and an 
examination of World Vision’s projects in Umzingwane district.  
From this, the following conclusions can be drawn about World Vision: (1) World 
Vision has developed its own conceptualization of ‘participation’ that allows it to pursue 
policies and practice approaches which prioritize efficiency and project sustainability 
while addressing the demands of their donors and authorities of the state; (2) while 
allowing efficiency and easing constraints from donors and the state, World Vision’s 
heavy reliance on local ‘partners’ (namely, local government), while possibly a recipe for 
great sustainability of both development projects and WV’s organizational stability, is 
potentially ethically problematic with regard to supporting existing systems of power that 
lead to and reproduce vulnerability; and (3) WV’s conceptualization of participation 
allows WV to pursue its own sustainability and organizational interests and values 
(prioritizing accountability to itself over accountability to beneficiaries) while adhering to 
the global standards in development assistance (‘big D’ development) that call for 
participation and organizational learning.  
Ultimately, these conclusions about World Vision exemplify the inherent conflicts 
between deep and meaningful empowerment-based participatory aims and other 
organizational aims of organizational stability and sustainability pursued through 
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efficiency and compliance to donors and the state. From this conflict arises a devolution 
of ‘participation’, fitting with the perspective that NGOs pursue organizational survival at 
the cost of addressing “higher order questions” (Mitlin et al. 2007:1700) with regard to 
empowerment and downward accountability. That being said, WV’s pursuit of 
organizational learning suggests that it is in fact considering these higher order questions 
although still prioritizing organizational survival and sustainability. 
 
6.2 ‘Participation’ and World Vision 
Participatory methods are not only prominent in the discourse surrounding ‘big D’ 
development but are accepted as a necessity of legitimizing such development work. As 
is noted in chapter two, practicing participatory methods is deemed both ethically and 
practically necessary. It was also noted that the concept of ‘participation’, while deemed 
necessary by global standards for acceptable and ethical ‘big D’ development, is open to 
conceptual slippage. This thesis has stressed the difference between involvement-based 
(top-down) participation, in which outside development agendas are pursued through 
consultation and inclusion of local beneficiaries, and empowerment-based (bottom-up) 
participation, which focuses on beneficiary decision-making. Additionally, it has been 
argued that while the value in the concept of participation is not misplaced, its central 
role in development discourse, just as other elements of development discourse, should 
be subjected to continuous scrutiny that challenges and reevaluates the paradigms 
surrounding it. In its efforts toward achieving both project and organizational 
sustainability through the efficient use of resources and answering to the requirements of 
the state and donors, WV has indeed questioned the very meaning and application of the 
concept of participation to a significant degree. In doing this, it has managed to balance 
the demands of donors and the state; however, this has been at the cost of deep, 
empowerment-based participation. 
World Vision’s approach to participation is complex and draws on elements from 
both bottom-up and top-down participation. Dispersed throughout its policies seems to be 
a push for understanding bottom-up participation as more of an idealistic goal or 
guideline that may only be fully achieved if all other conditions are permitting and should 
not be pursued at the risks of compromising relationships with local stakeholders (mainly 
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the state and direct beneficiaries) or compromising the value of efficient spending of both 
time and money (and ultimately the sustainability of World Vision). Chapter four 
emphasized this aspect in its discussion of LEAP, WV’s primary policy and framework. 
This framework strictly requires methods of efficiency through its standards (for 
example, the prioritization of secondary quantitative data for assessing rural community 
needs over primary qualitative data), whereas it suggests methods of bottom-up 
participation through its guidelines (for example, the guideline found in the design stage 
of LEAP that suggests the participation of general community members and the 
promotion of leadership among vulnerable groups). Therefore World Vision is 
continuously pushing toward two seemingly conflicting aims: stressing the importance of 
bottom-up approaches to participation and, simultaneously, prioritizing the necessity for 
practicality, efficiency and support of existing local structures of authority. For the two 
aims to be achieved simultaneously, compromise to some extent must take place.   
In achieving this compromise, World Vision’s application of its concept of 
‘participation’ questions the notions of who the true beneficiaries are and how they are 
reached. By conducting bottom-up participatory methods with local structures of 
authority (particularly emphasizing local government) and top-down participatory 
methods with direct project beneficiaries, the very role of ‘beneficiary’ and concept of 
‘participation’ is redefined. As was noted in chapter five, WV conducts trainer-of-trainer 
(TOT) sessions intended to build the capacity of Agritex to support local farmers. Here, 
the local government (which World Vision sees as the true means of achieving 
sustainability in initiating long-term support of the poor and vulnerable) and its 
employees are treated as the beneficiaries themselves. The direct beneficiaries on the 
other hand (the poor and vulnerable who receive World Vision’s inputs) are benefitting 
not through their own empowerment-building self-reliance which should emerge from 
their own instigation of and leadership in development projects, but through the receipt of 
long-term support from local state structures which is intended to generate a sense of 
stability. That support and stability is intended to create conditions for project success, 
thereby building confidence in personal achievement that catalyzes self-reliance. In the 
case of the projects in Umzingwane, these successes involve profitable agricultural 
production.   
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 This approach to participation allows WV to address the demands of its donors 
and the state. With regard to the latter, by implementing projects alongside of and 
through local government systems and structures (Agritex, in the case of Umzingwane) 
and by pursuing regular communication channels and building the capacity of those 
systems and structures, WV manages to maintain positive interactions and carry out its 
work. World Vision then uses this approach to its relationship with the state as an 
advantage in meeting the requirements of donors by allocating responsibilities 
(particularly in implementation and monitoring) to state structures and thereby stretching 
donor funds. As well, as is noted in chapter five, World Vision maintains some (be it 
minimal) presence with rural farmers, therefore meeting the participatory requirements of 
donors.  
 This conceptualization of ‘participation’ and its implementation question the 
foundation of deep participation. That foundation involves the inherent linkage between 
empowerment and sustainability being driven by self-reliance. WV’s ‘participation’ links 
empowerment and sustainability to long-term stability and support (by way of state 
structures) rather than to capacity-building that is merely externally catalyzed. Ultimately, 
WV’s ‘participation’ involves flexible and efficient maneuvering in the face of external 
pressures (from the state and donors) that allows it to pursue organizational sustainability 
while carrying out its projects. 
 
6.3 Ethical Implications of World Vision’s Support of State Structures 
While World Vision’s approach to participation may allow efficiency, enabling 
sustainability for both development projects and WV as an organization through building 
government capacity to ‘partner’ in carrying out development initiatives, its reliance on 
local ‘partners,’ particularly structures of state authority, takes the ethically problematic 
risk of contributing to factors that lead to vulnerability by supporting existing systems of 
power which may employ unjust or unethical practices. On the one hand, this 
conceptualization of ‘participation’ (which rethinks the role of the ‘beneficiary’ in clear 
support of state authority and existing structures of power) has the potential to instigate 
development and positive change within local government and its approach to responding 
to local needs and interests. From this perspective, such aims address the long-term 
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complaint made against NGO-driven ‘big D’ development that it merely pacifies local 
frustrations and therefore perpetuates the status quo. On the other hand, however, such 
practices have the risk of reinforcing and providing additional power to potentially 
incompetent, corrupt or unjust systems of governance that perpetuate vulnerability.  
Here may be where the implications of the dichotomy between local government 
ministries and associations with politics (discussed in chapter five), come into play.  
Representatives from both World Vision and local government in Umzingwane 
considered local government facilitators as separate from political representation and 
initiatives, although it is difficult to determine if this is a true reflection of actual systems 
of authority or if WV purposely does not publicly acknowledge the risk of such 
connections in order to maintain carefully-balanced relationships with local authorities. 
Chapter five explained the incident where my presence was very unwelcome at one WV 
project site in a rural farming area when political figures were present, and the reason 
given was that the political figures wished to maintain the local misconception that they 
(the political figures) were responsible for (and therefore should be credited with) any 
development assistance received by the community. World Vision’s approach of 
supporting and working through Agritex would support this understanding that 
development assistance is initiated by the state. 
 
6.4 World Vision’s Pursuit of Organizational Stability   
World Vision’s approach to participation that prioritizes accountability to itself allows it 
to pursue its own stability and sustainability, as well as its organizational interests and 
values. Through this approach to participation, which both supports local structures of 
state authority through capacity-building programs and draws on them for beneficiary 
support, particularly in project monitoring and evaluation, World Vision has enabled 
itself to achieve efficiency in the use of donor funds and to maintain an acceptable 
relationship with government, two elements which significantly contribute to 
organizational security and sustainability. World Vision’s approach to supporting and 
developing state structures allows it, at least to an extent, to stretch donor funding, 
therefore easing funding pressures. In the case of Umzingwane, this efficient use of 
resources was evidenced through World Vision’s connection with Agritex. As noted in 
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the previous chapter, World Vision saw its investment in capacity-building for Agritex as 
a way to stretch their funding. Because Agritex was held accountable for much of the 
monitoring and evaluation, a lesser portion of WV funding needed to be used towards 
those processes, allowing a greater portion to be budgeted for implementation. It is 
important to note that this trend does not resolve all difficulties in accessing sufficient 
funding but appeared to minimize these difficulties at district and project level, whereas 
such challenges were felt largely by higher levels of World Vision staff. The district-level 
staff appeared to accept such limitations as a circumstance which must be dealt with and 
therefore manipulated their methods accordingly to stretch funding. Their actions were 
made possible through their approach to participation which built the capacity of local 
state structures and then placed emphasis and accountability on Agritex to ‘partner’ in 
conducting necessary projects steps with beneficiaries (the Mzinyathini irrigation scheme 
rehabilitation may be an exception to this, as donor constraints significantly affected 
implementation plans). 
 The emphasis on building state capacity by engaging with state authorities in 
bottom-up participatory programs also greatly contributes to World Vision’s 
organizational sustainability by ensuring a positive relationship with government, helping 
to secure its access and permission to carry out its work. This occurs at both national and 
local levels.  As is mentioned in chapter four, WV sees itself as having an advantage over 
other NGOs in terms of gaining government permission and access to rural areas, due to 
its longstanding presence and relationships with state authorities, both at local and 
national levels. While this relationship between WV and the state does employ 
characteristics of the corporatist strategies that governments regularly take toward 
achieving control over the actions of NGOs (discussed in chapter two), WV appears to 
manipulate the power dynamics in the relationship to its advantage. By building 
government capacity, World Vision has influence over the ways in which government 
carries out development work. The close relationship also creates a sense of reliance of 
government on World Vision for funding, training and capacity-building. By building 
government capacities for carrying out social services and developmental support and 
holding government structures accountable for carrying out development tasks, World 
Vision’s presence builds up expectations among local constituencies of government’s 
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role in delivering such social services and support. With greater expectations from local 
communities, government structures are interested in maintaining World Vision’s support, 
which therefore allows World Vision some power and freedom in pursuing its own 
organizational values and directives by choosing how it supports government and what 
capacities it chooses to build-up.  
These concerns necessitate a state of constant reflection and active learning that 
questions and reevaluates World Vision’s ‘take’ on participation at multiple levels. The 
research found that World Vision attempts to achieve this from a variety of perspectives. 
A very strong emphasis is placed on such learning at the global level, and the continual 
updating and restructuring of the policies and guidelines of the World Vision global 
partnership is evidence that efforts toward constant organizational learning are being 
taken seriously. At the national level in Zimbabwe, initiatives aimed at such learning are 
carried out through WV’s use of the cluster system, which allows WV to both share its 
experiences and learn from other organizations and stakeholders for purposes of 
programming. In the case of Umzingwane, local-level learning (in terms of learning from 
beneficiary feedback) is once again carried out through local government. As was noted, 
however, not all districts claim the same positive interactions between WV and local 
government that Umzingwane does and, in those districts which do not, evaluative efforts 
at local-level learning are handled differently. This acknowledgement perhaps suggests 
that even though relationships between WV and Umzingwane government are close, WV 
is in fact regularly reflecting on the existence and implications of such close relationships. 
 
6.5 NGOs as an Organizational Form: the Significance and Legitimacy of Their 
Role 
The NGO objective of catalyzing empowerment through pursuing deep participation 
entails inherent conflicts between achieving such pursuits and achieving the objectives 
that enable NGOs to exist and carry out development assistance. Chapter two argued that 
the notion that legitimizes NGOs (downward accountability to beneficiaries through deep 
participation) is not what ensures or defines their existence. In fact, their existence and 
survival is defined by their ability to meet the demands and expectations of the various 
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stakeholders in their domain. Such demands regularly conflict with the realization of 
implementing deep participation.  
 The accountability that NGOs show to states and donors is the means for ensuring 
their organizational sustainability, and is therefore a reflection of their accountability to 
themselves. This study of World Vision has recognized that such self-accountability may 
involve two perspectives: that of holding themselves accountable to their own stated 
goals and values, and in following directions that allow for sustaining their own existence. 
The example of World Vision, though, also exhibits (through its devolved 
conceptualization of ‘participation’ and the official role of participation in WV policies 
and values) that the former of these perspectives (holding itself accountable to its stated 
goals and values) is ultimately a means to achieving the latter (enabling its organizational 
survival). This is shown through WV’s writing of values and policies into its 
documentation that ultimately shape a form of participation which enables organizational 
sustainability. In this respect, there is no discursive approach to participation that 
addresses the legitimizing standards of downward accountability and deep participation 
as well as addressing what is effective or achievable in actual practice. Therefore fluidity 
of the definition and application of the concept of participation inevitably occurs within 
NGO practices through efforts in working toward both organizational sustainability and 
downward accountability. 
Chapter two notes that the realization that NGOs prioritize their survival does not 
necessarily imply that their existence and their development aid are illegitimate or 
ineffective, provided that such a priority does not undermine their ability to achieve 
legitimate objectives for development assistance. Further, it may be that the priority of 
organizational survival and the priority of downward accountability are not always 
contradictory but have the possibility to coexist although they are disconnected. It was 
also noted in chapter two that the role that NGOs have come to fill in delivering 
development is deemed crucial to poverty reduction, and the very significance of that role 
may provide the opportunity for NGOs to impact on the forces that pressure them 
(namely states and donors). 
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6.6 Conclusion 
Ultimately, the legitimacy of the role of NGOs as structures of development and their 
practices must be questioned and considered within their specific social contexts. In the 
context of World Vision in Umzingwane, WV has compromised participatory 
methodology and empowerment for the purpose of enabling continued organizational 
presence and survival. Additionally, its policies remain focused on measurable, tangible 
results and prioritize efficiency in response to the pressures of its domain, rather than 
attempting to use the position of its role in development as a bargaining chip in order to 
change the character of the forces that determine its fate. In the end, if progress toward 
deep empowerment-based development is to be achieved, the existing paradigms that 
govern the character of relationships between NGOs, states, donors and beneficiaries 
must be significantly questioned and adjusted. 
.   
169 
References 
 
African Economic Outlook, 2012. Zimbabwe 2012 [pdf] Available at: < 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Zimbabwe
%20Full%20PDF%20Country%20Note.pdf>. [Accessed 8 October 2012]. 
Baily, C. A., 2007. A Guide to Qualitative Field Research. 2
nd
 Edition. Thousand Oaks: 
Pine Forge Press. 
BBC, 2013. Focus: US and UK concern over Zimbabwe election results. BBC News, 
[online] 4 August. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
23565126> [Accessed October 12 2013].  
Bebbington, A. 2004. NGOs and Uneven Development: Geographies of Development 
Intervention. Progress in Human Geography. [e-journal] 28 (6) pp.725-745, 
Available through: Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 14 September 
2012]. 
Bird, K. and Busse, S., 2007. Re-thinking Aid Policy in Response to Zimbabwe’s 
Protracted Crisis. [pdf] Overseas Development Institute. Available at: 
<http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-
files/3550.pdf> [Accessed 10 March 2012]. 
Bloch, D. and Borges, N. 2002. Organizational Learning in NGOs: an Example of an 
Intervention Based on the Work of Chris Argyris. Development in Practice, [e-
journal] 12 (3&4), Available through: Jstor database [Accessed 4 March 2012]. 
Bolton, M. and Jeffrey, A. 2008. The Politics of NGO Registration in International 
Protectorates: the Cases of Bosnia and Iraq. Disasters. [e-journal] 32 (4) pp. 586-
608, Available through: Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 19 
December 2012]. 
Bornstein, E. 2005. The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality, and 
Economics in Zimbabwe. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Borren, S. 2001. Development Agencies: Global or Solo Players?. In: Eade, D. and 
Ligteringen, E. eds. 2001. Debating Development. Oxford: Oxfam GB, pp. 171-
188. 
Bratton, M. 1987. The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in Africa. [pdf] Nairobi: 
Institute for Development Studies University of Nairobi. Available at: 
<ideas.repec.org/a/eee/wdevel/v17y1989i4p569-587.html> [Accessed 9 
September 2012]. 
Brett, E. A., 2003. Participation and Accountability in Development Management. The 
Journal of Development Studies, [e-journal] 40 (2), Available through: Academic 
Search Premier database [Accessed 24 July 2012]. 
Burgess, R. G., 1984. In the Field. New York: Routledge. 
Byworth, J., 2003. World Vision’s Approach to Transformational Development: Frame, 
policy and indicators. Transformation, [e-journal] 20 (2), Available through: 
Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 21 April 2013]. 
Campbell, H. G., 2007. The Zimbabwean Working Peoples and the Land Question. Black 
Scholar, [e-journal] 37 (1), Available through: Academic Search Premier database 
[Accessed 8 October 2012]. 
CARE USA, n.d. The Basics of Project Implementation a Guide for Project Managers. 
[online guide book] Available at: 
170 
<http://www.careclimatechange.org/files/toolkit/CARE_Project_Implementation.
pdf> [Accessed 14 September 2012]. 
Chambati, W. and Magaramombe, G., 2008. The Abandoned Question: Farm Workers. 
In: Moyo, S., Helliker, H. and Murisa, T. eds. 2008. Contested Terrain: Land 
Reform and Civil Society in Contemporary Zimbabwe. Pietermaritzburg: S&S 
Publishers, pp207-238.  
Chikanda, A., 2007. Medical Migration from Zimbabwe: Magnitude, Causes and Impact 
on the Poor. Development Southern Africa, [e-journal] 24 (1), Available through: 
Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 14 September 2012]. 
Chimhowu, A. and Philip W. 2008. Communal Tenure and Rural Poverty: Land 
Transactions in Svosve Communal Area, Zimbabwe. Development and Change, 
[e-journal] 39 (2), 285-308. Available through: Academic Search Premier 
database [Accessed 18 April 2012]. 
Chimhowu, A. and Woodhouse, P., 2010. Forbidden but not Suppressed: a ‘Vernacular’ 
Land Market in Svosve Communal Lands, Zimbabwe. Africa, [e-journal] 80 (1), 
Available through: Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 18 April 2012]. 
Chimhowu, A., 2009. Moving Forward in Zimbabwe. [pdf] Brooks World Poverty 
Institute. Available at: 
<http://www.bwpi.manchester.ac.uk/research/ResearchAreaProjects/Africa/Movi
ng_forward_in_Zimbabwe_whole_report.pdf> [Accessed 30 September 2012]. 
Chinaka, C., 2012. Zimbabwe Suspends NGOs as Possible Election Looms. Reuters 
Africa, [online]15 February. Available at: 
<http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/feb16_2012.html> [Accessed 29 October 
2012]. 
CIVICUS Civil Society Watch Action Alerts: Issue 229, 2004. ZIMBABWE: 
Zimbabwean Civil Society Organizations Targeted by Draft NGO Bill. [online] 
Available at: 
<http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/legisl/040825civicus.asp?sector=CACT&
year=2004&range_start=1>, [Accessed 12 March 2012]. 
Clark, J. 1997. The State, Popular Participation and the Voluntary Sector, In: Edwards, M. 
and Hulme, D. eds. 1997. NGOs, States and Donors Too Close For Comfort?. 
Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd. pp.43-58. 
de Beer, F. and Swanepoel, H. 1998. Community Development and Beyond. Pretoria: J.L. 
van Schaik Publishers. 
Dorman, S. R., 2003. NGOs and the Constitutional Debate in Zimbabwe: from Inclusion 
to Exclusion. Journal of Southern African Studies, [e-journal] 29 (4), Available 
through: Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 24 February 2012]. 
DWS Zimbabwe Associate Program, 2012. Lutheran Development Service, Zimbabwe. 
[online] Available at: <http://www.lutheranworld.org/lwf/index.php/themes/dws-
country-programs/zimbabwe-dws-associate-program> [Accessed 19 October 
2012]. 
Eade, D. 1997. Capacity-Building. Oxford: Oxfam GB. 
Ebrahim, A. 2004. NGOs and Organizational Change: The Relevance of Foucault and 
Bourdieu. In: International Studies Association, International Studies Association 
45
th
 Annual Convention. Montreal, Canada 17-20 March 2004. 
171 
Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. 1997. NGOs, States and Donors: An Overview. In: Edwards, 
M. and Hulme, D. eds. 1997. NGOs, States and Donors Too Close For Comfort?. 
Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd. Pp. 3-22. 
Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. 1992. Scaling-up the Developmental Impact of NGOs: 
Concepts and Experiences. In: Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. eds. 1992. Making a 
Difference NGOs and Development in a Changing World. London: Earthscan 
Publications Limited. Pp. 13-27.  
Ellerman, D. 2003. Should Development Agencies have Official Views?. In: Roper, L., 
Pettit, J. and Eade, D. eds., 2003. Development and the Learning Organization. 
Oxford: Oxfam GB, pp.40-57. 
FAO, 1997. Annex A-5 Mzinyathini Irrigation Scheme. S.l.: FAO Corporate Document 
Repository. [online] Available at: 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/X5594E/X5594e11.htm> [Accessed 6 March 2012]. 
Farrington, J., Bebbington, A., Wellard, K. and Lewis, D. J. 1993. Reluctant Partners? 
Non-governmental Organizations, the State and Sustainable Agricultural 
Development. New York: Routledge. 
Fisher, W. F. 1997. Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices. Annual 
Review of Anthropology, [e-journal] 26 (1), 239-464. Available through: 
Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 15 March 2012]. 
Green, M. 2010. Making Development Agents: Participation as Boundary Object in 
International Development. Journal of Development Studies, [e-journal] 46 (7), 
pp.1240-1263. Available through: Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 
28 February 2012]. 
Gwynne, B. and Miller, S., 2011. World Vision International Accountability Report 2011. 
[online] WVI. Available at: < http://www.wvi.org/our-
accountability/publication/2011-accountability-report> [Accessed 3 August 2013]. 
Hammar, A., Raftopoulos, B. and Jensen, S. eds., 2003. Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business. 
Harare: Weaver Press. 
Harsh, M., Mbatia, P. and Shrum, W. 2010. Accountability and Inaction: NGOs and 
Resource Lodging in Development. Development and Change, [e-journal] 41 (2), 
pp.253-278. Available through Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 2 
March 2012]. 
Hartnack, A. 2005. 'My Life Got Lost': Farm Workers and Displacement in Zimbabwe. 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, [e-journal] 23 (2), Available through: 
Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 8 October 2012]. 
Helliker, K. 2006. A Sociological Analysis of Intermediary Nongovernment 
Organizations and Land Reform in Contemporary Zimbabwe. PhD. Sociology 
Department, Rhodes University. 
Helliker, K. 2007. Marx, Weber and NGOs. South African Review of Sociology, [e-
journal] 38 (2), 120-133. Available through Academic Search Premier database 
[Accessed 7 May 2012]. 
Helliker, K. 2008. Dancing on the Same Spot: NGOs. In: Moyo, S., Helliker, K. and 
Murisa, T. eds. 2008. Contested Terrain: Land Reform and Civil Society in 
Contemporary Zimbabwe. Pietermaritzburg: SS Publishers. Pp. 239-274. 
Heurlin, C. 2009. Governing Civil Society: The Political Logic of NGO-State Relations 
Under Dictatorship. International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit 
172 
Organizations. [e-journal] 2010 (21), pp.220-239. Available through: Academic 
Search Premier database [Accessed 31 August 2012]. 
Human Rights Watch, 2009. False Dawn: The Zimbabwe Power-Sharing Government’s 
Failure to Deliver Human Rights Improvements. [pdf] New York: Human Rights 
Watch. Available at: 
<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/zimbabwe0809web.pdf>. 
[Accessed 13 March 2012]. 
Human Rights Watch 2011. Zimbabwe Country Summary. [pdf] Available at: 
<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/zimbabwe_1.pdf>. 
[Accessed 31 September 2012]. 
Human Rights Watch 2012. Zimbabwe Country Summary. [pdf] Available at: 
<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/zimbabwe_2012.pdf>. 
[Accessed 31 September 2012]. 
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). Participatory Learning 
and Action. [online] Available at:<http://www.iied.org/download-participatory-
learning-and-action> [Accessed 14 September 2012]. 
Jones, J. L., 2010. ‘Nothing is Straight in Zimbabwe’: The Rise of the Kukiya-kiya 
Economy 2000–2008. Journal of Southern African Studies, [e-journal] 36 (2), 
Available through: Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 8 October 
2012]. 
Kaldor, M., 2002 Civil Society and Accountability. [pdf] S.l.: United Nations 
Development Program. Available at: 
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2002/papers/Kaldor_2002.pdf> 
[Accessed 2 March 2012]. 
Kinsey, B. H., 2010. Who Went Where . . . and Why: Patterns and Consequences of 
Displacement in Rural Zimbabwe after February 2000. Journal of Southern 
African Studies, [e-journal] 36 (2), Available through: Academic Search Premier 
database [Accessed 8 October 2012]. 
Korf, B. 2010. The Geography of Participation. Third World Quarterly, [e-journal] 31 (5), 
pp.709-720. Available through: Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 24 
July 2012]. 
KPMG LLP, 2012. World Vision inc. and Affiliates Consolidated Financial Statements. 
[online] WVI. Available at: 
<http://www.worldvision.org/sites/default/files/pdf/ar2012-audited-financial-
statement.pdf> [Accessed 19 August 2013]. 
Kumar, S. 2002. Methods for Community Participation. Warwickshire: Replika Press Pvt. 
Ltd. 
Lewis, D. and Mosse, D. 2006. Encountering Order and Disjuncture: Contemporary 
Anthropological Perspectives on the Organization of Development. Oxford 
Development Studies, [e-journal] 34 (1), 1-13. Available through Academic 
Search Premier database [Accessed 2 March 2012]. 
Magure, B. 2009. Civil society’s quest for democracy in Zimbabwe: Origins, barriers and 
prospects, 1900-2008. PhD Department of Political and International Studies, 
Rhodes University. 
Makoba, J. W. 2002. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and Third World 
Development: an Alternative Approach to Development. Journal of Third World 
173 
Studies, [e-journal] 14 (1), Available through: Academic Search Premier database 
[Accessed 19 August 2012]. 
Makura-Paradza, G. G. 2010. Single Women, Land and Livelihood Vulnerability in a 
Communal Area in Zimbabwe. PhD. Wageningen University. 
Maroyi, A. 2009. Traditional Homegardens and Rural Livelihoods in Nhema, Zimbabwe: 
A Sustainable Agroforestry System. International Journal of Sustainable 
Development & World Ecology, [e-journal] 16 (1), 1-8. Available through 
Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 21 April 2012]. 
Mashava, R. and Dzingirai, V. 2010 Confronting Water Challenges in a Micro-Irrigation 
Scheme in the Umzingwane Catchment of Zimbabwe. [pdf] S.l.: Livelihoods 
After Land Reform. Available at: <http://www.lalr.org.za/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-
working-papers-1/LALRWP_04_Mashava_final.pdf/view> [Accessed 6 March 
2012]. 
Masiiwa, M., 2005. The Fast Track Resettlement Program in Zimbabwe: Disparity 
between Policy Design and Implementation. The Round Table, [e-journal] 94 
(379), Available through: Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 8 
October 2012]. 
Matondi, B. and Dekker, M., 2011. Land Rights and Tenure Security in Zimbabwe’s Post 
Fast Track Land Reform Program. [pdf] Harare: Ruzivo Trust. Available at: 
<http://www.landgovernance.org/system/files/Zimbabwe_RuzivoTrust_ASC_0.p
df>. [Accessed 30 September 2012]. 
Mayhew, S. H. 2005. Hegemony, Politics, and Ideology: the Role of Legislation in NGO-
Government Relations in Asia. The Journal of Development Studies, [e-journal] 
41 (5), pp.727-758. Available through: Academic Search Premier database 
[Accessed 14 September 2012]. 
Mbiba, B. 2001. Communal Land Rights in Zimbabwe as State Sanction and Social 
Control: a Narrative. Africa, [e-journal] 39 (2), 426-448. Available through 
Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 21 April 2012]. 
McCandless, E. 2011. Polarisation and transformation in Zimbabwe. Lanham: Lexington 
Books. 
Mebrahtu, E. 2003. Perceptions and Practices of Monitoring and Evaluation: 
International NGO Experiences in Ethiopia. In: Roper, L., Pettit, J. and Eade, D. 
eds., 2003. Development and the Learning Organization. Oxford: Oxfam GB, 
pp.332-355. 
Mitlin, D., Hickey, S., and Bebbington, A. 2007. Reclaiming Development? NGOs and 
the Challenge of Alternatives. World Development, 35 (10), pp.1699-1720. 
Mosse, D. 2004. Is Good Policy Unimplementable? Reflections on the Ethnography of 
Aid Policy and Practice. Development & Change, [e-journal] 35 (4), pp.639-671. 
Available through: Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 2 March 2012]. 
Mosse, D. 2005. Cultivating Development. London, Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press. 
Moyo, S., Makumbe, J. and Raftopoulos, B. 2000. NGOs, the State and Politics in 
Zimbabwe. Harare: SAPES Books. 
Mukherjee, N. 1993. Participatory Rural Appraisal Methodology and Applications. New 
Delhi: Ashok Kumar Mittal Concept Publishing Company. 
Munyanyi, R. M., 2005. The Political Economy of Food Aid: A Case of Zimbabwe. M.A. 
University of the Western Cape. 
174 
Murisa, T., 2010. Social Development in Zimbabwe. [pdf] Development Foundation for 
Zimbabwe. Available at: < http://www.dfzim.com/wp-
content/downloads/Social_Development_in_Zimbabwe_by_Dr_T_Murisa.pdf> 
[Accessed 28 September 2012]. 
Ncube, C. 2010. Contesting hegemony: Civil society and the struggle for social change in 
Zimbabwe, 2000-2008. PhD International Development Department, University 
of Birmingham. 
Ncube, G. T. 2011. Crisis of Communal Leadership: Post-colonial Local Government 
Reform and Administrative Conflict with Traditional Authorities in the 
Communal Areas of Zimbabwe, 1980-2008. African Journal of History and 
Culture, [e-journal] 3 (6), 89-95. Available through Academic Search Premier 
database [Accessed 18 April 2012]. 
Ndegwa, S. N. 1996. The Two Faces of Civil Society NGOs and Politics in Africa. West 
Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press. 
Newman, W. L., 2000. Social Research Methods. 4
th
 Edition. Needham Heights: Pearson 
Education Company. 
NGO Consultancy Africa, N.d. Civil Society Legislation in Zimbabwe History and 
Development [pdf]. Harare: NGO Consultancy Africa (PVT) Ltd. Available at: 
<http://www.ngoconsultancyafrica.org/files/Civil%20Society%20Legislation%20
in%20Zimbabwe%20History%20and%20Development.pdf> [Accessed 7 March 
2012]. 
Nikkhah, H. A. and Redzuan, M. B. 2010. The Role of NGOs in Promoting 
Empowerment for Sustainable Community Development. The Journal of Human 
Ecology, 30 (2), pp.85-92. 
OCHA, 2012. Zimbabwe: Humanitarian Contact Directory (2012). [online] OCHA. 
Available at: 
<https://zw.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/ZHCD%20D
onor%20Technical%20Agencies%20(20130719094342).pdf> [Accessed 21 May 
2012]. 
OCHA. 2009. Zimbabwe Who Does What Where by Province. 1:1,013,859. OCHA 
[online] Available at: <http://ochaonline.un.org/zimbabwe> [Accessed 21 May 
2012]. 
OCHA Zimbabwe 2012. Monthly Humanitarian Update Jan-Feb 2012. [pdf] OCHA. 
Available at: 
<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_3630.pdf>. 
[Accessed 29 September 2012]. 
O’Flaherty, M., 1998. Communal Tenure in Zimbabwe: Divergent Models of Collective 
Land Holding in the Communal Areas. Africa, [e-journal] 68 (4), Available 
through: Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 8 October 2012]. 
Parliament of Zimbabwe. N.d. Umzingwane Constituency. [pdf] Available at: 
<http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/attachments/article/75/Umzingwane.pdf> [Accessed 
6 March 2012]. 
Pearce, J. 2003. Between Co-option and Irrelevance? Latin American NGOs in the 1990s, 
In: Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. eds. 1997. NGOs, States and Donors Too Close 
For Comfort?. Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd. pp.257-274. 
175 
Plan Zimbabwe, 2012. What We Do. [online] Available at: <http://plan-
international.org/where-we-work/africa/zimbabwe/what-we-do/what-we-do> 
[Accessed 20 October 2012]. 
Potts, D. 2006. ‘Restoring Order’? Operation Murambatsvina and the Urban Crisis in 
Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern African Studies, [e-journal] (32) 2, 273-291. 
Available through Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 27 April 2012]. 
Power, G., Maury, M. and Maury, S. 2003. Operationalizing Bottom-up Learning in 
International NGOs: Barriers and Alternatives. In: Roper, L., Pettit, J. and Eade, 
D. eds., 2003. Development and the Learning Organization. Oxford: Oxfam GB, 
pp.22-39. 
Rich-Dorman, S. 2001. Inclusion and exclusion: NGOs and politics in Zimbabwe. PhD 
thesis, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford. 
Roper, L., Pettit, J. and Eade, D. eds., 2003. Development and the Learning Organization. 
Oxford: Oxfam GB. 
Rossi, Bendetta. 2006. Aid Policies and Recipient Strategies in Niger: Why Donors and 
Recipients Should Not Be Compartmentalized into Separate “Worlds of 
Knowledge”, In: Lewis, D. and Mosse, D. eds. 2006. Development Brokers and 
Translators. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, Inc. pp.27-50. 
Sayer, J. and Campbell, B. 2004. The Science of Sustainable Development. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Shepard, A. 1998. Sustainable Rural Development. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave. 
Shumba, A. and Mawere, D., 2012. The Causes and Impact of the Brain Drain in 
Institutions of Higher Learning in Zimbabwe. International Migration, [e-journal] 
50 (4), Available through: Academic Search Premier database [Accessed 14 
September 2012]. 
Smillie, I. 1997. NGOs and Development Assistance: a Change in Mind-set?. Third 
World Quarterly. [e-journal] 18 (3), pp.563-577. Available through: Academic 
Search Premier database [Accessed 14 September 2012]. 
Smith, D., 2013. Focus: Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe election win challenged in court. 
The Guardian, [online] 9 August. Available at: 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/robert-mugabe-election-win-
zimbabwe> [Accessed October 9, 2013]. 
Tembo, F. 2003. Participation, Negotiation and Poverty: Encountering the Power of 
Images. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Tendler, J. Turning Private Voluntary Organizations Into Development Agencies: 
Questions for Evaluation. [online pdf] U.S. Agency for International 
Development. Available at: < http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAJ612.pdf> 
[Accessed 14 September 2012]. 
Thomas, N. H., 2003. Land Reform in Zimbabwe. Third World Quarterly, [e-journal] 24 
(4), Available through: Jstor [Accessed 8 October 2012]. 
Tsunga, A. and Mugabe, T. 2004. Zim NGO bill: Dangerous for human rights defenders. 
[pdf] Available at: <http://www.kubatana.net/docs/hr/zlhr_ngobill_040728.pdf> 
[Accessed 15 March 2012]. 
Tvedt, T. 1998. Angels of Mercy or Development Diplomats?. Trenton: Africa World 
Press, Inc. 
176 
Tvedt, T. 2002. Development NGOs: Actors in a Global Civil Society or in a New 
International Social System?. International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit 
Organizations. [e-journal] 13 (4), Available through: Academic Search Premier 
database [Accessed 19 August 2012]. 
Umzingwane Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services (Agritex), 
2013a. Maize Yields T/ha and Production (T) 1999/00 – 08/09. [chart] Esigodini: 
Agritex. 
Umzingwane Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services (Agritex), 
2013b. Cereal Production for 2012 Season Umzingwane District. [chart] 
Esigodini: Agritex. 
UNDP, 2010. Millenium Development Goals Status Report Zimbabwe. [pdf] Harare: 
UNDP and Ministry of Labor and Social Services. Available at: 
<http://www.undp.org.zw/images/stories/mdg/mdgreport2010.pdf> [Accessed 16 
September 2012]. 
UNDP, 2012a. Country Program Document for Zimbabwe (2012-2015). [pdf] Harare: 
UNDP. Available at: 
<http://web.undp.org/africa/programmedocs/Zimbabwe%20CPD%20-%202012-
2015%20-%20Englishx.pdf>. [Accessed 8 October 2012]. 
UNDP, 2012b. Country Program Action Plan (2012-2015). [pdf] Harare: UNDP. 
Available at: <www.undp.org.zw/component/docman/doc.../49-cpap-2012-2015>. 
[Accessed 8 October 2012]. 
UNICEF Zimbabwe, 2009. WASH Implementing Organizations – Umzingwane District 
(2008-2009). WASH Atlas for 2005-2009. s.l.: UNICEF. 
UNICEF and European Commission Humanitarian Aid, 2011. Intervention mapping for 
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) in Zimbabwe Volume TWO. [pdf] 
UNICEF: Available at: 
<https://zw.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/WASH%20A
tlas%20(10-11)%20%20Volume%20II.pdf> [Accessed 19 October 2013]. 
USAID, n.d. USAID Country Profile Property Rights and Resource Governance 
Zimbabwe. [pdf] Available at: 
<http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/country-profiles/full-
reports/USAID_Land_Tenure_Zimbabwe_Profile.pdf>. [Accessed 29 September 
2012]. 
Vivian, J. 1994. NGOs and Sustainable Development in Zimbabwe: No Magic Bullets. 
Development and Change, [e-journal] 25 (1), 167-193. Available through Wiley 
Online Library database [Accessed 6 May 2012]. 
Wetmore, S. B. and Theron, F. 1998. Community Development and Research: 
Participatory Learning and Action – a Development Strategy in Itself. 
Development Southern Africa, [e-journal] 15 (1), Available through: Academic 
Search Premier database [Accessed 28 February 2012]. 
Wallace, T., Bornstein, L. and Chapman, J. 2006. The Aid Chain. Warwickshire: 
Intermediate Technology Publications Ltd. 
Wood, A., 2011a. Overview of NGO – Community Complaints Mechanisms. [online] 
WVI. Available at: <www.alnap.org/pool/files/complaint-mechanisms-overview-
final.pd > [Accessed 3 August 2013]. 
177 
Wood, A., 2011b. The Community Context and Complaints Handling by NGOs. [online] 
WVI. Available at: <http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/Community-Context-for-Complaints-Handling-final.pdf> 
[Accessed 3 August 2013]. 
WVI, 2012a. Core Values. [online] (15 October 2007) Available at: 
<http://www.wvi.org/wvi/wviweb.nsf/maindocs/7A0A54FD44BC11C388257375
00737C8A?opendocument> [Accessed 14 September 2012]. 
WVI, 2013a. Our History. [online] Available at: <http://www.wvi.org/our-history> 
[Accessed 3 August 2013]. 
WVI, 2011a. World Vision International Accountability Report 2010. [online] WVI. 
Available at: < http://www.alnap.org/resource/8772> [Accessed 2 August 2013]. 
WVI, 2010. The Ministry Framework Summary – Nov 2010. [online] WVI. Available at: 
< http://www.wvi.org/development/publication/ministry-framework> [Accessed 2 
August 2013]. 
WVI, 2012b. Citizen Voice and Action. [online] Integrated Ministry. Available at: < 
http://www.wvi.org/local-advocacy/publication/citizen-voice-and-action-project-
model> [Accessed 3 August 2013]. 
WVI, 2013b. Who We Are. [online] Available at: 
<http://www.worldvision.org/content.nsf/about/our-mission> [Accessed 3 August 
2013]. 
WVI Board, 2002. Transformational Development Board Policy. [online] WVI. 
Available at: <http://www.transformational-
development.org/Ministry/TransDev2.nsf/webmaindocs/C10F771C6F096B51882
56F4F00742F2E?OpenDocument> [Accessed 17 June 2013]. 
WVI, 2003. Transformational Development Core Documents. [online] Monrovia: WVI. 
Available at: <http://www.transformational-
development.org/Ministry/TransDev2.nsf/webmaindocs/30DFA9566A2AF00188
256F400076571C?OpenDocument> [Accessed 17 June 2013]. 
WVI, 2009. Update on LEAP and Child Well-being. [online] Monrovia: WVI. Available 
at: <http://www.transformational-
development.org/ministry/transdev2.nsf/maindocs/34874E1F560858F088256F10
00603B96?opendocument> [Accessed 17 June 2013]. 
WVI, 2011b. The Handbook for Development Programs. [online] Monrovia: WVI. 
Available at: 
<wvi.org/sites/default/files/Handbook_for_Development_Programmes.pdf> 
[Accessed 13 June 2013]. 
WVI, 2007. LEAP Second Edition. [online] Washington, DC: WVI. Available at: 
<http://www.transformational-
development.org/ministry/transdev2.nsf/maindocs/34874E1F560858F088256F10
00603B96?opendocument> [Accessed 17 June 2013]. 
WVI FPMG, 2009. Complaint and Response Mechanisms. [online] Monrovia: WVI. 
Available at: <http://www.alnap.org/resource/8770> [Accessed 3 August 2013]. 
WVI, 2011c. Annual Report on Child Well-being Word Vision Zimbabwe. [online] WVI. 
Available at: <http://cwbtpilot.wikispaces.com/file/view/Zimbabwe+-
+Annual+CWB+Report.pdf> [Accessed 4 July 2013]. 
178 
Zimbabwe Institute, 2008. The State of Civics in Zimbabwe. [pdf] S.l.: Zimbabwe 
Institute. Available at: 
<http://www.zimbabweinstitute.org/File_Uploads/file/State%20of%20Civil%20S
ociety%20Study%20final%5B1%5D.pdf> [accessed 2 March 2012]. 
Zimbabwe Institute, 2005. Zimbabwe Land Policy Study. [pdf] Zimbabwe Institute. 
Available at: 
<http://www.kubatana.net/docs/landr/zim_institute_land_policy_0508.pdf> 
[Accessed 28 September 2012]. 
Zimbabwe Parliament Research Department, 2011. Umzingwane Constituency Profile. 
[online] Zimbabwe Parliament. Available at: 
<http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/attachments/article/134/Umzingwane.pdf> 
[Accessed 27 March 2012]. 
ZimVAC, 2013. Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) 2013 Rural 
Livelihoods Assessment Draft Report. [online] Harare: ZimVAC. Available at: 
<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2013%20ZimVAC%20DR
AFT%20REPORT.pdf> [Accessed 19 October 2013]. 
 
179 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: List and Details of Interviews 
1. Interview with WVZ Grants and Human Affairs Director: in-person interview, 
May 24, 2012 
2. Interview with WVZ Regional Food Security and Livelihoods Program Manager 
(Interview 1): in-person interview, May 24, 2012 
3. Interview with WVZ Regional Food Security and Livelihoods Program Manager 
(Interview 2): skype phone interview, December 4, 2013 
4. Interview with WVZ Umzingwane District Coordinator: in-person interview, May 
21, 2012 
5. Email Correspondence with WVZ Umzingwane District Coordinator: questions 
sent October 3, 2013; responses received October 5, 2013 
6. Interview with WVZ Umzingwane Field Officer: phone interview, October 15, 
2013 
7. Interviews with WVZ Former Employee: May 21, 2012; May 24, 2012; and 
September 28, 2013 
8. Interview with the head of Umzingwane district Agritex: November 13, 2013 
9. Interviews with district and ward-level Agritex field officers: November 14, 2013 
and November 19, 2013 
10. Interview with Beneficiary 1: crop farmer at Mzinyathini irrigation scheme 
rehabilitation site (ward 20), November 14, 2013 
11. Interview with Beneficiary 2: chicken layer farmer (ward 8), November 14, 2013 
12. Interview with Beneficiary 3: conservation agriculture and guinea fowl farmer 
(ward 13), November 14, 2013 
13. Interview with Beneficiary 4: goat and conservation agriculture farmer (ward 5), 
November 19, 2013 
14. Interview with Beneficiary 5: guinea fowl and conservation agriculture farmer 
(ward 5), November 19, 2013 
15. Interview with Beneficiary 6: goat, rabbit and conservation agriculture farmer 1 
(ward 5), November 19, 2013 
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16. Interview with Beneficiary 7: goat and rabbit farmer 2 (ward 5), November 19, 
2013 
17. Interview with staff member from Operation Trumpet Call, May 21, 2012 
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Appendix 2: Guiding Questions for Interview with World Vision Regional Food 
Security and Livelihoods Program Manager and Umzingwane District Coordinator 
(Interview 1) 
1. What WV projects are in Umzingwane district? 
2. Could you please describe those projects (please include location, objectives, 
number of beneficiaries, project duration, inputs from WV and how success is 
measured)? 
3. How are they funded? 
4. What impact does the government have on these projects? 
5. Are there any political impacts or implications? 
6. What are WV’s processes for assessing needs, planning projects, acquiring 
funding, implementing projects and carrying out monitoring and evaluation in 
Zimbabwe?  In Umzingwane district? 
7. What happens when it is time for World Vision to leave the project area? How are 
withdrawal and preparation for withdrawal handled? 
8. What kinds of issues do you and lower-level staff face in carrying out these 
projects with regard to donors and funding? 
9. What kinds of issues do you and lower-level staff face in carrying out these 
projects with regard to beneficiary involvement? 
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Appendix 3: Guiding Questions for Interview with WVZ Regional Food Security 
and Livelihoods Program Manager (Interview 2) 
1. How often is WV staff actually in the field in Umzingwane? 
2. What is the structure of the WV chain of command in Umzingwane? 
3. Do you ever use the WV office located in the government block in Esigodini? 
4. The district field officer alluded to the idea that all WV work is done through 
Umzingwane government (almost outsourced). Is that true? Please explain how 
that works. 
5. In that regard, I mostly visited sites where WV had completed their involvement 
and now Agritex was monitoring project progress. Could you please explain the 
balance between WV working through Agritex vs. WV working directly in the 
communities?  Are duties allocated evenly or are more carried out by WV or 
Agritex? 
6. Can you tell me about the health and education project? (What is involved? Who 
is carrying it out (e.g. Umzingwane ministry of health)? How is it funded? 
(through sponsorship or donor grants)?)  
7. Are there any sponsorship-funded projects in Umzingwane? 
8. Could you please tell me about any new projects in the district? 
9. How is feedback passed back from beneficiaries to WV, both throughout project 
implementation and post-transition?    
10. I was wondering if you could clarify a few aspects about the Mzinyathini 
Irrigation Scheme project: 
The notes I have from our interview last year said that the project had been 
put on hold due to lack of funding, and that it should continue if more funding 
could be acquired. But then this year, the district coordinator said that the 
project had never been paused or put on hold for any reason.  Please could you 
clarify this situation? 
Agritex officers implied that WV had not been involved there for 5 or 7 and 
that WV simply fixed up the irrigation systems and left?  Please could you 
explain the timing and situation of WV’s final involvement and transition 
from Mzinyathini? 
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11. What happened with regard to project implementation during the elections last 
July? Did WV have ongoing projects in progress, and if so, were they halted 
during the months leading up to and following the election period? 
12. LEAP suggests that its guideline aspects must be flexible as local and national 
contexts differ from each other. Does practice on the ground actually get carried 
out exactly by the LEAP requirements and guidelines? Is LEAP ever limiting or 
frustrating? 
13. I learned that WV had done a project in an old resettlement area. Does WV ever 
get involved in the fast-track resettlement areas? If not, why? 
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Appendix 4: Guiding Questions for Interview with WVZ Umzingwane Field Officer 
1. Of the following projects, which are finished (WV having transitioned out of the 
project) and which are still in progress? 
a. FAO conservation agriculture and field days 
b. EU conservation agriculture 
c. Mzinyathini irrigation scheme rehabilitation 
2. What other projects are happening in Umzingwane now? 
3. Please describe those projects (including location, number of targeted 
beneficiaries, vulnerability criteria, duration of the project, inputs from WV and 
what is actually being done)? 
4. Could you please tell me about the health and livelihoods project? 
5. How are needs assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation 
carried out in Umzingwane? 
6. How do you ascertain feedback from beneficiaries and when? Do you apply such 
feedback during implementation? 
7. How involved is local government (mainly Agritex) in World Vision projects? 
8. Do you have a positive relationship with local government? 
Note: I did not need to ask questions seven and eight, as the field officer suggested that I 
should speak directly with Agritex officers because he felt that they could provide more 
accurate information of what is happening on the ground. 
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Appendix 5: Guiding Questions for Interviews with Former WVZ Employee 
(currently employed by TearFund UK) 
1. During your time with WV, what did you experience with regard to donors and 
accessing funding? 
2. How exactly do the ADPs work in terms of funding? 
3. Is there sponsorship funding available for projects outside of ADPs? 
4. The Grants and Human Affairs Director suggested that ADPs play a large role in 
determining national strategy. How so? 
5. How does such feedback affect strategy discussion at cluster meetings? 
6. What affects did the economic decline in the early 2000s have on World Vision? 
7. How did the 2008 elections affect World Vision, its work and its staff members? 
8. What do you think about WV’s relationship with the Zimbabwean state (both at 
national and local level)? 
9. In general, what do you think about WV’s methods and approach to responding to 
donors, the state and participatory processes with beneficiaries?  
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Appendix 6: Guiding Questions for Interview with WVZ Grants and Human Affairs 
Director 
1. What is the WVZ funding process? 
2. How do you go about acquiring funding? 
3. What kinds of issues are experienced with funding from donors (requirements and 
expectations as well as the proposal process)? 
a. Are there ever issues with line items in the budgets? 
b. Are there issues regarding monitoring and evaluation for donors? 
c. Are there issues with lag time in receiving funding? 
d. Is funding in Zimbabwe very competitive? 
4. How does that affect participation and needs assessments? 
5. What is the WVZ national strategy? 
6. How are beneficiaries and other stakeholders involved in developing national 
strategy and organizational learning? 
7. How does the LEAP policy affect WVZ? 
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Appendix 7: Email Interview Correspondence with WVZ Umzingwane District 
Coordinator 
This was carried out as follow up to the original interview and took place before the site 
visits. 
 
Appendix 7.1 Email sent after brief phone discussion where he agreed to answer 
questions but requested that I send them in email form 
Dear Mr. Bhuza, 
Thank you so much for taking the time to answer my questions. Since we last met, I 
decided to focus my research on WV, specifically in Umzingwane district. I hope to 
conduct 5 case studies, one in-depth study covering the Mzinyathini irrigation project and 
4 other case studies of WV development projects in Umzingwane district (which 
are: the EU funded conservation agriculture project; the Mzinyathini Poultry Project; the 
FAO Rabbit and Guinea Fowl project; and the FAO conservation agriculture project).  
I was hoping to learn from you about each of those case studies in depth, to get a 
better idea of how the projects were planned, carried out and finished. I hope that my 
research may be both useful and interesting to World Vision, in addition to working 
toward my master's degree. 
I have attached an Excel Document which has the questions regarding the specific 
projects in a table format. It is a pretty long list of questions, so please only answer what 
you can. The table has organized the questions by type and by project. Additionally, 
below I have listed a few general questions which are not related to a specific project. 
I want to thank you again so much for your time and help. It is most greatly appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
Kayla Waghorn 
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Appendix 7.2 Questions attached to the email (list) 
1. Are there any child-sponsorship projects taking place in Umzingwane? Have there 
ever been? Are there project clusters, or do projects in Umzingwane stand on their 
own as separate projects? 
2.  Is WV still involved in Umzingwane, and if so, who in WV is currently managing 
those projects?  
3. What impact do the official WVI methods, requirements, training documents and 
minimum standards have on actual real-life project implementation? 
4. What are the structures of WV offices? (e.g. I have noticed that there is a WV 
office located in the government building in Esigodini – who runs it? How often, 
if ever, is it open? Are there smaller offices for each project or project area 
(ADP)? What business takes place in such offices? 
5.  How often do World Vision field workers have contact with government (both 
elected officials and civil servants) and with whom do they have contact 
(councilmen, DA, etc.)? 
6. Are these positive interactions?  Why or why not? 
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Appendix 7.3 Additional detailed questions attached to the email (sent in table form) 
Please answer the following questions for each of the listed projects: 
Projects: 
1. Mzinyathini irrigation scheme 
2. EU funded conservation agriculture 
3. Mzinyathini poultry project 
4. FAO rabbit and guinea fowl project 
5. FAO conservation agriculture project 
Questions: 
1. Who funded the project? (If multiple donors, what % was funded from each) 
2. If the project lasted multiple years, was funding dependent on year end 
reports/results? 
3. Did such requirements hinder project operations? If so, in what way? 
4. How much feedback from the beneficiaries was reported back to the donors? 
Were they only interested in their own evaluation criteria? 
5. Were there group meetings, committees, etc. from the area who contributed to 
needs assessments?  E.g. who decided what the project was going to be, where it 
was going to be, and how it was going to be planned? 
6. How many people were involved in giving input during the assessing and 
planning stages? 
7. Did the community (members of the community, council, local leaders, etc.) 
request that you come to do a project there, or did WV make the initial contact? 
8. Were there children involved at all in discussions…e.g. how does this project tie 
in with the Child Well-being goals of WV? 
9. How many direct beneficiaries were targeted? How many direct beneficiaries 
were actually reached (based on project evaluations)? 
10. How many indirect beneficiaries were targeted?  How many indirect beneficiaries 
were actually reached (based on project evaluations)? 
11. How were the beneficiaries selected? 
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12. What criteria (specifically) determine who is most vulnerable?  E.g. is there an 
official age that is considered "elderly", or is there a number of children in the 
household that would classify a family as most vulnerable? 
13. What else was involved in the selection process? 
14. What daily M&E activities were carried out? 
15. What weekly M&E activities were carried out? 
16. What monthly M&E activities were carried out? 
17. What quarterly M&E activities were carried out? 
18. What annual M&E activities were carried out? 
19. Were there committees, focus groups, local leaders, etc. who were responsible for 
monitoring? 
20. How were monitoring results reported back to World Vision? 
21. What complaints and feedback mechanisms were in place? 
22. Would it have been easy for someone to give negative feedback? 
23. Were there disagreements among the beneficiaries about what was or wasn't 
working (what they liked or disliked about the project)? 
24. Will there be a post project evaluation, for example, an evaluation that takes place 
5 or 10 years after WV exits the project area? If so, will the field workers who 
were originally involved also be involved in this post-project evaluation? 
25. Is the project finished? 
26. What was the intended length of the project? 
27. What was the actual length of the project? 
28. Was there a stop or a break at any time during the project progress? Please 
explain what happened. 
29. Did the project achieve its intended goals? Why or why not? 
30. Would you consider the project a success? Why or why not? 
31. How many Word Vision employees were directly and indirectly involved in the 
project? 
32. How often did a WV employee go to the project site? 
33. What was government involvement in the project? E.g. was Agritex involved at 
all?  What were they responsible for? 
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34. What happened to the project in the time leading up to elections? Was it put on 
hold? Was there no difference? 
35. What, if anything, did the community contribute toward this project?  (e.g. did the 
community contribute labour, materials, etc.)? 
36. Did WV outsource any expertise to contract companies (e.g. did WV hire an 
engineer to design the irrigation scheme)? 
37. Did this project involve any efforts to build local government capacities such that 
they will be able to provide better services in the future? If so, please describe 
them. 
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Appendix 7.4 Answers to listed questions 
QUESTION RESPONSE 
1)      Are there any child-sponsorship projects 
taking place in Umzingwane? Have there ever 
been? Are there project clusters, or do projects 
in Umzingwane stand on their own as separate 
projects? 
 
There a program called Integrated 
Health and Livelihoods that started 
early this year targeting 6 wards. The 
Program is targeting children 
indirectly through their mothers. The 
intention is reduce Child Mortality up 
to the age of five. The program 
therefore aims to rehabilitate and 
create shelters for mothers waiting to 
deliver. 
Capernaum a Trust branch from used 
to pay fees for less privileged 
Children. May you verify with 
Umzingwane Ministry of Education. 
WV projects in Umzingwane are a 
standalone though logistically there is 
integration eg Use of Vehicles and 
Offices etc 
2) Is WV still involved in Umzingwane, and if 
so, who is currently managing those projects? 
Yes. Mr Farmer Mulagis as usual is 
still in running the show there. 
   Contact- 0775259404 
3) What impact do the official WVI methods, 
requirements, training documents and 
minimum standards have on actual real-life 
project implementation? 
 
Not sure if I got the Question right: 
Anyway minimum standards- think of 
the child protection. As WV you are 
there to monitor children rights and 
protection issues by providing 
guidelines to stakeholders on the right 
to education, shelter, clothes etc for 
the children. 
4) What are the structures of WV offices? (e.g. 
I have noticed that there is a WV office located 
in the government building in Esigodini – who 
runs it? How often, if ever, is it open? Are 
there smaller offices for each project or project 
area (ADP)? What business takes place in such 
offices (receipt of feedback, complaints, etc.) 
The very same offices you saw last 
time are still WV Umzingwane 
Offices. They were initially 100% EU 
Food Security and Livelihoods grant 
owned. Before the end of the EU 
program last year they were shared by 
WV Behavior Change (Global Fund) 
grant and EU program on a 50-50 
payment. There is no ADP in 
Umzingwane .Accountability, 
Monitoring and Evaluation (A, M &E) 
department is a cross cutting program 
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in WV conducting feedback and 
complaints and assist/monitor the 
proper implementation of projects. A 
storeroom to store essential documents 
is needed 
5) How often do World Vision field workers 
have contact with government (both elected 
officials and civil servants) and with whom do 
they have contact (councilmen, DA, etc.) 
Coordination is a day to day 
phenomena, Stakeholders have 
important roles explained at Inception 
eg Department of Veterinary need to 
do all the trainings in the goat project 
the same with other Departments. All 
NGOs are part of the Drought Relief 
Committee so meeting with DA and 
Council is ongoing following their 
annual plans and schedules. 
6) Are these positive interactions? Why or why 
not? 
 
My view: Very positive the 
organization becomes part of the 
community. Updates besides monthly 
reports are done any time and it’s a 
good way of monitoring activities of 
NGO work. Workmanship on projects 
such as construction of Fowl- runs is 
monitored and supervised by 
Government workers so WV is not 
blamed for poor workmanship. DA, 
Council and other offices were taken 
to do project site monitoring regularly 
say every three months and that alone 
was a good motivator to the 
beneficiaries. The best method to 
manage political labeling is to plan 
and site monitoring with government 
line ministry departments. 
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Appendix 7.5: Answers in table (as filled in by the district coordinator) 
Question Mzinyathini 
Irrigation Scheme 
EU Funded 
Conservation 
Agriculture (seeds 
and goats) 
Who funded the project? (if 
multiple donors, what % was 
funded from each) 
EU EU 
If the project lasted multiple 
years, was funding dependant 
on year end reports/results? 
Performance was 
critical for release of 
funding 
Performance was 
critical for release of 
funding( Same 
program with 
Umzinyathini) 
Did such requirements hinder 
project operations? If so, in 
what way? 
Not at all because 
implementation was 
done well 
Not at all because 
implementation was 
done well 
How much feedback from the 
beneficiaries was reported 
back to the donors? Were they 
only interested in their own 
evaluation criteria? 
Our reports and their 
own Evaluation 
Our reports and their 
own Evaluation 
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Were there group meetings, 
committees, etc. from the area 
who contributed to needs 
assessments?  E.g. Who 
decided what the project was 
going to be, where it was going 
to be, and how it was going to 
be planned? 
The Project 
Management 
Committee provided 
Information during 
needs assessment. 
The area assessment 
results determined 
the selection of the 
project location  and 
its management. Eg 
dilapidated canal 
and project 
proximity to 
Mawabeni Business 
Centre for marketing 
of produce once the 
project becomes 
vibrant. 
The Project 
Management 
Committee provided 
Information during 
needs assessment. 
The area assessment 
results determined 
the selection of the 
project location  and 
its management. Eg 
dilapidated canal and 
project proximity to 
Mawabeni Business 
Centre for marketing 
of produce once the 
project becomes 
vibrant. 
How many people were 
involved in giving input 
during the assessing and 
planning stages? 
4 4 
Did the community (members 
of the community, council, 
local leaders, etc.) request that 
you come to do a project 
there, or did WV make the 
initial contact? 
Project Requested as 
it was on RDC plan 
but without Funding 
Project Requested as 
it was on RDC plan 
but without Funding 
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Were there children involved 
at all in discussions…e.g. how 
does this project tie in with the 
Child Well-being goals of 
WV? 
Not at all  Not at all  
How many indirect 
beneficiaries were targeted?  
How many indirect 
beneficiaries were actually 
reached (based on project 
evaluations)? 
150 Beneficiaries 10 000 
How were the beneficiaries 
selected? 
Households  with a 
garden plot in the 
Scheme 
No cattle, Elderly, 
Those with orphans 
What criteria (specifically) 
determine who is most 
vulnerable?  E.g. Is there an 
official age that is considered 
"elderly", or is there a 
number of children in the 
household that would classify 
a family as most vulnerable? 
Elderly 65+ yrs. 
Child Headed 
Families, Families 
having 2 or more 
orphans and do not 
have a stable Income 
Elderly 65+ yrs. 
Child Headed 
Families, Families 
having 2 or more 
orphans and do not 
have a stable Income 
What else was involved in the 
selection process? 
Those who do not 
have cattle at all 
Those with land 
exceeding 0.5 
hectares 
What daily M&E activities 
were carried out? 
Project Site 
Monitoring,  
Complaints from 
beneficiaries 
Project Site 
Monitoring,  
Complaints from 
beneficiaries 
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What weekly M&E activities 
were carried out? 
Project Site 
Monitoring,  
Complaints from 
beneficiaries. 
Project Site 
Monitoring,  
Complaints from 
beneficiaries. 
What monthly M&E activities 
were carried out? 
Project Site 
Monitoring,  
Complaints from 
beneficiaries. 
Indicator Tracking 
Table to see monthly 
achievements 
against set targets 
Project Site 
Monitoring,  
Complaints from 
beneficiaries. 
What quarterly M&E 
activities were carried out? 
Quarterly reports, 
and Stakeholder 
visits 
Quarterly reports, 
and Stakeholder 
visits 
What annual M&E activities 
were carried out? 
Mid Term planning 
and Review 
meetings 
Mid Term planning 
and Review 
meetings 
Were there committees, focus 
groups, local leaders, etc. who 
were responsible for 
monitoring? 
Irrigation 
Committee 
Focus Group 
Discussions 
How were monitoring results 
reported back to World 
Vision? 
Reports and Feed 
back Meetings 
Reports and Feed 
back Meetings 
What complaints and 
feedback mechanisms were in 
place? 
Help Desk Help Desk 
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Would it have been easy for 
someone to give negative 
feedback? 
Yes Yes 
Were there disagreements 
among the beneficiaries about 
what was or wasn't working 
(what they liked or disliked 
about the project)? 
At Times but not 
always 
At Times but not 
always 
Will there be a post project 
evaluation, for example, an 
evaluation that takes place 5 
or 10 years after WV exits the 
project area? If so, will the 
field workers who were 
originally involved also be 
involved in this post-project 
evaluation? 
Not at all because 
implementation was 
done well 
Not at all because 
implementation was 
done well 
Is the project finished?     
What was the intended length 
of the project? 
3 years 3 years 
What was the actual length of 
the project? 
3  years 3 years 
Was there a stop or a break at 
any time during the project 
progress? Please explain what 
happened. 
No No 
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Did the project achieve its 
intended goals? Why or why 
not? 
Yes, Canals were 
rehabilitated and 
people watered their 
vegetables 
Yes, This was shown 
by the increase in 
adoption of the 
project by even non 
beneficiaries 
Would you consider the 
project a success? Why or why 
not? 
It was a success as 
they are doing 
vegetable farming 
again 
Yes, This was shown 
by the increase in 
adoption of the 
project by even non 
beneficiaries 
How many Word Vision 
employees were directly and 
indirectly involved in the 
project? 
7 7 
How often did a WV employee 
go to the project site? 
Twice a week 3 
What was the government 
involvement in the project?  
E.g. Was Agritex involved at 
all? What were they 
responsible for? 
Agritex Agritex 
What happened to the project 
in the time leading up to 
elections? Was it put on hold? 
Was there no difference? 
Direct Interaction 
with groups of 
people was 
discouraged 
Trainings were  
discouraged 
What, if anything, did the 
community contribute toward 
this project? (e.g. did the 
community contribute labor, 
materials, etc.) 
Labour for 
construction of the 
canals and Toilets, 
Fencing of the 
Scheme 
Labour for digging 
Holes and general 
crop management 
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Did WV outsource any 
expertise to contract 
companies (e.g. did WV hire 
an engineer to design the 
irrigation scheme)? 
Yes,  Engineers 
were outsourced 
from Gwanda 
No 
Did this project involve any 
efforts to build local 
government capacities such 
that they will be able to 
provide better services in the 
future? If so, please describe 
them. 
Leadership, conflict 
resolution trainings. 
Best practices in 
crop production 
done by Agritex, 
Asset Management 
Trainings 
Training of 
Government line 
ministry eg 
AGRITEX and 
Training of 
beneficiaries 
 
Question Mzinyathini 
Poultry Project 
FAO Rabbit and 
Guinea Fowl 
Project 
FAO 
Conservation 
Agriculture 
Project 
Who funded the 
project? (if multiple 
donors, what % was 
funded from each) 
FAO with funds 
coming from EU 
FAO with funds 
coming from EU 
FAO with 
funds coming 
from EU 
If the project lasted 
multiple years, was 
funding dependant on 
year end 
reports/results? 
3 months Program  3 months program 6 months 
Program 
Did such requirements 
hinder project 
operations? If so, in 
what way? 
Not Applicable Not Applicable Not 
Applicable 
201 
How much feedback 
from the beneficiaries 
was reported back to 
the donors? Were they 
only interested in their 
own evaluation 
criteria? 
Check progress 
Poultry records, 
WV reports and 
Own Evaluation 
and site monitoring 
Check progress 
Poultry records, WV 
reports and Own 
Evaluation and site 
monitoring 
Check 
progress 
Poultry 
records, WV 
reports and 
Own 
Evaluation 
and site 
monitoring 
Were there group 
meetings, committees, 
etc. from the area who 
contributed to needs 
assessments?  E.g. 
Who decided what the 
project was going to 
be, where it was going 
to be and how it was 
going to be planned? 
The Project 
Management 
Committee 
provided 
Information during 
needs assessment. 
The area 
assessment results 
determined the 
selection of the 
project location 
and its 
management. Eg 
dilapidated canal 
and project 
proximity to 
Mawabeni 
Business Centre for 
marketing of 
produce once the 
project becomes 
vibrant. 
The Project 
Management 
Committee provided 
Information during 
needs assessment. 
The area assessment 
results determined 
the selection of the 
project location and 
its management. Eg 
dilapidated canal and 
project proximity to 
Mawabeni Business 
Centre for marketing 
of produce once the 
project becomes 
vibrant. 
The Project 
Management 
Committee 
provided 
Information 
during needs 
assessment. 
The area 
assessment 
results 
determined 
the selection 
of the project 
location and 
its 
management. 
Eg dilapidated 
canal and 
project 
proximity to 
Mawabeni 
Business 
202 
Centre for 
marketing of 
produce once 
the project 
becomes 
vibrant. 
How many people 
were involved in giving 
input during the 
assessing and planning 
stages? 
4 4 4 
Did the community 
(members of the 
community, council, 
local leaders, etc.) 
request that you come 
to do a project there, 
or did WV make the 
initial contact? 
WV Initiative to 
supplement the 
Umzinyathini 
Irrigation Project 
WV Initiative to 
supplement the 
Umzinyathini 
Irrigation Project 
WV Initiative 
to supplement 
the 
Umzinyathini 
Irrigation 
Project 
Were there children 
involved at all in 
discussions…e.g. how 
does this project tie in 
with the Child Well-
Not at all  Not at all  Not at all  
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being goals of WV? 
How many indirect 
beneficiaries were 
targeted? How many 
indirect beneficiaries 
were actually reached 
(based on project 
evaluations)? 
500     
How were the 
beneficiaries selected? 
80 irrigation 
Beneficiaries and 
20 who were 
providing labour to 
the Irrigation 
Farmers 
Elderly, Those with 
orphans 
Those with 
cattle but no 
agric Inputs 
What criteria 
(specifically) 
determine who is most 
vulnerable? E.g. Is 
there an official age 
that is considered 
"elderly", or is there a 
number of children in 
the household that 
would classify a family 
as most vulnerable? 
Elderly 65+ yrs. 
Child Headed 
Families, Families 
having 2 or more 
orphans and do not 
have a stable 
Income 
Elderly 65+ yrs. 
Child Headed 
Families, Families 
having 2 or more 
orphans and do not 
have a stable Income 
Elderly 65+ 
yrs. Child 
Headed 
Families, 
Families 
having 2 or 
more orphans 
and do not 
have a stable 
Income 
What else was involved 
in the selection 
Not Applicable Not Applicable Not 
Applicable 
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process? 
What daily M&E 
activities were carried 
out? 
      
What weekly M&E 
activities were carried 
out? 
      
What monthly M&E 
activities were carried 
out? 
Project Site 
Monitoring,  
Complaints from 
beneficiaries. 
    
Note: The questions left out of the second table were asked but were not answered (their 
boxes were left blank in the table). 
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Appendix 8: Guiding Questions for Interviews with World Vision Project 
Beneficiaries located in Communal Areas in Umzingwane District 
1. Have you heard of World Vision? 
2. What is this project?  Please describe it. 
3. Whose owns this project? 
4. When did you hear about doing this? 
5. Who told you about it / How did you hear about it? 
6. What have you done to carry out this project? 
7. Did anyone ask you to do this project? 
8. If yes, who asked you? 
9. How did they ask? (e.g. did they ask a large group for volunteers, or come to you 
individually) 
10. Do you think the project is good? 
11. Why or why not? 
12. How does the project help you? 
13. Do you think it will last? 
14. Why or why not? 
15. Who has helped and supported you the most in this project? 
16. Where did these materials come from? 
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Appendix 9: Information Table Distributed to Umzingwane Agritex Officers 
Project  
Ward #  
Date Started  
Date Finished  
Number of Beneficiaries  
Description of inputs from 
World Vision 
 
Number of beneficiaries 
who are sustaining their 
project 
 
Number of beneficiaries 
who struggle or have failed 
to sustain their project and 
reasons why 
 
Does World Vision still 
come to monitor this 
project? 
 
Will World Vision provide 
more inputs for this project?  
If so, what other inputs will 
be provided? 
 
Any other comments?  
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Appendix 10: Returned Information Tables (Filled in by Ward-level Agritex 
Officers) 
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Appendix 11 Umzingwane District Agritex Data Charts 
Appendix 11.1 Cereal Production for the 2012/2013 Season 
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Appendix 11.2 Crop Production and Rainfall from Seasons 1999/2000 to 2009/2010 
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Appendix 11.3 Maize Yields per Hectare and Total Production Seasons 1999/2000 to 
2008/2009   
 
213 
 
 
